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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the methods used to introduce and sustain change to help 
answer the reasons why some organizations are successful at adapting and some are not.  
If there is agreement on the necessity to adapt an organization for improved performance, 
there may be some identifying features of successfully adapted organizations that could 
assist those still trying or about to embark.  In order to affect beneficial change, strategies 
to promote transformations must recognize the political, economic, and social issues, as 
well as the capabilities of the organizations.  A greater understanding of the instigators 
and barriers to lasting change provides a helpful guide to develop policy initiatives that 
incorporate these considerations and result in agreements or operations with more 
cooperative stakeholders. 
The research method used in this thesis was four separate case studies conducted in 
parallel.  The organizations selected for these case studies produce, or manage the 
delivery of, a technically complex good or service.  The methods used included 
interviews of key employees using a standard questionnaire format to facilitate data 
categorization and a review of any archival material that may have been made available. 
The trends in the data suggest that more commitment from lower level leadership and a 
wider availability of best practice documentation corresponds to less regression to former 
practices.  More formal training led to wider diffusion in these case studies, but the 
availability of documentation did not correspond to greater diffusion or adoption of the 
practices.  However, better availability of documentation did correspond to less 
regression.  The strongest defenses against regression were not supporting the old process 
or making permanent or semi-permanent physical changes to the work area. 
The recommendations centered on management policies, providing incentives, and 
creating organizational structures to promote initiatives and their diffusion throughout the 
organization, reduce regression, and  reconcile resistance to change.  They include using 
small, organic change offices in business areas that do not have a history of mature 
change practices to use as models, setting aside a percentage of realized savings for 
human resources investment, and time-in-grade provisions for management positions to 
allow for greater continuity. 
 
Thesis Supervisor:  Eric Rebentisch, PhD. 
Title:  Research Associate, Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development
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1.0 Background and Motivation 
 
In today’s environment of rapid technological change, firms and non-business 
organizations are challenged to respond effectively or risk losing competitive advantage, 
market share, or public confidence.  Technological advances and global competition are 
providing the impetus for changes at unprecedented frequencies.  The stress placed on 
flexible and evolving management practices in this environment is significant.  Despite 
the differing motivations of business and public service, common features exist in how 
they react to change as organizations.  The root commonality is that organizations consist 
of people and a study of organizational change involves both psychosocial and economic 
perspectives. 
 
A realistic view of the effects of policy in the technical arena must account for how 
organizations respond to changing environments.  These pressures might be political, 
economic, or social.  In order to affect beneficial change, strategies to promote 
transformations must recognize these issues, as well as the capabilities of the 
organizations.  A greater understanding of the instigators and barriers to lasting change 
would provide a helpful guide to develop policy initiatives that incorporate these 
considerations and result in agreements or operations with more cooperative 
stakeholders. 
  
In business, many change initiatives and methodological philosophies have been 
promoted in the last half-century.  The non-profit sector has also emulated many of these 
initiatives, since profit maximization is not the only possible goal to which an 
organization may aspire.  More efficient provision of services and customer satisfaction 
are also motivators for organizational change. 
 
1.1 Overview and Problem Definition – Why Adaptation and Change are Important 
in Aerospace Companies 
 
The aerospace industry has embraced many of the change initiatives that have been 
traditionally associated with the automotive industry and large-scale manufacturing.  
Shrinking defense and space program budgets and losses in the airline industry have 
resulted in company consolidations, greater competition for a smaller number of 
programs or customers, and smaller production runs.  Aerospace companies are also 
managing a larger supplier base as they outsource non-core competencies and become 
system integrators by deciding what they will manufacture internally and what they will 
buy from suppliers.  In cooperation with many of their customers, aerospace companies 
have been motivated to adopt productivity enhancing initiatives in an attempt to reduce 
costs and retain or expand markets. 
 
Many change initiatives were brought to the forefront by Japanese management practices.  
These initiatives may come under the aegis of quality circles, Total Quality Management, 
Lean Thinking, Six Sigma, 10X, or other programs related to Japanese management 
practices or systems dynamics views of corporate processes.  Some of these ideas were 
initially introduced into Japan by Deming, an American.  As global competition emerged, 
 13 
American firms could no longer rest on the laurels of their achievements of the first half 
of the century and looked to the success of Japanese manufacturing, particularly the 
Toyota Company, for ways to improve productivity.  Current global competition requires 
flexibility and absorption of principles from various cultures. 
 
Most major firms have recognized the need to change effectively and have embraced 
these philosophies to varying degrees.  Some do not seem to truly internalize these 
changes, and as soon as the change effort loses favor, or is replaced by a different 
program, the fledgling changes may be discarded and the organization reverts to its 
previous practices. 
 
The aerospace sector has traditionally been seen as more of a craft industry than a mass 
production industry for some of its products.  Aircraft and spacecraft are not produced in 
as large a number as many other goods, such as automobiles, and are very complex 
systems when characterized by the engineering, material, and safety considerations that 
are required in their design, manufacture, and testing.  These differences have provided a 
challenge to the acceptance of change initiatives in these companies because of the 
existing practices and culture and the perception that initiatives that are useful for mass 
produced items will not apply to specialized and technologically advanced or highly 
complex systems. 
  
The effectiveness and staying power of organizational change mechanisms have a 
profound effect on the strength and productivity of firms, the capabilities of 
governmental organizations, and the economies and societies that depend upon them.  
The health of the aerospace industry is important for the national security and economic 
strength of the United States, so the successful adoption of initiatives which promote 
improved manufacturing and business practices is especially critical.  Since various 
change philosophies have been attempted, there are numerous examples of successes, 
partial successes, and failures.  Failures in this sense would refer to an inability to 
incorporate the proposed changes in a permanent manner, which would result in a return 
to previous inefficient practices. 
 
In light of the proliferation of these programs and the length of time they have been 
practiced, significant and useful observations can be made about how change initiatives 
are implemented and sustained.  Since current global competition requires flexible and 
adaptable management practices, these external observations of the instigators and 
barriers to lasting, institutional change would be useful for firms attempting to maintain 
their competitive positions. 
 
An examination of the methods used to introduce and sustain change would help to 
answer the reasons why some organizations are successful and some are not.  If there is 
agreement on the necessity to adapt an organization for improved performance, there may 
be some identifying features of successfully adapted organizations that could assist those 
still trying or about to embark. 
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This is not a study of best practices that constitute the nature what the organization 
wishes to become.  The methods and structure of the organization and how these affect its 
ability to adopt and sustain best practices and change its culture is the focus of this 
research.  The dynamic interrelationships amongst different parts of an organization and 
its financial and political environment may illustrate the struggles, illuminate the barriers 
faced, and point to ways to address these issues in either business practice or policy 
development. 
 
1.2 Key Research Questions 
Questions still remain as to the efficacy of change initiatives and how particular 
companies are able to maintain their emphasis on change.  These include the following: 
• How are initiatives introduced and implemented? 
Aspects of this problem include the mechanisms by which organizations decide 
change is necessary and choose a philosophy to follow or emulate.  What 
functional part of the organization acts as a promoter and how is the organization 
as a whole structured with regard to its eventual achievement of its stated goals? 
• How do organizations actually attain senior management endorsement as well 
as employee cooperation and empowerment? 
Are the particular people entrusted to implement or promote change placed in 
influential positions?  To what extent are the job security concerns of employees 
allayed?  Does management recognize differences in performance when change 
initiatives are attempted but not fully incorporated into the organization’s culture 
and when they are truly successful? 
• What are the barriers to complete and lasting change in large, complex 
organizations? 
What is the nature of misunderstandings between the professed long-term goals of 
upper management and the perception by operational members of the 
organization?  Is communication enough to seal the breach?  How do 
organizations deploy resource savings from change efforts?  If change is 
considered beneficial in the current environment, why is it sometimes so difficult 
for large organizations, which have been successful at their endeavors in the past, 
to change even in their best interests? 
• In organizations with a history of change initiatives, what mechanisms to 
maintain momentum are evident? 
Are the change initiatives self-reinforcing?  Are limiting factors that counteract 
initial advances recognized?  Are fundamental or only symptomatic causes in the 
system identified and addressed?  How is the evolution through multiple change 
initiatives or programs characterized? 
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2.0 Literature Review 
 
The subject of organizational change has received numerous treatments from 
behaviorists, economists, and management theorists.  There has been much discussion 
about organizational decision-making, methods to implement changes and the 
effectiveness of these methods, barriers to change and to optimal problem solving, and 
the effects of technological innovation on organizational change.  Most of this literature 
is predicated on the definition of a firm as an organization, since the strong economic 
motivation for change, in many instances, has put the business firm in the center of these 
discussions; however, these behaviors can be extended to cover many different types of 
organizations.  Since organizations comprise individuals, I also found it helpful to 
examine literature about how individuals adopt changes. 
 
2.1 Behavioral Models of Organizations and Communities 
 
Allison adopts the concepts of routines and standard behavioral patterns in large complex 
organizations in his Organizational Process Model.1  In this model, he looks at 
governmental actions by viewing governments as a collection of quasi-independent 
organizations with different primary responsibilities.  Rather than acting as a monolithic, 
rational, maximizing decision-maker, governments perform complex routines defined by 
the programs within the organization’s repertoire. 
 
He also uses the concept of “bounded rationality” as developed by Simon.  Simon 
defined limits to rationality encompassed within the skills, values, and knowledge of the 
decision-maker.2  This rests on a principle of efficiency defined by a rational 
maximization of goal attainment.  The limits to this rationality may be described by the 
amount of knowledge a human can accumulate and also apply, the ability to assimilate 
information, and distortions in communication. 
 
Allison then continued by explaining how decision-makers simplify the process in five 
ways, given the limit to the alternatives that humans can comprehend in a complex 
problem.  The problems are factored so that separate pieces of the problem are assigned 
to separate organizational units.  Satisficing becomes the goal rather than optimization or 
maximization when an alternative is found that is good enough.  Satisficing allows a 
simplified search because every possible alternative is not considered.  The search order 
is also a significant indicator of which alternative will be chosen.  Uncertainty avoidance 
is accomplished by quick corrective action rather than evaluating the probability of all 
outcomes.  Repertoires of existing programs or routines provide the choices for 
organizational action. 
 
                                                 
1 Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision, (Boston:  Little, Brown, and Company, 1971) 
2 Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior, 2nd Edition, A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organizations, (Toronto:  Collier-MacMillan, Canada, 1945, 
1968) 
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In this model, the choices available to government leaders exist in the repertoires of its 
component organizations.  These repertoires consist of rehearsed standard operating 
procedures, which is how the organizations can coordinate complex actions.  Once again, 
the goals of a particular organization are defined by bargaining amongst different 
interests within the organization.  Difficult trade-offs are not made, as problems are 
addressed sequentially.  In a governmental or military situation, these different goals and 
routines are illustrated by budget requests and plans for standard combat scenarios. 
 
Organizational learning occurs as new situations are faced.  However, significant change 
does not occur unless the organizations are faced with major environmental shifts.  
Leaders can use excess budget funds to effect change.  Additionally, a budget shortfall or 
a severe performance failure may prompt fundamental change. 
 
Government leaders exercise control by deciding which repertoires are used where and at 
what time.    A good predictor of how an organization will act is its prior actions.  The 
standard operating procedures do not provide flexibility in different circumstances; 
therefore, change is incremental, as new procedures are adapted from old ones.  In 
addition, organizational momentum may carry operations past its beneficial lifespan.  
Since organizations will rarely depart from their routines, direction which contradicts 
organizational goals, requires coordination with other organizations, or requires tasks 
other than those contained in the organizational repertoire will not be accomplished as the 
leader intended. 
  
Cyert and March use the concepts of organizational goals, expectations, and choices to 
describe their behavioral theory of the firm.3  They posit that a firm may contain many 
different types of goals including market share, sales, and production, not only profit.  
These goals may be contradictory in different parts of the firm and, therefore, lead to 
unresolved conflict.  The sequential manner in which goals are addressed allows the firms 
to make decisions in the presence of conflicting goals. 
 
Organizational expectations affect decisions by tempering the amount and kind of 
information available to decision-makers, thereby affecting search patterns and the 
relative strengths of various options.  Information about relevant choices are not simply 
equally available for those who wish to find it.  The conflicting goals of the firm’s 
subunits determine the kind of information that is presented. 
 
The way in which firms implement decisions conforms to standard operating procedures 
already developed in the firm’s practices.  The choice taken by the firm will tend to 
satisfy the goals agreed upon by a coalition of subunits.  Since the search is motivated by 
a problem, the search will begin in the neighborhood of the problem symptoms and then 
proceed to an alternative near the first solution, if that one is lacking. 
 
                                                 
3 Cyert, Richard M. and March, James G., A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, (New Jersey:  
Prentice-Hall, 1963, 1992) 
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Any change initiative in an organization must account for these behavioral 
characteristics.  Realistic expectations of what will be accepted must be based on an 
understanding of what information is available and how decision-makers use this 
information to search for alternatives, categorize options, and implement solutions. 
 
In an attempt to avoid uncertainty, organizations will gather feedback from the effects of 
their decisions and negotiate with the environment to reduce uncertainty.  Examples of 
these negotiated environments are trade associations and industry common practices as 
applied to external environments, and budgets that necessarily define the internal 
environment.  As organizations adapt by changing search, decision, and goal formulation 
rules, they become learning organizations.  The theory of Cyert and March has 
contributed to other studies that attempt to predict and understand the decision outcomes 
of firms, given that firms operate in a manner consistent with behavioral theories. 
 
The idea of a firm as an organization was expanded in Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary 
theory.4  They dismiss the orthodox view used in most economic theory that firms act 
with perfect information to maximize profits or other measures of firm success.  The 
characteristics of the parameter that is maximized would then determine the decision 
rules used to achieve the maximization.  They disapprove of the orthodox theory as a 
basis for conducting any real understanding of the internal dynamics of the firm as it 
undergoes change in response to market conditions or other impulses.  They support the 
concept of “bounded rationality”, whereby managers make decisions without perfect 
information and not necessarily to the economic optimum.  Despite their attempt to 
introduce some realism into the explanation of how economic decisions are made, the 
orthodox theory still holds sway, even in advanced microeconomics courses. 
 
Their evolutionary theory parallels the constructs of biological evolution to describe how 
organizations change.  They view the standard operating procedures, or routines, as the 
genetic material that is passed to future manifestations of the organizations that have 
either been changed or replicated.  The routines are a form of memory storage and are 
influenced by the individual skills and knowledge of the members of the organizations, 
much of it tacit.  Organizations use routine functions in order to maintain a truce amongst 
conflicting internal goals.  Therefore, the choices available to the firm are actually very 
narrow and their actions can be predicted by the routinized behavior observed in the past.  
Even when attempting a change, the heuristics of the firm will dictate how the strategy 
develops.  Drastic or extreme changes will probably not be easily adopted. 
 
Anderson and Tushman examine technological change and provide a cyclical model to 
describe technological change using an historical study of the flat glass, container glass, 
cement, and minicomputers industries.5  Their model is influenced by the evolutionary 
                                                 
4 Nelson, Richard R. and Winter, Sidney G., An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change, (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1982) 
5 Anderson, Philip and Tushman, Michael L., “Technological Discontinuities and 
Dominant Designs:  A Cyclical Model of Technological Change”, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 35, Issue 4, December, 1990 
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theory groundwork provided by Nelson and Winter, as they describe a process of 
variation, selection, and retention. 
 
In their model, a technological discontinuity, in which new innovations are significantly 
different than the existing technology, is followed by an era of ferment.  The 
discontinuity expands the frontier by fundamentally changing the process, not the scale.  
Discontinuities that are competence-enhancing build upon the current body of 
knowledge.  Those that are competence-destroying cause certain skills to become 
obsolete.  Eventually a dominant design emerges and becomes the industry standard.  
Then incremental change and improvements, focusing on lower cost and design 
differentiation, take place until a new technological discontinuity occurs. 
 
Their results show that there are a significant number of new designs introduced during 
eras of ferment as compared with eras of incremental change, and eras of ferment were 
significantly longer for competence-destroying discontinuities.  Sales peak after a 
dominant design emerges due to increased demand; however, a discontinuity itself never 
becomes the dominant design.  Dominant designs were also not on the technical frontier.  
Competence-enhancing discontinuities tend to be supported by industry incumbents, but 
there was no clear correlation between competency-destroying discontinuities and 
newcomer introduction.  They surmise that newcomers may be necessary to initiate the 
destruction of old ways of thinking, but institutional experience may still be required.  
Their findings also showed that most of the technological progress occurs in the 
discontinuity and not during the era of incremental change. 
 
Anderson and Tushman raised further questions about how the sociological and 
economic aspects of organizations affect the selection of a dominant design and what 
characterizes companies that pioneer industry standards.  They also questioned the 
recurring effect technological cycles might have on organizational evolution.  They also 
stress the organization’s ability to create networks and coalitions to maintain a variety of 
competencies and exploit technological capabilities in order to affect industry standards. 
 
It has already been established that organizations must become learning organizations in 
order to grow and effectively change when necessary.  Schein explains how companies 
should treat organizational learning as a change process and create parallel systems.6  
Organizational slack is required in order to create parallel systems in which employees 
can reflect and practice so that they can reframe their thinking and test new behaviors.  
These parallel systems are often created with organizational slack as pilot or experimental 
programs.  It is also necessary to locate the parallel system near the positions of power 
and, in some cases, the CEO is the initial learner.  Parallel systems located in the middle 
of the power structure may be threatening to upper management unless higher levels can 
be involved in some way.  Other ways of gaining support are to use consultants or 
organizational sets consisting of other learning companies.  Consortia can provide new 
                                                 
6 Schein, Edgar H., “Learning Consortia:  How to Create Parallel Learning Systems for 
Organization Sets”, Society for Organizational Learning online working paper, August, 
1995 
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outlooks from those not entrenched in your own corporate culture and can expose 
learners to researchers and coaches. 
 
Much of these works have identified challenges to organizations in recognizing, 
formulating, and accepting change.  They summarize the dilemma faced by managers and 
other employees in complex organizations, who may individually see the need for 
improvement, but are stymied by the nature in which organizations behave.  The notions 
of bounded rationality and programmed routines tend to limit the available alternatives an 
organization can follow.  Understanding how organizations behave can clarify the need 
for methods by which organizations can introduce and implement change. 
 
In his book Diffusion of Innovations7, Everett Rogers examines the way in which an 
innovation is communicated within a social system and is diffused from its source to the 
adopters.  He recognized the presence of a common interest in the diffusion of 
innovations in the research traditions of anthropology, early sociology, rural sociology, 
education, industry, and medical sociology.  He found that those within these different 
research traditions were unaware of the applicability of studies done in each others' areas 
that could contribute to a more general theory of the adoption and diffusion of 
innovations.  He used studies from the adoption of agricultural technology and 
innovations, the adoption of new prescription drugs by physicians, and the adoption of 
innovations in developing societies to bolster his arguments. 
 
He defined an adoption process and the characteristics of those involved in the process.  
He made the distinction between adoption as an individual decision and the process of 
diffusion occurring among the adopters.  This has some bearing on company or 
organizational initiatives, even though adoption here refers to an individual choice, 
whereas company leadership generally directs that a particular initiative be used.  He 
used learning theory to begin to explain how innovations are adopted by individuals.  
Learning requires continued reinforcement of response to stimuli.  Adoption is a process 
of learning, deciding, and acting over a period of time.  Education level was also 
correlated with rational and discriminating decision-making. 
 
Rogers defined five stages in the adoption process and five adopter categories to describe 
individuals.  The five stages are awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption.  The 
adopter categories are innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and 
laggards.  The adopter categories are defined by individual characteristics, modes of 
communication, and social relationships.  Each adopter category, in the order listed 
above, displays significant characteristics described as venturesome, respect, deliberate, 
skeptical, and tradition.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the adoption process and is adapted from 
Rogers' diagram8. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations, (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 
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8 Ibid. 1, Figure 11-1, page 306 
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Identity of Potential 
Adopter: 
1. Security/anxiety 
2. Values 
3. Mental ability 
4. Social Status 
5. Cosmopolitenss 
6. Opinion leadership 
Perceptions: 
1. Social System 
Norms on 
Innovativeness 
2. Economic 
Constraints and 
Incentives 
3. Characteristics of 
the business to which 
innovation applies 
Adoption Process 
Information Sources: 
1. Cosmopoliteness 
2. Personal or Impersonal 
Awareness   Interest   Evaluation   Trial   
Adoption 
Adoption 
Rejection 
Continued
Adoption
Discontinuance 
Later
Adoption
Continued
Nonadoption
Figure 2.1:  The Adoption Process 
Adapted from Diffusion of Innovations by Everett M. Rogers 
 
Based upon the studies he reviewed, he made generalizations about the diffusion of 
innovations and ideas, the roles of opinion leaders and change agents, and means of 
communication.  Opinion leaders are crucial to the diffusion of innovations and ideas.  
There may be opinion leaders in several adopter categories.  Opinion leaders are 
important because personal influence from peers is important in the evaluation stage and 
for later adopters.  They provide reinforcement and validation.  Although opinion leaders 
may often be of a higher social status than their followers, too wide a difference in social 
status can be a barrier to diffusion. 
 
The characteristics of the innovation as perceived by potential adopters is often more 
important than the benefits that experts might attach to the innovation.  Innovations with 
material benefits that are visible and easily communicated are more easily diffused than 
non-material innovations or ideas.  There is also an interaction affect that tends to 
increase adoption as more people in a social system become adopters and, therefore, 
interact with those who have not yet adopted. 
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A change agent who is trying to promote an innovation is usually an outsider to the social 
system.  This may mean that they lack accountability and do not share in the risk that 
adopters face.  That may not be true in commercial companies where the official change 
agents responsible for implementing the initiative may also have similar incentives to 
others in management and act in the interest of company profitability.  Behavioral 
changes require effort, but a change agent may overdo his efforts at promotion because at 
some point word-of-mouth becomes more influential to the spread of an idea.  Because 
cultural values and past experiences affect how people perceive innovations, the change 
agent should try to change the norms of the social system rather than promote single 
innovations as separate entities.  They must also be aware of the needs of the system and 
promote competence so that potential adopters can better evaluate ideas.  . 
 
One of Rogers' generalizations was that impersonal information sources, such as mass 
media, are more important in the awareness stage, but that personal contacts are most 
important during the evaluation stage.  Personal communications are more influential 
because of the selective exposure, perception, and retention displayed by individuals to 
information they receive.  Reception to new ideas is subject to selective exposure because 
individuals tend to seek information or sources that coincide with their own ideas and 
opinions.  Some people are marginal to different adopter categories so they can bridge the 
gap or diffusion would occur too slowly.  He also found that since adoption follows the 
trial stage, one way to speed adoption would be to provide incentives for trial of the 
innovation.  The adoption to trial phase has been found to be longer for early adopters 
than for later adopters because early adopters take greater risks and the increased time 
they spend may provide more confidence to later adopters to adopt more rapidly. 
 
In their work concerning organizational learning contained in a resource book for how to 
achieve a learning organization, Senge, et al.9, spoke about the role of leadership in 
organizational change.  They believe that leadership comes from the creative tension 
formed by people when they truthfully articulate their current reality and vision for the 
future.  They make a distinction between the myth of leader-heroes and what they call 
leadership communities.  The myth of the hero-CEO, who will come in and transform an 
organization from the top using his or her superior vision and special skills and influence, 
is actually a distorted view.  The idea that an overpowering leader will bring about 
change runs counter to the current views that empowerment throughout the organization 
is a better way to cultivate change and  develop adaptive behavior, and that real and 
lasting change must come from diverse sources.  An overbearing, forceful leader may be 
able to demand compliance, but will be unable to change internal values, because those 
must be formulated voluntarily.  In addition, the myth that managers must only present 
solutions and not problems hinders practices that can promote learning in teams. 
 
In contrast, leadership communities consist of local line leaders, network leaders, and 
executive leaders.  Local line leaders have direct impact on and accountability for the 
                                                 
9 Senge, Peter; Kleiner, Art; Roberts, Charlotte; Ross, Richard; Roth, George; Smith, 
Bryan, The Dance of Change, The Challenges to Sustaining Momentum in Learning 
Organizations, (New York, Doubleday, 1999) 
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results of an initiative.  Network leaders use their contacts outside of the business unit to 
help to diffuse the change across the entire organization.  Executive leaders must take a 
long-term view, provide infrastructure support for change, and lead by example, as well 
as recognizing that traditional models and their own behaviors may be obstacles to 
change.  Senge, et al. describe this using an ecological model to show that each type of 
leader needs the other types in order for the whole to be effective so that a diversity of 
leadership can interact to sustain change. 
 
They recognized that many change initiatives are not successful because the leaders 
concentrate mainly on growth mechanisms and not on the limiting mechanisms that are 
barriers to change.  They name ten challenges to initiating and sustaining change.  These 
are lack of time and guidance, justifying the relevance of change, management clarity, 
fear and anxiety, misunderstandings about success measures, groups that feel they're 
misunderstood, governance structure, diffusion, and questions about the strategy and 
direction of the organization.  Many of these challenges highlight the cynicism and 
distrust that people feel toward the various change initiatives that have been promoted in 
their organizations. 
 
2.2 Organizational Structure and Complexity 
 
The behavioral aspects discussed above are evident in the view of firms as complex 
organizations.  A paper by Wang and von Tunzelmann investigated how complexity in 
organizations affects the firm’s structure and management.10  They define complexity in 
the two dimensions of depth and breadth.  Depth refers to analytical sophistication and 
breadth describes a range of heterogeneous areas.  Firms may face complexities of 
technology, markets, production processes, administration, or products.  They examine 
how complexities across functional areas can be coactive or conflictual.  Coactive 
complexity, which requires integrative management, would have a positive effect on 
performance. 
 
The firm’s ability to perform complex functions rests with its body of knowledge.  The 
ability to address a large variety of different functions may come into conflict with its 
ability to concentrate advancement in particular components.  For instance, a product 
may contain cognitive complexity in its individual components as well as complexity in 
breadth by the difficulty of integrating them.  Different processes may require cognitive 
skills and interactive skills.  Wang and von Tunzelmann promote a dynamic approach to 
cope with shorter product lifecycles and the multidimensional complexity found in firms.  
They also note the concept of bounded rationality as a constraint on management’s ability 
to process information. 
 
A look at some methods for structuring flexible organizations that are responsive to 
change is in order.  One form of organizational structure for dealing with complex 
products is a project-based organization (PBO).  Hobday studied the effectiveness of a 
                                                 
10 Wang, Q. and von Tunzelmann, T., “Complexity and the functions of the firm:  breadth 
and depth”, Research Policy, 29 (2000) 805-818. 
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PBO versus a matrix organization in a case study of a European firm in which each 
structure was used at a different division to manage the development and production of 
complex products or systems (CoPS).11  In a PBO, the firm is organized by project rather 
than by functional units as in a matrix organization.  The PBO is used in order 
concentrate distinctive knowledge and skills toward a particular product and is more 
flexible and responsive to innovation.  Another feature of the PBO form is the high status 
and authority accorded to the project manager (PM), who otherwise must negotiate with 
functional managers for resources in a matrix organization.  The PBO is considered a 
better form to handle technical complexity, shortened product cycles, and changing 
consumer demands. 
 
CoPS are defined as high value, high technology, complex, and usually business to 
business products or services that are characterized by small production amounts, direct 
user involvement in development, and innovative designs or processes.  They may 
require expertise across many disciplines and are sometimes produced by alliances of 
firms with distinctive resources they can contribute to the project.  Many non-routine 
tasks or intelligent processes, an uncertain production environment, and changing user 
requirements also characterize CoPS. 
 
Hobday found that the PBO was better suited to CoPS management; however, there were 
certain disadvantages to a pure PBO form.  The company studied eventually changed its 
PBO division to a project-led organization to address these concerns.  Its functional 
matrix division was changed to a project matrix organization, where PM’s and functional 
managers have equal authority.  Although the pure PBO form was most effective at 
resource allocation, knowledge management, and design optimization for a CoPS, 
employees could not always benefit from cross-project learning and could not see clear 
career paths and learning silos that are evident in matrix organizations.  There were few 
incentives for senior staff to mentor new employees and pass on tacit knowledge.  This 
led to job insecurity and concern over the long-term effectiveness of the PBO in 
communicating lessons learned from project to project.  In the project-led organization, 
the PM’s could still exert authority over allocations for the project, but some weak 
functional lines existed to provide for organizational learning and to develop future 
leadership. 
 
Another form of organization to commercialize complex technologies is a network.   
Networks were a strategy also recommended by Anderson and Tushman.  Kash and 
Rycoft discuss the network strategies used in the evolution of six technologies in jet 
turbine blades, radiation therapy, cardio-imaging, audio compact disks, the 3.5 inch 
floppy disk, and Intel’s microprocessor.12  These self-organizing networks of various 
firms combine their resources of core capabilities and complementary assets and, through 
                                                 
11 Hobday, Mike, “The project-based organization:  an ideal form for managing complex 
products and systems?”, Research Policy, 29 (2000) 871-893. 
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their interactions, demonstrate a capacity to learn.  Trust and reciprocity play significant 
roles, since members of the networks must have confidence in shared information. 
 
Kash and Rycoft describe three patterns of innovation that may determine the trajectory 
of a network as technology evolves.  New technologies and scientific breakthroughs 
characterize the transformation pattern, which is usually chaotic and uncertain.  
Transition patterns are characterized by major advances in existing technology and 
innovations made with the current body of knowledge.  Continuous problem solving and 
exploitation of complementary capabilities are evident in the normal pattern. 
 
Networks allow adaptability to innovation within these patterns by sustaining leading 
edge scientific and technological knowledge, broadening learning, and providing 
flexibility by self-organization.  Networks can better react to four indicators of innovation 
pattern shifts.  These indicators include technical community disintegration, invaders as 
new competitors, new technology waves, and market or governmental policy climate 
change.  Networks can use a shared strategic intent and continuous trend monitoring and 
communication to develop trajectory roadmaps.  These roadmaps provide a forum for 
debate and a sense of direction to help integrate the network capabilities.  Since risk in 
technological innovation is an expected condition, the flexible structure of the network 
allows for experimental approaches and removes a hindrance to creative decision-
making. 
 
How companies respond to technological change is a predominant theme in the literature 
and is very timely, as current Internet business models now place a premium on 
exploiting innovations quickly.  Stringer offers a view on how large corporations can 
commercialize innovations made by small entrepreneurial organizations.13  Most large 
corporations are not radical innovators and corporate size has been shown to be inversely 
correlated with innovation. 
 
Once again, the biological parallel is made, as he describes how large companies are 
genetically conservative and unable to learn fast enough.  This is because industry leaders 
are more likely to adopt sustaining technologies that improve product performance over 
disruptive technologies, which may initially lead to customer dissatisfaction and loss of 
market share.  Bureaucracies also favor stability and incremental improvements.  In 
addition, internal research and development departments cannot adequately cover the 
entire range of emerging technologies.  The work environment in large corporations is 
not conducive to innovators, as they are high achievers and seek conditions where they 
have individual responsibility.  Large corporate environments are characterized by social 
skills reflecting an emphasis on power.  Smaller companies, by contrast, have lower 
investments in the status quo and are closer to the market, making them more responsive 
to the changes in demand.  They are also characterized by a higher concentration of 
innovative entrepreneurs. 
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Review, Vol. 42, Issue 4, Summer 2000 
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Stringer recommended nine strategies for large corporations to encourage and 
commercialize innovation.  Those changes within the organization include creating an 
innovation culture, hiring more creative people, establishing informal project 
laboratories, creating idea markets, and separating the organization into the core, 
traditional business and an entrepreneurial side.  Strategies that use resources from 
outside the organization include acquisitions, joint ventures, alliances, corporate 
venturing and a corporate venture capital fund, and emerging industry funds. 
 
An example of a change agent and a method for growing an internal coalition is 
described by Hamel in an article about how IBM capitalized on the Internet.14  An IBM 
programmer named David Grossman recognized many of the application opportunities of 
the Internet and brought it to the attention of those at headquarters when IBM content at 
the Lillehammer Olympics was being used by Sun Microsystems on the web.  He took 
the initiative of demonstrating the web to those in management who were unaware of its 
existence or potential. 
 
Grossman was joined by John Patrick, a well-respected staffer.  Patrick became the 
business translator for Grossman and other Internet followers within IBM.  He was able 
to obtain resources such as people and hardware, especially when they prepared an IBM 
website and received the support of CEO Lou Gerstner.  Working outside of normal 
channels, they were able to showcase IBM products and capabilities, culminating in their 
1996 Summer Olympic website.  This created outside expectations that the Web group 
was able to use for its advantage.  If they had to give up a person to another business unit, 
they didn’t view it as a loss, but as an opportunity to colonize other parts of IBM with 
their way of thinking. 
 
The concept of self-renewing organizations as a key to success in the current economic 
climate is discussed by Kets de Vries.15  He observes common values in organizations 
that recognize business environment changes and develop and retain their best people.  
They are characterized by an atmosphere of trust, candor, and fairness, which allows for 
better decision-making.  These organizations also form teams and encourage diversity, 
which empowers employees and enables them to work towards a common agenda.  They 
also value their customers’ perspective as the ultimate arbiter of their success and 
promote achievement and creativity by being less critical of well-meaning mistakes.  
Self-renewing organizations also provide training and development, and practice 
distributed leadership to coach future leaders.  
 
Kets de Vries explains that the ability of these companies to succeed lies in their 
recognition of the psychological motivational needs of individuals.  The human needs for 
attachment and exploration are extended to affiliation and assertion in the corporate 
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setting.  When these companies provide a milieu that aligns individual motivational 
systems with corporate objectives, it allows people to transcend individual needs in order 
to experience fulfillment.  
 
Kotter addresses the missing elements in failed change initiatives.16  He finds that 
companies who attempt shortcuts in the process don’t fully understand all of the steps 
that must be followed.  In particular, a sense of urgency must be created and led by 
change champions who aren’t inhibited by the possibility of being blamed for a crisis.  
The urgency must push people out of their comfort zones and facilitate open debate.  
Then a coalition of powerful people who can operate outside of the hierarchy must 
snowball from the initial instigators.  This coalition must develop a clear and coherent 
vision to inspire change.  The vision must be communicated using every available avenue 
and must be demonstrated by the actions of senior leadership. 
 
The transformation cannot be successful unless obstacles, which could include the 
organizational structure, are removed.  Other obstacles may be the compensation or 
appraisal systems, or even individual naysayers.  Another important step is to celebrate 
short-term wins to maintain momentum, but not to declare the entire war won too 
quickly.  The entire process may take up to ten years and is very vulnerable to regression 
in the early stages.  The changes must be incorporated into company culture and become 
part of normal behavior in order to become permanent. 
 
2.3 Improvement Models and Methods 
 
Many present techniques for change management have been adopted from Japanese 
management practices since World War II.  One of these philosophies, Lean principles, is 
described by Womack and Jones.17  They enthusiastically promote five major principles 
of lean thinking as the way to eliminate muda (waste in Japanese).  These principles 
include identifying value from the customer’s perspective, defining the value stream, 
causing the process to flow, reacting to customer pull, and striving for perfection.  These 
concepts in practice have produced dramatic production efficiencies and, if extended over 
many firms in a value stream, can establish a lean enterprise. 
Defining value requires a dialogue with customers and a rethinking of traditional 
definitions.  Then the entire value stream from raw material producers of component 
parts to the customer can be mapped.  This will facilitate the identification of three types 
of processes, those which create value, those which create no value, but are currently 
required (Type One muda), and those which do not create any value and can be 
eliminated immediately (Type Two muda).  This analysis may reveal wasted transport, 
inventory, excessive defects, or inactivity.  They propose that mass production and batch 
and queue processes lead to much of this waste.  In the cases where firms have made 
large capital investments to reduce manufacturing costs by a reduction in direct labor, the 
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savings may be offset by other costs downstream, including the technical support and 
large inventories. 
In order to produce flow, the firm must focus on the product itself and ignore traditional 
job definitions.  By forming real product teams in more than name, cross-functional 
employees can utilize other skills they may never have exercised.  In addition, they 
discuss the importance of takt time as opposed to Material Requirements Planning 
systems (MRP’s).  Level scheduling would facilitate the use of takt time as a production 
driver, which relates production to the actual rate of sales.  Reconfiguring plant layouts, 
right-sizing equipment, and reducing machine changeover time from one product 
variation to another would contribute to flow.  In this case, the scope of production might 
change as necessary, but the level of effort would still conform to takt time.  In fact, they 
cite a study by Csikzentmihalyi that defines the most rewarding work as that which 
shares the same characteristics as flow, intense concentration on a challenging yet 
achievable task, with immediate positive feedback. 
Pull requires reaction to actual demand and not “created demand” or forecasts that 
require large numbers of parts in inventory, but not necessarily a large variety.  In order 
to use level scheduling effectively, the firm would have to practice level selling so that 
items produced would reflect average demand.  The premise of perfection rests on 
constant assessment and continuous improvement.  Since perfection cannot be described 
accurately, it requires constant effort.  By focusing on a particular vision and committing 
resources to it, management can develop a policy deployment, which defines targets and 
timelines for achieving them.  Another requirement for effective change is a change agent 
who operates as a beneficent tyrant in order to facilitate a change that will eventually 
benefit everyone. 
Another key element to promote lean thinking is to address the loss of employment as 
waste is removed from the value stream.  Resources made available by eliminating waste 
can be directed to other activities that have future benefits, such as producing more items 
in-house or developing new product lines.  To avoid resistance to change, employees 
must be guaranteed job security.  Employee morale may suffer if they cannot distinguish 
between layoffs due to decreased sales or those due to dramatic internal change.  A one-
time reduction in the workforce might be necessary, but prolonged or piecemeal 
reductions would poison the atmosphere for change. 
Continuous improvement (CI) is another method used by companies to remain 
competitive.  Terziovski and Sohal surveyed 385 Australian manufacturing firms to 
determine the extent of and motivation for CI programs.18  Continuous improvement is 
based on concepts by Deming and by Imai’s Kaizen.  Kaizen is composed of the four 
stages of plan, do, check and act.  It involves ongoing improvements throughout all layers 
of the organization.  Organizational learning is a necessary prerequisite for continuous 
improvement so that knowledge can be created, communicated, and utilized. 
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Respondents to the survey were motivated by production efficiency, reduced production 
costs, and improved performance quality.  Half of the respondents limited CI to 
manufacturing and did not apply it across the organization.  Organizational success was 
positively correlated to the length of time CI had been implemented and the extent of CI 
within the company.  They recommend that large companies introduce CI throughout 
their entire organizations and use globalization, which provides a larger pool of 
knowledge, to facilitate innovation.  Smaller companies can exploit globalization through 
joint ventures. 
Ravichandran and Rai investigate quality management programs, including Total Quality 
Management, in information systems and software development.19  Information systems 
developers are presented with problems in product quality, long lead times, and user 
dissatisfaction.  They found that successful performance was linked to process 
management efficacy.  This, in turn, was associated with management infrastructure 
sophistication and stakeholder (including programmers and vendors) involvement.  
Senior management leadership was an important aspect related to management 
infrastructure sophistication.  They recommended that management provide a coherent 
commitment to quality performance by establishing practices that promote coordination 
and learning.  They warn against senior management providing too much direction rather 
than facilitating change at the functional level.  By promoting skill development, 
management will enhance stakeholder empowerment for the benefit of future 
development. 
The effectiveness of Total Quality Management (TQM) in the public service sector in 
Austria was the subject of a longitudinal case study by Scharitzer and Korunka.20  The 
impetus for creating a more customer-oriented, efficient public sector has led to an 
emphasis on new public management (NPM). 
They used surveys of employees and customers of a large public housing agency.    These 
surveys revealed a decrease in customer satisfaction during the organizational change, but 
a marked increase a year after the change was implemented.  Customers were not only 
concerned with the outcome of the service, but also with the reliability and competence 
of those involved in the problem solving process.  They were also less critical than the 
employees and displayed an increase in loyalty to the municipal service after the change 
policies were implemented. 
The employees also showed increased stress and dissatisfaction immediately following 
the implementation.  Higher strain and lower job satisfaction were correlated with those 
less involved in the organizational redesign.  In addition differences in job satisfaction 
                                                 
19 Ravichandran, T. and Rai, Arun, “Quality management in systems development:  An 
organizational system perspective”, MIS Quarterly, Vol. 24, Issue 3, pages 381-415, 
September, 2000 
20 Scharitzer, Dieter and Korunka, Christian, “New public management:  Evaluating the 
success of total quality management and change management interventions in public 
services from the employees’ and customers’ perspectives, Total Quality Management, 
Vol. 11, Issue 7, September, 2000 
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and perceptions of job security were evident in different work categories.  Management 
and customer representatives showed significant job content dissatisfaction.  They 
recommend passive and active participation measures, such as more formal distribution 
of information to compensate for the negative effects on employees.  The positive 
customer satisfaction reports were provided as feedback to employees with good effect.  
They had been unaware of the positive effects of their organizational change on their 
customers. 
The literature carries common themes of flexible organization and continuous learning to 
adapt to changes in technology and the economic climate.  Networks and coalition 
building were also recurring suggestions of recommended strategies. The situation today 
provides a fertile environment in which to examine organizational change.  Many of the 
barriers to the acceptance of change initiatives and their diffusion throughout 
organizations still exist, despite decades of research identifying these challenges. 
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3.0 Research Design and Methodology 
 
The research method used to study the aforementioned questions was four separate case 
studies conducted in parallel.  The large size of the organizations necessary to make 
meaningful observations does not lend itself to experiential manipulation of variables.  
The Lean Aerospace Initiative, under whose auspices I conducted graduate student 
research, consists of a consortium of companies in the aerospace industry and related 
government agencies.  I selected a sample of case studies from this population.  Four case 
studies, rather than one, will greatly enhance the applicability of the study to other 
circumstances. 
 
The organization selected for a case study produced, or managed the delivery of, a 
technically complex good or service.  A firm that produced a variety of separate products, 
which resulted in organizational complexity, was also a viable candidate.  The 
organization had to have chosen to follow a major change initiative during the past five 
years, either in part or throughout its entire organization.  A large, division-level 
operation with between 1000 and 20,000 employees was sought. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
The research questions in Chapter 1 and the literature review in Chapter 2 led to an 
examination of three major aspects of the adoption and diffusion of change initiatives in 
the organizations studied.  These broad areas are leadership, training, and 
communication.  The approaches taken by the organizations in this study to promote the 
initiative, reconcile resistors, and attempt to engrain the initiative into the company 
culture include emphasis on different levels of leadership, training procedures, and 
communication methods.  The three hypotheses that follow each address one of these 
areas. 
 
Hypothesis 1.  If lower level leadership is more committed to the initiative, there will be 
less regression, even if measures were not taken to make the changes to the process 
irreversible. 
 
Although those in the senior leadership of a company or organization define the vision, 
identify the strategies, and are often the more visible champions of an initiative, they 
must identify and nurture leaders throughout the organization in order to affect the 
changes at the operational level and eventually transform the culture.  Short-term goals 
might be accomplished by dictate, but will not become enduring once the person or 
persons in senior positions leave, as the change will have been driven mostly by 
personality in those cases.  The leaders who work directly with operational employees 
must be motivated to help change the organization by providing incentives that, as close 
as possible, align their personal goals with those of the company. 
 
Many change initiatives are deployed in such a way as to make regression to the former 
state difficult, if not impossible.  In some cases, however, there are still examples of 
departments that have not fully realized cellular manufacturing, or old databases and 
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legacy software that are still supported.  Some initiatives are accomplished in stages over 
a long period of time so that the opportunity for slippage is constantly present.  In 
individual cells or departments where measures have been taken to make the changes 
irreversible, the physical layout and available equipment has been so altered that the 
employees cannot simply revert to an old method on their own. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Training a larger part of the workforce leads to the employees having a 
greater ability to integrate, diffuse, and initiate change. 
 
Approaches to training can be described as two extreme cases in terms of inclusion of 
employees, where most real situations are somewhere along a continuum between these 
two extremes.  In some change initiatives, there have been attempts to include as many 
employees as possible in training and events such as kaizens where work practices are 
redesigned.  In these cases, the desire is to elicit ideas from the lowest level possible and 
to engage subject matter experts.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, companies may 
use only a core group of planners to redesign the processes and deploy the new processes 
as a finished product to those who must work to it. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  Having a formal best practices or lessons learned documentation available 
to all results in better diffusion and less regression. 
 
This hypothesis follows from hypothesis 2, as many companies with formal training 
programs within their change initiatives who include employees throughout the process 
produce documentation to record the characteristics of the change as well as the manner 
in which it was produced.  When the reasoning behind changing a process is explained, 
employees can better use these lessons in other situations.  They have not only learned 
how to implement a particular new process, but can apply their training and the body of 
knowledge already collected within best practices to stimulate new ideas and build a 
culture of learning, continuous improvement, and adaptation. 
 
3.2 Research Instrument 
 
The methods used included guided interviews of key employees using a standard 
questionnaire format to facilitate data categorization.  Broad access to interviewees at 
each site was requested in order to triangulate data and to pursue emergent trends in the 
study.  Observations were made of employee attitudes and reactions while responding to 
questions.  The visible effects of the initiative as well as employee behavior were 
observed during plant tours.  The case study also involved a review of any archival 
material that may have been made available.  The data collection portion of the research 
schedule spanned approximately two years from January, 2001 until October, 2002. 
 
The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.  It consisted of eighteen questions that 
were worded to elicit responses that would provide information relevant to the key 
research questions.  Some of the questions referred to the individual's experience with 
change initiatives in the organization in order to build the history of the initiative from 
various pieces, to determine its origin, and to characterize the interviewee's role in the 
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change.  They were also asked what effects the initiative had on their job description, 
whether it involved training, and what level of effort was dedicated to the initiative. 
 
Other questions dealt with the perceived champions of the change and the support of 
leadership, what savings were realized, and how these savings were measured and 
redeployed.  In addition, interviewees were asked to characterize the resistors to the 
initiative and explain how resistance was resolved.  The final question asked about the 
current status of the change and how it appeared to be evolving.  This question addressed 
regression. 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
 
Ideally, the kind of data I collected would have been defined directly from the information 
necessary to test the hypotheses.  All of the interviewees would have been asked identical 
questions in an identical fashion and would have provided answers that could be calibrated and 
quantified in distinctly measurable ways.  This was not the case, however. 
 
The questionnaire was written with the intention of capturing the data necessary to 
answer the various research questions.  Many of the questions were open ended and 
provided an opportunity for interviewees to expound on particular issues of interest or 
competence.  Interviewees in different functions and at different levels in the hierarchy 
could provide more complete information in some areas than in others.  For instance, 
some interviewees had a clearer perspective about where savings might be redeployed 
than others.  Therefore, many answers could not be simply categorized or were not direct 
equivalents to other answers to the same question. 
 
I also found that I could group certain questions into one longer question if the amount of 
available time was an issue.  I also individualized the questions to build upon themes that 
interviewees may have introduced or I changed the emphasis depending on whether I was 
speaking to a director, manager, front line supervisor, engineer, or factory worker.  Their 
roles and perspectives in the initiative and how they might understand the questions were 
different, so evoking responses required different manners of questioning. 
 
Another issue that affected data collection was the difficulty of gathering additional data 
after site visits.  I discovered that I was more likely to receive useful data if I insisted on 
it while I was still at the site than if I tried to collect it later through telephone calls.  The 
contact people were generally cooperative, but, in a practical sense, my research was not 
a priority for which they were responsible.  I could have requested items such as training 
records or proof of savings more vigorously and in person.  The training records or 
history of kaizen events might have provided dates, manhours spent in training, and 
frequency of training throughout the life of the initiative.  This information would have 
provided more objective data to support histories related in the interviews and it could 
have been used to more formally judge the extent of training and to identify periods of 
time of more intense training.  It may have been awkward to obtain more specific data 
about savings to compare the planned and actual business cases made for improvement 
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implementations because the financial information they contain might be sensitive or 
proprietary. 
 
In each case study, I asked to speak to employees who had resisted change efforts as well 
as ardent supporters.  In general, I was given fairly wide access to people, but resistors 
were not well represented in my sample, either because they had left voluntarily, were 
removed from the organizations, or I was not aware of their existence or names and so 
could not request their participation.  I relied on the institutional knowledge of my 
sponsors to choose appropriate interviewees and to provide introductions to prepare the 
way for their participation. 
 
3.4 Case Study Framework 
 
The organization of the case studies emerged from the interviews and the structure of the 
questionnaire.  Certain question families formed the major subject headings of the case 
studies.  These are the initiative history, champions for the initiative, training and level of 
effort, communications, success measures, savings, regression, resistance, and continuing 
evolution.  I recognized certain trends in the discussions about resistance which gave rise 
to the categories I called reconciliation strategies.  They were addressing cultural issues, 
mitigating resistant behaviors, areas of management emphasis, and actions taken toward 
regressive tendencies.  In case A2, the natural categorization of the differentiation of the 
resistance data was by that evident within the directorate, from external suppliers, from 
the contracting community, and from internal customers and suppliers. 
 
3.5 Case Study Descriptions 
 
The observations made in these case studies are not only descriptive, but also offer 
additional insight into organizational change processes actually occurring throughout the 
world.  Four case studies were used, although the initial intention was to do two case 
studies at three companies for a total of six.  The plan was to have a mix of 
manufacturing and business process initiatives and to showcase both a mature and a 
newer initiative at each company. 
 
3.5.1 Case Studies at Company A 
 
Case studies A1 an A2 were conducted at a division that is part of a larger aircraft 
company.  The division manufactures large aircraft structures for numerous product lines 
for the larger company.  I visited the division four times from March 2001 to August 
2002.  During those visits hosted by the Company A Production System Office, I was 
given tours of the major manufacturing facilities, spoke with various people connected 
with change initiatives, and formally interviewed 54 employees from directors to hourly 
factory floor workers.  The interviewees included directors of the major functional areas 
and product families, product line managers, shop workers, team leaders for specific 
initiative implementations, and representatives from the various aircraft structures 
groups, strategic planning, finance, struts and nacelles, and coaches and facilitators from 
the Company A Production System Office. 
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The interviewees identified a number of different change initiatives in which they had 
personal experience.  The change initiatives that are being implemented at Company A 
are many and varied.  This allowed an examination of the various initiatives and how 
they interacted across the organization, as well as a more detailed analysis of strategies 
employed by certain sub-groups within the larger organization.  
 
Once I had spoken with employees and managers throughout the organization who were 
familiar with the numerous change initiatives that had been undertaken throughout the 
years, I continued my inquiries with a focus on two particular initiatives in order to 
understand these processes in more depth.   In consultation with my sponsor from the 
Company A Production System Office, I chose the Lean deployment within the Skin 
Fabrication Directorate and the Material Flow Optimization effort in Supplier 
Management.  These not only provided an opportunity to examine initiatives in both a 
manufacturing and a business process, but also a chance to see the effects of an initiative 
with a slightly longer history and to compare it to a newer effort. 
 
During the initial site visits, I was able to speak with people across the division and in 
many disciplines to get an overview of the major initiatives occurring throughout the 
organization.  During my final visit, the interviews were concentrated in Skin Fabrication 
and Supplier Management so that I could focus on the two particular initiatives being 
implemented in those organizations.  The initiatives in these organizations were LEAN 
production and Materials Flow Optimization, respectively.  These choices not only 
allowed the inclusion of both manufacturing and business process initiatives in the study, 
but also detailed observations of the influences of leadership changes and time on these 
initiatives.  It also broadened the mix of the types of employees involved and the skill 
sets they possessed. 
 
I interviewed 14 different people in Skin Fabrication over the course of three site visits.  
The interviewees included the director, two product line managers (PLM, second level 
managers), three supervisors (first level managers), a manager in the support 
organization, a quality focal, a capacity planner, three lead workers, and a floor 
mechanic, and another PLM in an informal, partial interview.  In Supplier Management, I 
interviewed a total of 10 people.  They included the manager and project leader for the 
initiative, a manager who reports to the director, a second level manager in material 
management (a counterpart in manufacturing services), a first level manager in business 
management, an e-business project leader, three material management analysts, and a 
purchasing analyst.  These interviewees provided information based upon their 
understanding and experiences related to the Lean and MFO implementations.  The 
different perspectives illustrated the degree to which the knowledge of the initiatives and 
the associated principles had penetrated into and across the organizations. 
 
3.5.2 Case Studies at Company B 
 
Company B is a consolidated company of what had been three separate full service 
aerospace companies.  For the purpose of discussion, the headquarters site will be called 
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site 1 and the other sites, site 2 and site 3.  My initial contact was at site 2, where I made 
a site visit and conducted five interviews in June 2001.  Soon after that, my contact 
retired.  I was later referred to a new contact at site 1.  By this time, I had already defined 
a need to seek both a manufacturing initiative and a business process initiative.  My new 
sponsor gathered information on various initiatives and I chose two. 
 
I visited site 1 in October 2002 and interviewed 12 people for both case studies.  During 
analysis, I determined that what would have become the business process case study for 
Company B was too wide in scope and did not have enough in common for a comparison 
with the other case studies.  It would have required more site visits to all three sites and 
interviews with more than the five people I had already interviewed. 
 
The manufacturing case study that remained was the successful adoption of LEAN 
manufacturing principles in an electrical harness production cell at site 1.  The impetus 
for this initiative was the impending decision to transfer the work to a plant in a foreign 
country.  I interviewed seven people who had been involved with this initiative.  They 
included the project leader and a facilitator from the LEAN department, the cell 
supervisor, a production line support specialist, a planner, an electrical engineer, and a 
harnesser. 
 
3.5.3 Case Study at Company C 
 
My initial contact for this case study was at the headquarters company, which is a 
division of a larger corporation.  I made two site visits to the company headquarters in 
March 2001 and July 2001and interviewed four people informally, including three key 
people in the office that is the umbrella organization for the company-wide improvement 
initiative.  When my contact moved to a different function, my new contact looked for 
candidate case studies at the headquarters plant.  I made two more site visits in January 
2002 and February 2002 and interviewed six people in the Quality section of a program 
office and in the International Business Development Group.   
 
My new contact found an opportunity for me to study the transformation of a plant 
located in a different state from the headquarters company.   This plant manufactures 
turbine fan blades and other jet engine parts for aircraft engines.  The corporation had 
formally launched a corporate-wide LEAN-type initiative in 1996.  The adoption of the 
initiative by this plant was the focus of the case study.  The initiative will be referred to 
as the Continuous Improvement (CI) initiative in the text, although all continuous 
improvement activities at the company headquarters were not merged with the larger 
initiative until mid-2000. 
 
I made two site visits to this plant in July and August 2002 and interviewed 12 people 
formally and one informally.  The interviewees were from different manufacturing units 
and support units.  They included a manager in the CI office, a facilitator in the CI office, 
a supervisor in non-destructive testing, five CI leads, a manufacturing cell leader, an 
engineering technician, a quality engineer, and two machinists. 
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4.0 Company A – Two Case Studies:  LEAN Manufacturing and Supplier 
Management 
 
These case studies were conducted at a division that is part of a larger aircraft company.  
The division manufactures large aircraft structures for numerous product lines for the 
larger company.  Another core product and competency is tooling.   
 
The consolidation of aircraft manufacturing companies in recent years has concentrated 
manufacturing into fewer, but larger, companies.  In addition, global competition 
provides an impetus to reduce costs, improve quality, and, thereby, maintain a larger 
share of sales to customers.  This division is a cost center for the corporation and does not 
produce its own profits.  It is an internal supplier to its parent company and must 
therefore compete for work that could be distributed among several plants. 
 
The current change initiative environment is a culmination of various initiatives that 
began in the early 1980’s that are depicted in Figure 4.1.  In October 1981, the division 
started using Quality Circles, based upon a model from Florida Power and Light.  This 
was a grassroots effort that involved management when approval was needed.  In the 
mid-80’s, the quality effort progressed from the Total Quality Concept to Total Quality 
Commitment to Continuous Quality Improvement.  The current emphasis on Lean, 
applied to manufacturing and other processes, began in 1996. 
 
Figure 4.1: Change Initiative Timeline for Company A 
 
Much of the initial groundwork and curriculum came from a major supplier to the 
division.  The Company A Production System Promotion Office now coordinates the 
educational and coaching efforts.  Employees attend a Lean class for two weeks in order 
to learn the principles and vocabulary used in Lean.  When a particular process is targeted 
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for a Lean transformation, selected employees attend a kaizen event and apply the result 
to the factory floor. 
 
4.1 Case Study A1:  Lean Production in Skin Fabrication 
 
The skin fabrication unit builds exterior skins and nacelles and involves work with sheet 
metal, a stretch forming process, preparation for chemical milling, and corrosion 
protection.  As an internal fabrication shop, this unit affects all of the product lines and is 
in a unique position between suppliers of raw materials and assembly operations 
throughout the organization.  This directorate made remarkable gains in reducing unit 
costs over a three year period.  A new director was assigned in April 1999 to lead the 
directorate through a LEAN transformation that was enormously successful.  Even after 
one year, rework and scrap costs per unit, as well as shortages, had dropped dramatically.  
Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the major milestones for the LEAN implementation in 
the directorate. 
Figure 4.2: Case Study A1 Initiative Timeline and Results 
 
4.1.1 Initiative History 
 
Current continuous improvement programs at the company had their genesis with Quality 
Circles in 1982.  In 1994, they emphasized cycle time management and, in 1995, Just-in-
Time manufacturing gained attention.  That year, upper management visited Japan and 
then approved an approach to use LEAN by 1996.  In the first two years, they made 
attempts at shop floor improvements using kaizens.  It was not until 1998 and 1999 that 
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there was an effort to look at the entire value chain.  In 1998, the corporation also 
suffered heavy losses and that directed attention toward reducing costs.  This integrated 
approach was not begun in earnest until 1999.  Although most efforts at implementing 
LEAN practices began on new product lines, the skin fabrication unit was one of the first 
units in the division to start sending employees to Company A’s formal LEAN classes. 
 
The current director was appointed in April 1999, for the purpose of alleviating systemic 
problems that had resulted in high scrap and rework costs.  He had previously spent 19 
years in manufacturing research and development with the company.  This was his first 
position in which he was responsible for building the product.  He had had previous 
experience with the development of Determinate Assembly, an initiative that began in 
manufacturing research and development.  The people he named as champions for this 
initiative, the general manager and another executive who has since moved to corporate 
headquarters, had faith in his ability to turn this unit around. 
 
4.1.2 Champions for the Initiative 
 
The interviewees were asked to name the person they perceived as the champion for the 
initiative.  The champion would provide support in terms of resources, visibility, and 
enthusiasm.  They could name more than one person and many did, as some people might 
have been able to distinguish a single champion and others recognized significant 
contributions from a couple of people.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of the 
champions along the hierarchy continuum in relation to the relative level of the 
respondents within the hierarchy of the interviewee pool. 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Naming Champions in Skin Fabrication:  Frequency and Management 
Level 
 
The most frequently named individual was the director, as either the sole champion or in 
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program manager of the Company A Production System Office.  Others who were 
considered champions of the initiative included the general manager, a former director of 
operations at the time of initial implementation and now at corporate headquarters, the 
current director of operations, their own product line manager (PLM), and a manager in 
the support organization of the directorate (who has since left the company). 
 
The level of the employee within the organization influenced their opinion of who they 
considered a champion.  When the perceived champions were at higher levels in the 
company or were those who represented different functional organizations, they had 
generally been named by the interviewees in management positions.  The factory workers 
or interviewees without direct reports usually named their own PLM or others within the 
directorate with whom they had more direct contact or who they perceived as providing 
direct support to the daily or detailed implementation of the initiative.  This does not 
mean that the leadership was not effective at all of these levels, but that it is important to 
cultivate leadership throughout the hierarchy, as employees at different levels appear to 
have been motivated by those who have more visibility at their level. 
 
4.1.3 Training and Level of Effort 
 
The formal training in Lean implementation consists of a Lean class and kaizens, which 
focus on particular processes in particular shops to apply solutions directly following the 
exercises.  The format and curriculum are based on models developed by a major supplier 
of raw materials to the division who shared their accomplishments and know-how in a 
mutually beneficial arrangement.  This strategic relationship would allow for 
improvements in the processes of a major customer, would strengthen the business that 
produces the product, and perhaps later generate greater sales for the supplier. 
 
This director was one of the first managers to take the course and further required all of 
the 39 management-level employees in his directorate not only to take the course, but 
also to teach it at least once a year.  This mandate illustrated his belief that the managers 
themselves must believe in the program in order to remain engaged and to impart this 
enthusiasm to workers.  As of August 2001, when I interviewed the director, 70 percent 
of the directorate had attended class.  The organization held one LEAN class on average 
every two and one half weeks and included personnel on all three shifts.  As of February 
2003, the directorate had trained over a thousand employees and 80% of the current 540 
employees in the directorate had gone through training.  Because of lay offs and 
subsequent movement of employees within the company, they had actually trained more 
people than were currently within the directorate. 
 
The time devoted to this implementation provides some idea of the scope of the project 
and its significance.  Two former PLM’s are dedicated full time to the project across the 
directorate.  Some efforts are sporadic, but involve many hours and people while they are 
active.  Although the time spent directly on tasks associated with LEAN were not tracked 
separately, one supervisor who had been involved with the original implementation effort 
provided some estimates of the number of manhours initially invested.  He indicated that 
20 people working 20 hours each developed a mission statement in 1999.  These 20 
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people each spent three and a half days in initial training, and a team of five people held 
daily and weekly meetings, and spent time doing factory walk-throughs.  The number of 
hours he estimated was 66% of a full-time equivalent.  One PLM said that during the first 
four months, five employees were dedicated full-time in his area. 
 
All of the interviewees had attended the LEAN class.  Many had participated in multiple 
kaizens.  Not surprisingly, those in production management positions stated that they 
spent approximately 25% to 30% of their time on issues related to change initiatives.  
Those in non-management roles spent less than 10% of their time occupied directly with 
change initiatives, although they were in the positions most directly affected by changes 
to processes.  Some of this apparent difference in emphasis may be due to different 
perceptions about what constitutes tasks or work efforts related to change.  Some of it 
may be due to the different roles of those in management and those on the factory floor in 
bringing a change to fruition.  One PLM described his job as more visionary than looking 
at individual activities and processes.  He felt he must ask what the future will look like 
and concentrate on system management rather than process management.  This described 
a strategic, system-wide and forward-looking approach. 
 
4.1.4 Communicating the Initiative 
 
The importance of developing leaders at all levels of the organization who support and 
inculcate trust in the initiative is also shown when considering how employees were 
generally informed of upcoming initiatives or specific process changes and how they best 
absorbed this information.  Almost all respondents listed daily crew meetings as a source 
of important information regarding change initiatives.  The personal, face-to-face 
interchanges played a significant part in transferring information from supervisor to 
crews, shift to shift, and from kaizen participants to the rest of the crew. 
 
Many different avenues were used to provide information about new or ongoing 
initiatives.  These included management talks with employees, all-hands meetings, 
celebrations of successes, official company publications, memos across shops or shifts, 
word-of-mouth, and even showing audit results.  Employees were asked to volunteer for 
kaizen events or de facto leaders were chosen to attend.  They, in turn, shared information 
with the rest of the crew.  Management tried to elicit ideas from hourly employees and 
supported their participation in kaizens. 
 
One manager spoke about building coalitions by speaking with two to three lead 
mechanics (those who are assigned additional coordinating duties, but are not in 
management positions) rather than announcing an initiative cold.  The supervisor can 
inform the lead who will have influence with the rest of the crew.  This agreed with what 
other managers said about the need to make communication continuous.  The original 
group involved with the implementation tried to constantly talk about LEAN with those 
in the shops.  A manager observed that the implementation team must continually talk 
with those affected by the change and demonstrate procedures to effectively 
communicate. 
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4.1.5 Success Measures in Skin Fabrication 
 
The success of the implementation was recognized internally through a number of means, 
including an employee opinion survey, scrap and rework costs reductions, inventory 
reductions, and external recognition.  The directorate improved by 14 points in two years 
in a survey designed to measure employee satisfaction.  In addition, the unit applied for 
and was recognized with a statewide award based on Baldridge criteria.  (Since the 
division is a cost center for a larger corporation, it is not eligible for the Baldridge award 
itself.) 
 
An example of a particular improvement was implemented in laminates.  A dedicated 
team was assigned to the problem and consisted of representatives from five shops, 
quality assurance and a line manager.  At the beginning of the process, where the 
aluminum is stretched, there were 66 separate part numbers.  They did not want to track 
66 part numbers along the length of the line.  The team built a simulation of the factory 
and was able to reduce the part numbers carried throughout the process to six, based upon 
combinations of material thickness. 
 
The metrics recorded for shortages, rework and repair costs, and scrap costs illustrate 
significant improvements compared to levels before LEAN was implemented.  Shortages 
were reduced by 98% from a high in May 1999 to August 2002.  The weekly average 
from January through July 2002 was 83% below the target amount.  Rework and repair 
costs per unit were reduced by almost 25% from 2001 to 2002, using a three-month 
average of the first seven months of data for 2002.  Scrap costs were reduced by nearly 
42% in the same time period.  The current rework and repair costs and scrap costs per 
unit compared with 1999 correspond to reductions of 45% and 69%, respectively. 
 
Other areas of improvement were in reduced inventory, cycle time, and part travel time.  
Some of the reduced inventory was due to implementation of Min/Max, an initiative that 
is the subject of the case study of supplier management at this division and is discussed in 
greater detail in a later section.  One example of cycle time improvement resulted in a 
decrease from 44 to 21 days.  Some of this was due to process improvements that reduced 
run times, such as in the chem mill tanks, and set-up times.  The movement of parts 
within the shops has improved, resulting in a better flow pattern.  Unnecessary part travel 
is also a quality issue, as the parts can be damaged each time they are handled.  One 
supervisor said, “In my 24 years in [Skin Fabrication], this is the most streamlined 
process I’ve ever seen.  Panels aren’t traveling all over the plant.”  
 
Scheduled maintenance of shop machinery was instituted and they found they had fewer 
severe breakdowns.  In addition, if the outcome of a kaizen includes a recommendation 
for new equipment, the case may be more convincing and the expenditure more likely to 
be made because previous kaizens resulted in savings elsewhere. 
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4.1.6 Savings 
 
The division is an internal supplier of major assemblies to the corporation, therefore, it 
competes for work among other divisions and even external suppliers for its share of 
aircraft orders.  This means that savings do not necessarily belong to the division, but 
directly affect the cost of the airplane and the division’s competitiveness within the 
corporation.  The various efficiency initiatives are designed to reduce cost per aircraft. 
 
In Skin Fabrication, 70 percent of their cost is in material, so scrap and rework reduction 
contribute heavily toward reducing unit cost.  The director identified the motivation 
concerned with personal incentives to reduce scrap and rework as “pride in work.”  
People do not want to remake the same part twice or scrap work that they have spent time 
and effort accomplishing. 
 
The issue of labor costs is tied not only to savings, but also to workers’ perceptions and 
possible resistance.  I was told repeatedly that there was no intention to lay off personnel 
due to improvement gains.  However, people had to be flexible enough to accept job 
changes if new opportunities for work opened within the division as work was realigned.  
Although the union has specific job codes, there is some flexibility in the contracts to 
allow people to be moved for short terms.  This unit has not met with resistance from the 
union.  They have managed their headcount through their work statement.  In anticipation 
of lower production rates, they did not hire to an absolutely full level.  Rather than 
lowering headcount through lay offs, they can reduce overtime and use natural attrition.  
One manager noted a reduced overtime rate from 20% to 2.8% over one year. 
 
Eight of the respondents said that they had seen no lay offs due to LEAN improvements.  
One noted that lay offs in other areas affected manpower in their area because of shifting 
jobs to other areas.  Most acknowledged that reductions in labor were due to lower 
production rates and the cyclical nature of the business.  One manager said that LEAN 
improvements would allow them to use their current headcount during accelerated 
production schedules, rather than rehiring and then reducing the workforce to follow the 
ups and downs of aircraft orders. 
 
A shop employee acknowledged that the productivity improvements meant progress for 
the company, but was hard on individuals.  It appears to people that they are producing 
more with fewer people.  More employees are cross trained and are able to do many of 
the different tasks necessary within their shops.  In one shop, they have reduced the 
number of employees from 22 ten years ago to 7 today and it appeared to an interviewee 
that they were doing the same amount of work with fewer people. 
 
4.1.7 Regression 
 
The differing responses regarding degree of regression illustrate that respondents within 
the organization possess different views and that the culture is still evolving.  Although 
the organization’s metrics showed that the initiative had improved operations, the 
answers to questions about whether the processes had changed and if, in fact, any 
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processes had returned to the way they were before the initiative began were inconsistent.  
If the cultural change had been complete, you would expect to receive the same answers 
from all respondents about regression. 
 
In some cases, the process was allowed to regress if the results were not as intended.  
Discontinuance of kanban cards and reverting to the hot list were seen by some 
employees as a return to the old processes.  There were conflicting opinions about the 
degree of regression.  Some felt that they were continually learning and progressing 
towards a more ideal state.  Others perceived the productivity gains as producing the 
same products in much the same way, but with fewer people. 
 
The regression seemed to be linked to a lack of focus.  Kaizen events focus attention on a 
particular problem in a particular shop.  Once the resources are no longer concentrated 
and the stress is removed, there is a tendency to regress to the old process.  One 
respondent thought that management focus and follow through were weak.  Lower rates 
also allow some slippage in discipline because the regressive tendencies will not be felt 
as strongly during lower production.  This regression is manifested by a return to a hot 
list, the loss of FIFO, and the disuse of kanbans.  These components of a LEAN process 
were discarded if the production rates were not high enough to force people to push the 
limits of productivity gains.  The differing perspectives of respondents about whether 
there truly were regressions of this sort highlighted views about the necessity of these 
components for continuing productivity improvements. 
 
One PLM said that the hot list was really only a placebo because it did not hurt to 
reassure employees, and that the floor was really run on LEAN principles.  One lead felt, 
however, that although they received new equipment to help simplify tasks, the actual 
process has not changed in five years.  A first level manager recognized some room for 
improvement when there are still two people dedicated to checking for defects, indicating 
that they have yet to achieve a level of surety in their methods.  As discussed above, 
some regression is allowed if management feels that the improvement is not as effective 
as originally intended.  If the metrics for quality, cost, and delivery show improvements, 
regardless of the extent that LEAN principles are followed, then management might 
regard the implementation as successful.  There was no desire to just follow the form of 
the initiative if the tools they do choose to use and maintain are effective. 
 
4.1.8 Resistance 
 
Blatant resistance was very light in Skin Fabrication.  The director reported that he had 
only one in 500 people leave the class after the first day.  They had expected that there 
would be more.  Other managers reporting outright refusal of employees to participate 
also indicated that there were very few employees who fit that category.  Estimates of the 
number of employees who still resisted either by complaining or by providing a challenge 
to managers ranged from 5 to 30 percent. 
 
The director reported that newer employees with less than 3 years in the company seem 
to be completely behind the initiative.  In some cases, those with 25 years of experience 
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have already made up their minds that nothing would really change.  Even if those with 
greater seniority and more experience showed some resistance, they also knew the 
processes so well that their advice and input are respected and are to be valued. 
 
There was no agreement among respondents of where the most resistance was displayed 
within the hierarchy.  Not surprisingly, interviewees tended to consider the strongest 
resistors as belonging to a different group than their own.  These groups could be 
differentiated by management level or seniority.   
 
One respondent said that lower level managers seemed to be more hesitant at first than 
senior level managers by appearing reluctant and disbelieving in their initial verbal 
reactions to the initiative.  However, he noted that their early resistance may have been 
due to the expectations placed on them.  The first level managers are closer to the product 
and the deadlines, so adjustments to changes have a direct impact on their teams’ output.  
However, the interviewee observed that once you make the change and it is successfully 
implemented, you would not have a stronger supporter than the lower level manager and 
his team.  He used the example of changes in the laminate section to describe how a first 
level manager became a better advocate.  Those changes worked because the first level 
supervisor was assigned to the implementation team full-time and was pulled from other 
responsibilities that might have distracted from his efforts toward the improvement 
initiative. 
 
Although others reported that first level managers, especially those on second shift, might 
have been more resistant initially, these managers now express their wish that they had 
begun improvements earlier.  Managers on second shift were thought to be more inclined 
to be resistant since they may not have been directly involved with planning and meetings 
regarding these changes that occur on first shift.  Others also reported that supervisors or 
PLM’s could be more resistant depending on how the change might affect their shops.  In 
some cases, counterproductive decisions might have been made which might aggravate 
perceptions and cause resistance.  It is difficult for people to see the entire picture and put 
a company perspective over the interests of their particular shop.  The individual may not 
recognize the gains he has made. 
 
Some respondents noted that resistance was more likely to come from shop floor 
employees.  Others felt that hourly workers could be very receptive if the changes were 
presented well in advance of implementation and in a manner that did not threaten their 
job security.  The kind of resistance that could be displayed at this level could take the 
form of apathy and a desire to just do the job and go home.  Employees can also hold up 
an initiative for what seems like legitimate reasons. Since they are accustomed to being 
held to a target, they might find something to build rather than wait for the kanban signals 
in place to work as intended.  The resistors may also be those who were not included in 
kaizens or idea solicitation. 
 
In order to address expected resistance to the changes, a number of strategies were 
followed.  Some were planned purposely to counter resistance and others were perhaps 
not planned for that intention, but were later found to be useful.  These strategies could be 
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classified into those addressing culture, mitigating resistant behaviors, management 
emphasis, and actions taken towards regressive tendencies.  They are interconnected and 
many approaches contain aspects of more than one category. 
 
4.1.8.1 Culture and Resistance 
 
Since the aircraft manufacturing business is cyclical and this has resulted in downsizing 
in response to downturns, people may link efficiency efforts with workforce reductions 
and perceive these initiatives as another threat to job security.  In addition, resistance is to 
be expected when the average age of the workforce is 47 and the average seniority is 17 
years, numbers quoted by one PLM.  The employees are accustomed to an ingrained 
culture. 
 
The culture is influenced by a very knowledgeable and experienced workforce.  The 
director recognized that he had to work with the union from the beginning on this 
implementation.  When teaching LEAN classes, he emphasized the combined work 
experience of the participants as one reason for why their ideas would be welcomed.  
Other respondents equated cultural change with comfort level.  Since it takes time to 
develop comfort, the cultural changes must precede the process changes in order to 
prepare the workforce and improve acceptance.  There seemed to be tension between the 
length of time necessary to evolve cultural change and the ability to sustain enthusiasm 
for an initiative over the time required for such a change. 
 
A counter approach to allowing more time for acceptance and comfort to build was also 
in play.  Some spoke of a clear message that you must get onboard or clear the way for 
others moving in the direction of change.  Employees would need to open their minds to 
this new way of thinking.  In this approach, the new model was how the business would 
be conducted and employees would have to just get used to it.  One respondent indicated 
that many initial resistors in management had since retired and some resistors may have 
been moved to another part of the company.  This tough talk may have been difficult to 
enforce.  Union rules would make it difficult to remove people entirely if they otherwise 
performed their job, but showed resistance to adopting a change initiative. 
 
4.1.8.2 Mitigating Resistant Behaviors 
 
Actions or conditions that helped smooth acceptance included peer pressure and the 
existence of a critical number of accepting people within the organization.  The critical 
number may be a core group of well-respected co-workers.  Many employees I spoke 
with were repeatedly asked to participate in kaizen events because they were well 
regarded and had influence in their shops.  Peer pressure was mentioned specifically by 
three respondents, but an accepting atmosphere engendered by fellow employees was a 
common theme in other answers related to reconciling resistance.  Another reason peer 
pressure was effective is because others would have to carry the workload for a non-
participating co-worker. 
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Not surprisingly, one lead stated that those who participated in kaizens were generally 
more receptive.  Although it would seem that providing opportunities for nearly everyone 
to be in kaizens would provide a greater pool of non-resistors, the reality is that 
production must continue and the entire shop cannot be pulled offline to accommodate a 
kaizen event. 
 
Allowing people to voice negative comments was also viewed as important because it 
provided an opportunity for management to explain the reasons for a decision.  Giving 
consideration to negative comments would signal that other opinions were also 
considered valid and, in addition, would allow managers and supervisors to look at things 
differently and not be locked into a predetermined path.  The challenge was to do this 
while attempting to focus on the positive aspects. 
 
4.1.8.3 Management Emphasis 
 
The emphasis that management placed on change initiatives indicates the relative 
importance of the initiative and the consequences of non-compliance.  The director 
reported that there was a great emphasis placed upon quality for the customer as an 
outcome for LEAN transformation.  He has made it a priority for his managers to teach 
the LEAN classes to the employees.  If they are initially uncomfortable, they have an 
opportunity to teach as a team with another manager.  The leadership must be convinced 
of the importance of the initiative before they can effectively instruct and persuade their 
crews.  One first level manager also described how second shift leads were matched with 
those on first shift in order to pass information more smoothly and maintain continuity 
between shifts.  There was also some indication that some initial adversaries in 
management had since retired and that the company seemed to move the most recalcitrant 
resistors elsewhere so that they would presumably do less harm to the initiative. 
 
Since this initiative was broadly directed from the very top of the division, it had high 
visibility for corporate headquarters.  Any successes or failures could draw attention at 
very high levels, depending on the impact to programs.  One way to provide incentives 
for the implementation of a major change initiative is to tie results to performance 
appraisals.  One PLM said that 50% of his merit increase was tied to LEAN 
implementation. 
 
One such performance plan for a management position in Skin Fabrication illustrates the 
relative weight given to the initiative from 1998 through 2001.  This performance plan is 
only representative of targets in Skin Fabrication.  The increasing weight over time shows 
that LEAN became more important within this time period.  Although the format and 
headings changed slightly from year to year, it is still possible to compare the importance 
given to various goals.  Table 4.1 provides a summary of the performance plans with 
regard to LEAN and other improvement areas, although these goals were listed 
separately.  The weight percentage is the amount that each area contributed to the 
person’s overall rating.  The difficulty level refers to management’s perception of how 
difficult it was to achieve the goals within that category.  The listing category is the major 
heading under which LEAN was included on the performance plan.  A comparison of the 
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listing category was included to show how LEAN emerged from a special, separate 
program to become embedded within primary manufacturing objectives of delivery and 
cost. 
 
Table 4.1:  Comparing LEAN and other Categories in Performance Plans 
Yr Comparisons LEAN Quality Cost Delivery 
Weight 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Difficulty Difficult Very Diff. Very Diff. Very Diff. 
98 
Listing 
Category 
Breakthrough 
Policies 
Improvement 
Goals 
Improvement 
Goals 
Improvement 
Goals 
Weight 10% 27% 15% 15% 
Difficulty Very Diff. Very Diff. Very Diff. Very Diff. 
99 
Listing 
Category 
Key Cost 
Reduction Focus 
Areas 
Qual. Impr. & 
Improvement 
Goals 
Cust. Satis./ 
Improvement 
Goals 
Cust. Satis./ 
Improvement 
Goals 
Weight 30% 10% 25% 10% (not 
incl. LEAN) 
Difficulty Very Diff. Very Diff. Very Diff. Difficult 
00 
Listing 
Category 
Delivery Key 
Organizational 
Focus Areas 
Key 
Organizational 
Focus Areas 
Key 
Organizational 
Focus Areas 
Weight 30% 15% 65% 
(including 
LEAN) 
10% 
Difficulty Very Diff. Very Diff. Very Diff. Diff. To 
Very D. 
01 
Listing 
Category 
Cost Performance 
Commitments 
Performance 
Commitments 
Performance 
Commitments 
 
 
LEAN progressed from a more tentative and separate policy with very little weight and 
not very difficult targets to an initiative with a larger share of the performance goals and a 
recognition of the greater difficulty involved in achieving them.  The initiative also 
became more integrated into the other key improvement areas, although its place within 
these headings moved.  The areas of quality improvement (scrap and rework reduction), 
cost reduction, and delivery are linked to LEAN implementation because LEAN activities 
facilitate improvements in these categories. 
 
4.1.8.4 Actions Taken Towards Regressive Tendencies 
 
Providing visibility to process changes and their results was another way that 
management dealt with resistance.  Huge kanban cards would serve as reminders to a 
new method and vocabulary.  Digital imaging used as part of a shop improvement and 
other improvements that become an advantage to workers were also used to dispel 
negative mind-sets. 
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Some of the PLM’s had positive attitudes regarding regression.  They viewed 
disappointment with regression as due to unrealistic expectations.  They saw the need to 
discuss regressions early and, during instruction, warned workers not to be impatient 
about achieving significant gains quickly. 
 
4.1.9 Continuing Evolution 
 
In some conversations I had at this division, the implementation of the broader LEAN 
initiative was described as a LEAN journey.  A journey implies an evolving path and 
possibly new and broadening directions.  The future and the health of the initiative is 
expressed in views about the culture, current regression, the ability to learn, and the 
choices made for the subsequent steps. 
 
The culture has changed to the point where people realize that the initiative is not just 
new jargon, but is a different way of doing things and is not going away.  They see a need 
to continually progress and alter their far-reaching goals.  Better management support is 
evident by more teaming of different functional areas for projects in order to include 
more voices.  One first level manager stated his opinion that to improve even more, the 
first level managers must be empowered to a greater degree.  This desire for more 
empowerment seemed to come from the frustration of operating within an atmosphere 
that was unforgiving of mistakes and an inability to advise or provide ideas to other 
managers because there is no authority to do so. 
 
There were many learning opportunities that were used to advantage.  Some lessons 
learned, if put to good use, could be used to more effectively utilize LEAN.  They 
realized that some process changes are better resolved without kaizen.  In some cases, 
though, the kaizen was helpful in identifying boundaries across shops or the division that 
would be affected by the process change.  One PLM said that if you listen to the factory, 
it would signal where to go next.  Some employees said that the gains they accomplished 
were being kept, but that they must continuously and gradually improve.  The initiative 
requires vigilance and constant revisiting. 
 
Openness to ideas has also improved.  There are hourly employees looking for 
opportunities and the management tends to listen to them.  Some respondents spoke about 
giving ideas to managers and the cascade of ideas throughout the division.  There is also 
better communications with suppliers. 
 
There are a number of ideas about where to go next.  The director indicated that the first 
processes at the beginning of a part’s journey through their directorate must be revisited 
in order to make the back-end flow.  This would move emphasis upstream.  Most of the 
difficulty now is aligning improvements from within the directorate at these interfaces 
with other organizations within the division.  The two managers who are dedicated to 
LEAN implementation across the organization had once been assigned to either ends of 
the flow and so understand the implications.  The directorate is trying to move from 
pockets of improvement to linking the entire chain.  This provides a challenge to 
management to motivate their own peers and facilitate cooperation with organizations 
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they do not directly control.  This is different from the leadership they must provide to 
those already under their supervision. 
 
They would also like to institute electronic signaling and changes that minimize handling 
of the skins to protect them from damage.  Some spoke about including their suppliers 
and customers.  They have recognized some cross-ownership issues with changes that 
have effects across more than one shop and the need to coordinate for better 
implementation.  At a time of fewer orders they recognize that they must remain nimble 
and flexible. 
 
4.2 Case Study A2:  Material Flow Optimization in Supplier Management 
 
The initiative called Material Flow Optimization (MFO) was begun with the recognition 
that the value chain of this division extends to the suppliers and that improvements in 
supplier management will be an enabler for other LEAN measures as well as a full 
initiative on its own.  Many benefits from this ongoing initiative have already been 
realized.  Buyers are able to handle twice as many part numbers, inventory has been 
reduced by 75%, and supplier consolidation has significantly reduced the number of 
suppliers with whom Company A's buyers must directly interact.  In addition, tier 1 
suppliers have adopted this initiative for use with their own suppliers, thereby spreading 
the efficiencies and cost reductions farther up the value stream.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
major achievements during the MFO implementation. 
 
Figure 4.4: Case Study A2 Initiative Timeline and Results 
 
Material Flow 
Optimization 
Began 
Min/Max 
Implementation 
Began 
Most of 
Case Study 
Interviews 
42 Buyers 
IIO Supervisor and 
Team Assigned 
Planning Began 
August 1998 August 2001 August 2002 
98% of Suppliers use Min/Max 
Tier 1 Suppliers Have Adopted Min/Max for Their Suppliers 
Results: 
January 1999 
Parts per Buyer:  250 
29 Buyers 
Parts per Buyer:  450 
75% inventory Reduction 
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This initiative consists of two phases and Phase I, called min/max, had been implemented 
in 2000.  Phase II consists of a more comprehensive collection of sub-initiatives 
including kitting and reducing the number of tier 1, or direct, suppliers.  Phase I was 
begun in conjunction with the start of a particular improved product line and the need to 
address part shortages and extraneous inventory early in the process.  This is an example 
of an initiative that spans the enterprise and crosses company boundaries. 
 
Because of globalization, the supplier base is less restricted, but Company A would like 
to deal directly with only the best suppliers.  This requires classifying and evaluating 
suppliers.  The corporation is attempting to make these classifications uniform across the 
divisions.  These evaluations, as well as attempts to buy subassemblies rather than 
individual parts, has led to fewer direct tier 1 suppliers.  Some suppliers who have been 
dropped from tier 1 status might still supply to other suppliers and their products are part 
of the ultimate assembly, but they can no longer call themselves Company A suppliers.  
There is an enormous amount of pride and the related business benefits that come from 
being a Company A supplier. 
 
The purpose of this initiative includes meeting production levels with no inventory 
shortages, working with fewer suppliers, but in greater partnership, and implementing 
point-of-use delivery.  Just-in-time (JIT) delivery confronts union issues because, by 
convention, the supplies stop at the dock and are delivered to the shop by Company A 
personnel.  If the supplier were to have the responsibility of delivering directly to the 
shop, a non-Company A person would be on the shop floor doing a traditionally union 
designated job.  Inventory is regulated by providing minimum and maximum levels to 
suppliers and allowing them to manage their deliveries while keeping Company A’s 
inventory within the given range. 
 
This new paradigm has also required a change on the part of Company A and min/max 
has, therefore, resulted in a major cultural change.  In order to relinquish micromanaging 
their suppliers, they must make their production and delivery schedule more transparent.  
Company A had to share production schedule information with suppliers in order for this 
procedure to work properly.  This is accomplished through electronic communications 
and a web-based network.  Historically, Company A did not feel comfortable releasing 
this kind of information.  Suppliers did not violate this trust, but if they had, Supplier 
Management would have used that information to determine that the supplier was not a 
good business partner.  What they asked of suppliers was to keep their inventory within a 
particular range, but they let the suppliers run their own businesses as they saw fit.  This 
approach helped suppliers prioritize the part numbers and load their own shops 
accordingly. 
 
Supplier Management also instituted changes with internal suppliers, or fabricators, and 
interdivisional suppliers.  The initiative allowed them to use the analysis to look at their 
entire supply management as an integrated system.  This directorate does not have direct 
control over internal suppliers the way it does over outside vendors.  The programs or 
product line management assist in that regard by applying pressure and influence when 
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and where needed.  Since rules for external suppliers have already been established, this 
directorate can affect its influence by sharing best practices. 
 
The initiative was launched because a particular forward-thinking shop in the improved 
product line which had been highly successful with LEAN needed further improvements 
in the supply chain to facilitate the best flow and to make further productivity 
improvements.  They helped to develop min/max.  A current senior manager in the major 
product line that was implementing LEAN was then the assistant director of Supplier 
Management.  He and a PLM from manufacturing wrote the initial agreement between 
the directorates.  The current manager of the IIO had the action to implement it for the 
whole division. 
 
Phase II of MFO began once min/max became a stable method.  This part of the initiative 
is concerned with facilitating true one-piece flow and kitting.  There are four elements of 
MFO:  min/max, packaging and kitting of parts and point-of-use deliveries, supplier 
consolidation, and reviewing make/buy decisions.  The benefit of kitting is reducing the 
number of part numbers in the system.  Kitting may not always reduce waste and increase 
efficiency, as it may be less responsive to engineering changes. 
 
4.2.1 History of MFO in Supplier Management 
 
About ten years ago, Supplier Management and Contracts worked together in one 
organization.  At that time, the Material Management Analysts (MMA’s) and the 
Procurement Agents (PA’s) were placed in separate organizations.  It was thought at the 
time that the MMA’s role would eventually move to the suppliers.  The ultimate goal of 
the initiative is to reduce inventory and shortages and that is an MMA focus.  Unit cost 
reduction is a PA focus.  Sometimes these aims are not compatible if a supplier who is 
effective at inventory control and managing deliveries is not the lowest cost vendor. 
 
The Materiel Management Organization (MMO) has an initiatives integration group with 
a manager and 5 full-time staff members.  They represent former managers from the 
materials management group.  There are also some industrial engineers.  Min/max began 
in 1999 and MFO at the beginning of 2001. 
 
I spoke with two members of the Initiative Integration Organization (IIO) for the 
directorate.  One is the project leader for the automated packaging plan that is used to 
analyze part families and determine which parts are candidates for purchase as kitted sub-
assemblies.  This interviewee was also the buyer who began the drive for min/max at the 
division.  Shortages and inventory were characterized as out of control and min/max was 
to become the vehicle to improve these problems.  They began with an account for the 
worst supplier Company A had at the time.  This buyer was enthusiastic about correcting 
the situation.  The other interviewee was the head of the IIO and was brought into the 
directorate from the Program Management Office to find out what this buyer had done 
and to coordinate the project. 
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The buyer who started min/max began it as a full-time assignment four and a half years 
ago.  This buyer was joined a couple of months later by a team of four shortage 
administrators.  The supervisor of the Initiative Integration team has 9 direct reports to 
him.  He began in August of 1998 in this position.  Before that, he was at the Program 
Management Office (PMO).  His perspective included the meta projects of continuous 
improvement, and inventory management and the specific initiatives that support those 
goals, namely, min/max, MFO, and the automated packaging software  
 
Originally, they gave him a three-month assignment with part-timers assigned to work 
with him.  This proved difficult because the loyalties of the group members were divided 
and the initiatives were huge projects added to their full workload.  A dedicated group 
was critical to their success.  Since this group understands LEAN better than others not 
directly involved in the project, management has been talking about rotating people 
through the group to cross train others. 
 
This is a completely different assignment from his previous one in PMO, but his 
experiences and working relationships formed links with some key people early in this 
initiative.  At the time, his current director was the director of PMO, where she had spent 
much of her career.  Materiel had problems, so they assigned her as a co-director for 
about one and a half years.  She brought the current IIO leader to Supplier Management 
with her.  Then she left for a while for another assignment.  Another major change agent, 
now a senior manufacturing manager in a major product line, had been an assistant 
director under the current Supplier Management director.  The IIO leader had worked for 
that manager on the min/max implementation. 
 
4.2.2 Champions for the Initiative 
 
The person or persons that the various interviewees named as champions for the initiative 
also highlighted the cross-organizational emphasis of the initiative.  Some of the named 
champions were members of organizations affected by inventory issues, but were outside 
Supplier Management.  A champion would provide support in terms of resources, 
visibility, and enthusiasm.  Most respondents named more than one champion which 
highlighted the contributions made by the many different organizational interests in this 
initiative.  Only one interviewee named a champion above the director level and, in that 
one case, the leadership positions were named in a general way and not as particular 
persons.  The initiative may have visibility above the director level, but, from the 
interviewees’ perspectives, the sponsors of the initiative are closer to the actual problems 
being solved.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of the champions along the hierarchy 
continuum in relation to the relative level of the respondents within the hierarchy of the 
interviewee pool. 
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Figure 4.5:  Naming Champions in Supplier Management:  Frequency and 
Management Level 
 
The most frequently named individual was the IIO supervisor, as either the sole 
champion or in combination with others.  The second most frequently mentioned 
champions were the current Director of Supplier Management and a senior manager in 
that directorate.  Others who were considered champions of the initiative included the 
former directors of Operations and Supplier Management, the Director of Manufacturing 
Services, a former assistant director of Supplier Management, and a senior manager in 
Manufacturing Services.  A champion in a higher level is at a higher position than a high 
level respondent because the interviewees were all below the director level.  The levels 
are relative within the separate groupings of interviewees and champions.   
 
The level of the employee within the organization influenced their opinion of who they 
considered a champion.  When the perceived champions were at higher levels in the 
company or were those who represented different functional organizations, they had more 
often been named by the interviewees in management positions.  This does not mean that 
the leadership was not effective at all of these levels, but that it is important to cultivate 
leadership throughout the hierarchy, as employees at different levels appear to have been 
motivated by those who have more visibility at their level.  In particular, there were a 
large number of mid-level champions named by lower level respondents.  These 
champions were 1st and 2nd level managers. 
 
4.2.3 Training and Level of Effort 
 
Initiatives in this organization tend to be implemented by a dedicated team of seven to 
eight employees.  The team may be assigned a specific supplier, shop, or project.  This 
requires changing job assignments by reassigning buyers engaged in buying parts and 
placing them on study teams.  The teams may develop business cases used to decide 
whether the division should fabricate particular parts or only assemble those parts after 
they have been fabricated elsewhere, otherwise known as make/buy. 
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The persons on the Initiative Integration Team spend 100% of their time on change 
initiatives.  The senior managers tend to spend 30% to 50% of their time on initiatives.  
Those not currently on project teams spent a couple of weeks or months at the beginning 
of the implementation either training or on specialized teams.  They no longer spend any 
significant amount of time working on change initiatives specifically. 
 
4.2.4 Generating Ideas 
 
The origin of the ideas and how they are communicated also influences how the 
initiatives are received and accepted.  They did not train their entire workforce in formal 
classes or in as comprehensive a way as LEAN tries to do in manufacturing.  That means 
that the idea paths, the working relationships of the idea sources, and the communication 
means are even more critical to the success and diffusion of the initiative. 
 
At a broad level, the ideas begin in strategic planning activities.  Division goals and the 
plans to achieve them may originate with the Quality Council, a group consisting of 40 to 
50 executives.  Directors also help to establish the vision, according to one manager. 
 
Two respondents mentioned that ideas flow from both the bottom up and the top down.  
A manager said that they are “continually asking people to think of ways to do things.”  
The ideas were well-received, if there have been previous successes in the area.  
According to another manager, the path of ideas and their accomplishments form a single 
thread if traced from those in upper management who initiate them to the employees who 
accomplish them.  This manager felt that the organization had improved its capabilities in 
providing a continuous course between the broad goals of upper management to the 
specific accomplishments expected of employees. 
 
All of the respondents had different notions of where specific ideas originate.  Ideas may 
come from the users within Supplier Management.  Some of the changes may even be 
suggested by the suppliers to the buyers.  Some changes are suggested by the 
manufacturing shops.  It is a joint implementation effort with the manufacturing 
customers, but driven by manufacturing needs.  When subject matter experts (SME’s) are 
solicited for ideas, they also become the trainers, lending credibility to the effort. 
 
According to one MMA who cited cooperation between procurement and manufacturing 
for min/max, they usually assign a generalist who works with SME’s when making 
procedural changes.  For instance, in the Business to Business software project, the team 
member may not be an expert on writing purchase orders, but they coordinate, arrange 
meeting, and resolve issues between parties.  The project leader creates the changed 
procedures based upon the knowledge of experts. 
 
The IIO plays a significant part in bringing ideas forward and implementing them.  One 
buyer thought that most of the changes have come through the IIO, although they may 
come from outside the group originally.  The IIO members might go on fact finding trips.   
Another MMA considered min/max a LEAN initiative because it leads to even leaner 
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JIT, Point-of-Use, and packaging.  This MMA is not in the IIO, but works with them to 
do kitting.  The initiatives group consolidates the ideas and develops them to the best 
potential. 
 
The Company created MFO themselves to encapsulate related initiatives, although 
min/max was a given process.  The specific changes involved with a significant initiative 
like min/max are kept within the project teams.  The IIO gathers information and a 
project team may be formed with representation from affected parties throughout the 
division.  Every team has buyers and contract administrators.  Some teams have a few 
representatives from shop operations.  The SME’s develop preferred processes and then 
the team can develop a Statement of Work (SOW).  The project teams refine the 
processes and are responsible for communication, status reporting, and reviews with 
upper management.  In August 2002, they had 70 to 80 active MFO projects with 
functional people involved. 
 
4.2.5 Communicating the Initiative 
 
The IIO placed emphasis on communication early and used several different 
communication avenues.  They had more hour-long all-hands meetings, but one 
interviewee thought that this form of communication may have been over utilized.  The 
director spoke about the initiative at all-hands meetings.  The members of the group 
approached managers of different programs and spoke at their staff meetings.  A routine 
called staff notes allows them to give status updates at staff meetings.  They also held 
weekly meetings with operations and solicited input at crew meetings.  The project 
leaders speak with management weekly.  Other methods of communication included 
Quality Councils, the web, cascade training, one-on-one meetings, mentorships, coaching 
direct reports, newsletters, informal reports from SME’s, and TIP sheets.  The degree of 
communications depended on the type and impact of the change.  Other types of 
communication that were mentioned included word of mouth, rumors, and e-mail memos. 
 
Although they strive for widespread visibility, the information that is made available is 
not always fully absorbed by users until they have a specific application that requires its 
use.  In these cases, more focused instruction for an individual is required.  This may 
sometimes be planned instruction with well-developed background documentation or 
spontaneous training.  An example is when MFO or a sub-initiative will affect a specific 
buyer.  The buyer is given specific attention and a primer and TIP sheets.  There are also 
piecemeal communications when information does not reach those involved.  For 
instance, the B to B software has an internal webpage on the directorate website, but 
SME’s were not necessarily spreading the word.  A buyer had approached the B to B 
focal and said that a supplier wanted to use electronic purchasing.  That buyer didn’t 
know about the webpage, but was shown by the focal after she had raised the subject. 
 
The sub-initiatives in the Phase II portion of the initiative were very familiar to those 
heavily involved in project implementations, which is to be expected.  However, the 
distinction between the implementation of min/max and the full complement of MFO is 
not necessarily clear to all of the users.  There was not a universal recognition of a formal 
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announcement to launch MFO.  Although min/max has been implemented and seems to 
be fully accepted, there did not seem to be as clear an understanding that min/max was 
part of a larger ongoing MFO.  There remain various other projects under the same 
framework that are receiving similar attention and will have significant consequences.  
Employees speak about min/max as a discrete initiative.  I was told that the contracting 
arena started hearing about MFO in 2001.  They do not consider themselves to be directly 
affected unless a procurement agent (PA) is assigned as a focal or advisor for a project 
team. 
 
Procedural changes related to the initiative are distributed to the buying community by 
releasing notices.  Although the procedures are documented, I was told that people may 
not always refer to the formal procedure book all of the time.  The procedure written to 
deploy min/max in commercial contracts is an example of how new procedures were 
developed.  Only one PA was given the separate assignment to develop the procedures 
and training for the PA’s, with consultation from a manager.  This PA was referred to the 
project leader and spent three weeks working full-time on this special assignment.  Since 
this procedure was unlike anything they had had before, the PA had to look carefully at 
the contract language.  They have to ensure that the company was covered and 
understand what adjustments had to be made.  This PA learned the details about the 
initiative by being so completely involved in the implementation.  
 
There is also an e-business initiative that originated at the corporate level.  This allows 
business-to-business electronic communications and transactions with suppliers and is 
part of the vision for MFO implementation.  One example given for why this division is a 
more innovative organization is their advanced status on this initiative.  The corporate 
level has a longer decision timeline, but this division did not want to wait.  They found a 
company that could provide software that would meet their needs.  Some of the features 
are unique to the division and some come from corporate.  The web network existed 
before min/max, but min/max was incorporated into it.  The B-to-B software is used for 
purchase orders, change orders, and bar coding in receiving areas.  The e-business team 
also tries to think of ways to incorporate what other groups are doing into the network to 
provide an integrated system. 
 
Min/max and MFO have also required communication with suppliers.  Each member of 
the group started with one or two key suppliers.  A key supplier was defined as those who 
made many parts or served more programs.  One form of assistance they provided to 
suppliers was sending Company A personnel to the supplier’s site to assist them with 
lessons learned from Company A’s LEAN experiences. 
 
Before the group made a visit to a vendor, the group would meet with the internal 
customer first and coordinate.  The customer reviewed the min/max levels and decided if 
they were acceptable.  MMA’s and PA’s were invited on visits.  This on-the-job 
experience and TIP sheets, which are written instructions, constituted the formalized 
training.  The MMA’s are trained first in order to explain the process to suppliers. 
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Many of the respondents said that min/max was how they operated now.  Those who 
have been using min/max, but just recently have been called upon to help with other 
aspects of MFO, such as point-of-use, still were not completely clear about what MFO 
includes, although they could see some connection to the particular aspect in which they 
were involved. 
 
4.2.6 Success Measures in Supplier Management 
 
The objective of this initiative was to reduce inventory and shortages and to increase the 
number of part numbers handled by a purchaser by defining sub-assemblies rather than 
details, where possible.  These success measures were established to assist programs in 
meeting their milestones.  The goals of improved quality, cost, and delivery were a 
recurrent theme.  The directorate also wanted to double the statement of work that 
procurement could handle with the current headcount.  They had more than doubled the 
parts per buyer from approximately 250 in 1998 to 450 in 2002.  Inventory had been 
reduced by 75%. 
 
The division has also recouped savings by ordering parts as kits and by reducing the 
number of direct suppliers.  One example for a particular manufacturing cell showed a 
reduction from 69 different outside suppliers for 452 part numbers to 27 kits and one 
supplier. 
 
When they change to fewer suppliers, they do not cancel the contract, but reassign them.  
Some suppliers become tier 2 suppliers and supply part of the kit to the tier 1 supplier.  
The tier 1 supplier has the authority to decide whether to make or buy those parts sold by 
tier 2 after the tier 2 contacts expire.  Tier 1 suppliers are now using min/max with their 
suppliers because they have seen how beneficial it is and do not want to revert to 
managing discrete purchase orders.  There is a published schedule of when the suppliers 
will transition to min/max.  As of August 2002, 320 or 98% of the outside suppliers were 
in the program. 
 
Of 7000 active part numbers in August 2001, 40% were detail parts that would later be 
joined in sub-assemblies.  Buying 3000 sub-assemblies would be preferable to buying 
7000 individual parts.  This goal also aligns with their core competency of building large 
assemblies. 
 
One MMA went from approximately 300 parts to handling 734 parts.  The greater 
efficiency allows this buyer to participate on 4 or 5 other teams working on LEAN 
activities or supplier development, not necessarily the norm for most MMA’s.  This 
buyer described the old process as being a supplier babysitter. 
 
Supplier Management sets the minimum and maximum inventory levels by determining 
the average daily demand for parts for the coming six months.  The lowest minimum 
level is two weeks worth of inventory on hand.  The maximum levels are based on the 
category of the part, which depends on part cost, demand, and usage.  Category A parts 
require 1 month of inventory, category B, 2 months of inventory, and category C, 50 
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days.  These minimum and maximum levels had only been guidelines and not stringent 
requirements before the initiative was implemented. 
 
Before min/max was implemented, outside suppliers could not prioritize their orders 
because they lacked information about Company A’s priorities.  The company had high 
expediting charges because the old process required many phone calls and intensive work 
by the buyers to resolve issues. 
 
An MMA said that before min/max was implemented, buyers had to do many change 
orders in response to slowing or speeding schedules.  With min/max, there are no change 
orders, just changing minimum and maximum levels.  When production rates are high, 
this is helpful.  For slow rates, this may still be good for the company because it still has 
to deal with various orders, but there are more complaints from the suppliers.  For 
instance, a min/max of 2 and 3 may meet the company’s requirements, but the supplier 
my consider min/max unnecessary for that kind of order. 
 
The directorate used various tools to assist suppliers.  One is a master schedule with an 
18-month forecast of build requirements.  It is updated weekly.  The daily min/max 
worksheets contain the supplier’s delivery targets.  On a monthly basis, the division 
shares delinquencies and other metrics with suppliers.  This provides frequent feedback 
so that suppliers can see how Company A has assessed them so they can react quickly 
and adjust accordingly.  The emphasis is on providing the right metrics to drive the right 
behavior.  Suppliers are given the chance to excel according to their own actions.  The 
assessment based upon objective measures also strives to remove the human element so 
there is less danger of choosing favorites based on subjective criteria. 
 
Examples of the metrics kept on suppliers illustrate what is expected of suppliers.  For 
instance, a supplier is penalized if they are below the minimum.  The division had also 
experienced difficulties with receiving.  When the receipts are not received quickly 
enough, the supplier is penalized.  The supplier has the responsibility to contact the 
MMA if they have a bad metric.  The MMA adjusts the measure according to the actions 
taken to improve. 
 
One MMA who has fewer part numbers and fewer suppliers than before found that it is 
much easier to manage.  The workload also depends on the complexity of the parts.  
There are also good and bad suppliers.  This buyer has one that the buyer was 
embarrassed to say they never have to call.  Some must be called four to five times a day. 
 
The web-based network is also used to facilitate this initiative by sharing min/max 
information on the web with outside suppliers and other divisions.  They also use a 
consolidated inventory database to analyze purchasing and receiving data. 
 
According to a manager, the organization has less than half of the planners and buyers 
than they had four years ago.  This decrease was not all due to production rate reductions.  
They also reassigned about 40 buyers to be negotiators to work on lowering unit costs.  
Another product line’s parts were also added to the workload.   
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The MMA’s have reported that this initiative has changed their jobs a great deal.  They 
handle more part numbers, have far fewer purchase order changes and less paperwork.  
At first, they might have had to cancel purchase orders, calculate one-year usage, and 
reissue purchase orders, but once that initial hurdle was over, the process saved them time 
and eliminated what some considered busy work.  They have reported that the initiative 
has facilitated ease in scheduling and has created more of a pull system.  The shops also 
like min/max because it provides them with more space that has been freed of excess 
inventory.  Employees usually perceived labor decreases as mainly due to rate reductions 
and not increased efficiency.  One acknowledged that it hard to say whether excess 
personnel were laid off or if the company found other ways to utilize them. 
 
4.2.7 Savings 
 
The impression from the interviews is that Company A management is committed not to 
lay people off, but to use the remaining employees more effectively.  However, natural 
attrition and a voluntary layoff had resulted in a 29 buyers compared with 42 in 1999.  
They did not hire to replace attrition.  They claim not to have eliminated any MMA’s due 
to the initiative, but the increased efficiency has allowed the remaining buyers to manage 
more part numbers.  The average was 450 part numbers per buyer as of August, 2002, or 
double what was possible before min/max.   
 
One manager stated that the company looked at the increased productivity as “instead of 
how can we do things better so we can lay people off, how can we do things better and do 
other things?”  The initiative contributes to survival because headcount has been 
decreasing due to fewer product orders because less work is available. 
 
One manager thought that the savings might be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  
They have had a 75% reduction in inventory.  Min/max was an enabler, although there 
have also been inventory reductions associated with material savings from other 
processes. 
 
A few MMA’s could credit non-specific, but significant savings due to min/max, but did 
not perceive any direct correlation between min/max implementation and labor 
reductions.  There were fewer buyers as a result of attrition and a layoff as a result of rate 
reductions following 9/11.  Some of the decrease has been gradual and some people have 
been moved to other parts of procurement.  The increased efficiency and freed time has 
allowed them to spend more time on LEAN initiatives and to become more than just 
buyers.  Manpower has also been freed because the supplier handles more of the 
inventory responsibility. 
 
Savings go back to the program at the corporate level.  The operating plan is adjusted 
accordingly and they must commit to this new business plan.  They work to their new 
budget and attempt to find opportunities to save money and reduce risk.  The savings are 
rarely reinvested, but one manager stated that they sometimes approached management 
with opportunities to add people and make money. 
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Production rate changes after 9/11 did not affect their MFO targets.  They gave their 
suppliers forecasted requirements and the suppliers appreciated the shared information 
because excess raw materials cost them as well. 
 
They have seen savings by being able to control inventory without change orders and 
saving the time associated with that paperwork.  They have also reduced material holding 
costs.  They have eliminated the need for three buildings for raw material storage.  
Another advantage of a smaller inventory is that if parts are modified due to engineering 
changes, large inventories can become rework or scrap.  There are savings due to the new 
PA procedures because of the reduced potential for termination claims and the workload 
those entailed.  They expect savings in receiving because there will be bar coding and 
advance notice of shipping. 
 
More savings are expected when they incorporate e-buy procedures.  Savings from the B 
to B software use would include time and other expenses eliminated due to electronic 
documents.  They had not realized these savings yet because of delays in implementing 
the software, but the budget had already been committed.  The product still needed 
improvement, but this division has been more aggressive about this change than other 
divisions.  Some of the delay has been caused by the difficulty of achieving a common 
product because there are 29 different sources feeding it. 
 
Min/max is also affecting internal suppliers.  An example is the skin fabrication unit.  It is 
an expensive process and productivity increases and reduced inventory would provide 
significant advantages.  The managers who understood the issues worked with the major 
supplier.  The Lean Promotion office also has a stronger role.  One of the aims is for the 
different programs to level load the internal shop. 
 
4.2.8 Resistance 
 
Resistance to this initiative comes from many sources.  Most of the interviewees 
described resistance from the outside suppliers who had to adapt to Company A’s new 
policies.  There was also resistance in the Supplier Management community, Contracting, 
and internal suppliers and customers.  Most interviewees were the ones now using the 
system or had played key roles in the implementation.  People named resistor categories 
that were different from the category in which they belonged. 
 
4.2.8.1 Resistance within Supplier Management 
 
Among the interviewees, the perception about resistance within Supplier Management 
was inconsistent.  According to one manager, there has been a minimum of resistance, 
because they have effectively used communication strategies and managed an open-door 
policy with management.  There is a Materiel Employee Evaluation Form for every 
employee in the directorate and adoption of the initiative and related goals has been tied 
to their performance appraisals. 
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Another manager stated that individual “force fields” went up and many employees did 
not want to have anything to do with the initiative when min/max was first introduced.  
Once it proved a success, however, many people may have claimed that they had initiated 
it.  From this manager’s perspective, all of the lower level employees displayed 
resistance.  At higher levels, this manager thought that political correctness gave the 
appearance of acceptance at first.  Some had an attitude similar to “not invented here.”   
 
In general, there has always been resistance to change, according to one manager.  
Another manager said that the workforce was fairly evenly divided between supporters 
and resistors, with not many in between.  Most interviewees viewed resistance as 
inevitable.  Some said that the tendency was for the resistors to be the ones who had been 
there the longest.  They had been doing it the same way for many years.  The seasoned 
people in purchasing wanted to keep a thumb on suppliers.  Some who displayed 
resistance were worried that it might require more work from them without any benefit.  
Resistors seemed to have had many reasons to show that their way, the old way, was 
better. 
 
A number of approaches used to deal with resistance were cited by the interviewees.  One 
MMA said that people just needed to see the advantages of the initiative and would have 
to get used to it.  Many who did not want to change either left the company, moved to 
other jobs, or were laid off.  This was a harsher strategy that attempted to change the 
culture by removing resistance or eliminating the old procedure in such a way as to 
prevent any regression. 
 
Another strategy was to involve those most agreeable to change and improvement.  The 
project leader the IIO manager chose had only been there a short time, asked questions 
about the process, and was eager to fix it.  The employees currently using min/max, as 
represented by the interviewees, were the ones who were most enthusiastic and 
understood the reasons for change.  One MMA was personally glad because they no 
longer had to do change orders.  Another said that those who have gone through the 
change and have seen the benefits are now enjoying the new process.  Some who adapted 
even acknowledged that they may not have supported it before, but have changed their 
minds. 
 
Those MMA’s who are in the IIO may also be perceived as receiving special treatment 
because they do not buy parts as conventional MMA’s do.  In answer to whether there 
have been attempts to get resistors on teams, an MMA said that there are just some 
people who battle for the initiative.  To this interviewee, everybody knows about the 
initiative and they see and recognize its contribution to success.  There has been emphasis 
on including the input of SME’s within the organization so that they will feel ownership 
towards the initiative.  They have also assigned resistors to suppliers who have been 
successful with implementation. 
 
Communication has played a significant role in allaying fears and lessening resistance.  
Project leaders and managers have tried to present a very positive picture and explain 
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why they are using this initiative.  Each week, product line managers (PLM’s) and 
mechanics present success stories. 
 
They have tried not to define this as only a Supplier Management initiative to emphasize 
the contributions and responsibilities of other functional silos.  A manager thought it has 
been successful because they have passed off the processes after development.  They also 
maintain visibility with the project managers because the initiative needs supporters high 
enough for attention, but close enough to the products and projects to have credibility 
with employees. 
 
The initiative has only recently gained particular attention as an incentive included on 
performance appraisals.  Although items such as inventory and shortage reduction have 
always been a Supplier Management responsibility, and those metrics have been a 
significant part of the performance standards for the directorate, the specific name 
Material Flow Optimization had not appeared on a manager’s performance plan until 
2001. 
 
4.2.8.2 Resistance from External Suppliers 
 
Many of the interviewees stressed the resistance from external suppliers rather than 
resistance within the organization.  The outside suppliers may have perceived this 
initiative as placing the burden of managing Company A’s inventory on them.  The 
suppliers were also concerned about being measured to different or stricter standards. 
 
According to one interviewee, many of the suppliers now like min/max because they can 
determine their own destinies.  They have also solicited written testimonials about 
challenges and successes from the more successful suppliers who participated in pilot 
program so that they can distribute them in-house or to recalcitrant suppliers.  One MMA 
said that one of the characteristics of the initiatives group is that they can facilitate 
between parties.  Company A is also large and powerful enough to strongly persuade 
suppliers.  The B-to-B software will eventually have a yearly cost to suppliers that may 
cause concern.  They have had one-on-one meetings with suppliers to explain the 
advantages of the system. 
 
They have not lost any suppliers because of difficulties in transforming an otherwise 
cooperative supplier into a lower cost supplier or an already lower cost supplier into one 
who adopts min/max.  LEAN facilitators from Company A go to the supplier’s site and 
help them to attain the goals required of the initiative.  There has been a great deal of 
importance placed upon building partnerships with suppliers. 
 
4.2.8.3 Resistance within Contracting 
 
Within Contracting, the emphasis has been on getting lowest unit cost.  The MMA’s 
interviewed felt that there was a tendency in contracting to think that MFO occurred in 
the Material Management Organization and that it did not affect contracting until it was 
done and in place.  They did think that the relationship has improved over time. 
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Some of the conflicts were a result of the different emphasis each organization places on 
determining the best supplier.  An MMA may not be as concerned about a difference of 2 
cents a part, but a million of such parts could cost a great deal.  A PA may be concerned 
about an individual part’s cost, while the MMA is creating a package and the entire 
package costs less than the total of the individual parts.  Another MMA complaint might 
involve problems with a first delivery after contracting has changed a supplier because of 
cost savings.  PA’s may not see the sense of controlling some parts with min/max, such 
as those that require large batches like sheet metal or those with expensive freight costs. 
 
Much of this was resolved when the director became involved and championed the 
initiative.  Upper management directed the MMA’s and PA’s to work together.  Now 
each area considers the other’s interests.  The PA’s have received information on how 
good the suppliers are.  They have also compromised and satisfied the goals of each by 
allowing continuous improvement credit for packaging.  They had meetings and some 
head-to-head discussions to reconcile this.  This initiative has required the cooperation of 
other parts of the division and has reached across organizational boundaries. 
 
MMA’s sent copies of supplier testimonials to PA’s who had difficult suppliers.  Usually 
the PA’s did not need to get heavily involved, unless a supplier had major issues with 
adopting min/max.  With practice, people got used to the new process. 
 
4.2.8.4 Resistance from Internal Customers and Suppliers 
 
Some of the interviewees in Supplier Management have played a role in influencing the 
internal customer to change.  It requires a working relationship with manufacturing and a 
group effort to set the min/max levels.  Some of the team members interact often with 
shop personnel.  MFO and min/max have visibility and some advantage with 
manufacturing because a former Supplier Management senior manager is now a manager 
on the operations side of a major product line. 
 
According to one manager’s perspective, the difficulty has been with suppliers from other 
divisions and not internal suppliers.  This manager still described some barriers to MFO’s 
acceptance by internal suppliers.  Although everyone may have agreed with the concept, 
the implementation has been more difficult because of conflicting interests.  These 
conflicts surface because one aspect of MFO would require moving work that they do not 
do well outside and moving work that they do well from suppliers into the division.  This 
manager thought that the strongest deterrent and biggest frustration has been contractual 
problems with the union with regard to shifting work. 
 
4.2.9 Continuing Evolution 
 
Min/max started in 1998 in a manufacturing cell and the implementation is now 
considered complete.  MFO is still in its infancy.  Before the implementation of min/max, 
they held enormous inventory and experienced horrible delivery performance.  Now they 
are refining min/max.  Nothing has reverted to former ways according to a manager.  
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Another manager reiterated that min/max is now how they do business.  They do not have 
to promote it vigorously anymore. 
 
Most interviewees referred to min/max as how they operate.  They felt that min/max had 
become deeply embedded in the organization and that everyone had fully embraced it.  A 
PA said that min/max had become part of the organizational culture and that Corporate 
and other divisions have copied it.  Min/max is no longer perceived as an initiative, 
according to a manager in manufacturing services, because it is the way they conduct 
business.  Although the initial sponsors may have left the division, it has continued under 
other leadership. 
 
One interviewee found it hard to recall how it was before the initiative.  She started in 
January 1997.  There have been no more termination claims.  There have been real 
benefits to both suppliers and buyers.  One MMA described the transformation as 
unbelievable change.  This buyer considered herself more of a change agent now.  The 
IIO leader also thought that it had been immersed within the whole organization, but 
acknowledged that since initiative are his entire job, he might have a prejudiced 
perspective. 
 
This manager felt that MFO would benefit from the min/max initiative that employees 
have already experienced.  They anticipate useful input from people.  Everyone has seen 
the vision they have for MFO, although most may not be able to quote it.  The have the 
incentives to achieve these goals will be met through inventory and shortage metrics. 
 
Another manager said that although, there is still some confusion as to what MFO is, they 
have good people working with customers.  This manager did not see any problems with 
implementing it in Supplier Management.  There has been some reluctance from the 
unions, but, in the end, the health of the company in general will provide jobs.  An MMA 
said that people were not yet familiar with MFO.  They still did not have a clear idea 
about how the company defined MFO.  Another MMA said that suppliers were more 
willing to adopt changes introduced by the company because they appreciate being able 
to do what makes sense and have accepted LEAN practices.  This buyer had not heard of 
any challenges to MFO.  Some interviewees did not use the name MFO when referring to 
projects that fell within the initiative.  MFO has still not gained the visibility and clarity 
that min/max has accomplished. 
 
The experience with min/max does seem to have had a positive effect regarding the 
organization’s acceptance of change.  People have a vocabulary they can apply to other 
things and they seem to be learning.  They have taken the min/max language and have 
modeled it for PO changes and kitting.  The MFO team has sought input from a diverse 
group of people who will be the first to implement it.  Then they issue TIP sheets in order 
to instruct everyone to do it that way.  This MMA sees kitting as the next major order of 
business.  With the old method, suppliers usually complained, but now they want to work 
for you.  The suppliers understand the company’s priorities and reasons and feel more 
like a partner because the company has been sharing information. 
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Some MMA’s see the change as positive because of their deeper involvement and a 
greater sense of being a change agent and not just a conduit for a given process.  There 
are opportunities to volunteer and the teams are becoming more diverse.  They usually 
assign a high performance buyer to help a supplier.  Some see further improvements in 
the areas of integrated packages and kitting, point-of-use deliveries, and achieving nearly 
JIT quantities.  Min/max is still constantly improving.  It is considered a method of 
communication with suppliers and defines the way they write PO’s.  An MMA thought 
that they could not have reached this point without the min/max embryo. 
 
Although the organization has had a positive experience with min/max and change has 
been accepted for the most part, there are still indications that not everyone can or will 
participate actively by applying these lessons learned.  One interviewee said that 
“Company A employees who are not actively doing change are followers.”  Another 
MMA said, “Sadly enough, some people are just negative.  Most people, if given a 
chance, come to realize it’s not a bad thing.”  Another MMA referred to the project team 
in a positive way as “that group”, but indicated by this reference that the changes come 
from above and only a small group of MMA’s have been involved.  Another MMA is 
always surprised to get a call from a buyer asking what min/max is because they had been 
doing it for three years.  This buyer did not think that it had fully permeated throughout 
the entire organization, but had been accepted by all of the external suppliers 
 
Some glitches with advancing min/max and MFO in particular applications were cited.  
One MMA said that they have talked about or “payment upon consumption”, or not 
paying the supplier until the parts are used, which this MMA did not consider realistic.  
Min/max may also be harder to adapt to standards like fasteners.  One complaint 
regarding this issue was that corporate had gotten involved and confused the process.  
Corporate may have a tendency to impose its own way even if a division is more 
advanced or complete in its implementation. 
 
There has also been a cultural change for suppliers.  Moving from 300 to 100 suppliers 
means that some are no longer Company A suppliers and no longer have the prestige that 
comes with that.  Also, originally continuous improvement was perceived by suppliers as 
trying to squeeze more cost savings out of them and forcing them to change their 
processes.  Now it is seen as more of a partnership for mutual benefit. 
 
Another complaint may be how they measure suppliers.  One MMA thought that it might 
be hard to grade a company when there are so many variables at work.  It is also the 
supplier’s responsibility to catch problems in their metrics.  For instance, you cannot tell 
from looking at a receipt when the receipt was entered, but you can tell when the item 
was received.  The supplier is penalized until the receipt is entered which is a Company 
A responsibility. 
 
Other adjustments have been necessary in the relationships with contracting. With the old 
process, the contractor decided who would make the parts and told the buyer.  Now, the 
customer feeds information to the MMA who feeds it to the contracting.  Contracting has 
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their own initiative of supplier consolidation and Supplier Management must prove that if 
they use MFO, it will help organizations achieve other metrics. 
 
Since Supplier Management is a support organization, they work closely with the 
customer in the factory.  Their goal is to be an integrator and to bring parts in as sub-
assemblies.  Their role is to ensure they have the right supply base.  Initiatives in Supplier 
Management and LEAN initiatives in internal suppliers complement one another.  The 
successes are spread to other programs because management has been seeded with those 
with experience in other successful initiatives.  The IIO also keeps in mind that there are 
still other groups that have yet to begin min/max, even if it has been successful 
elsewhere.  Raw materials had only been using min/max for a year. 
 
There is also a new value chain concept taking hold, according to one manager.  
Managers are looking at the whole value chain and not just their assembly.  Directors 
have removed themselves from the daily operations to allow them to examine 
implications to the value chain.  They assign their sub-directors manage the day-to-day 
operations. 
 
A change of personnel in management positions has also changed everyone’s 
perspectives creating an “environment is more ripe for change and initiatives,” according 
to one manager.  Another manager said that the next steps would be to restructure the 
organizational design to reflect these changes. 
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5.0 Case Study B:  Lean Production in Aircraft Electrical Harness 
 
The impetus for the successful adoption of LEAN manufacturing principles in this 
electrical harness production cell was the impending decision to transfer the work to a 
plant in a foreign country.  The cell used LEAN to reduce labor costs by 72% and made a 
successful bid to keep the work in-house.  Three and a half years after the effort began, 
the cell's achievements are touted as a shining example for the rest of the company and 
show what is possible through implementing LEAN practices.  Figure 5.1 provides a 
timeline of the significant events during this implementation and the results achieved. 
 
Figure 5.1:  Case Study B Initiative Timeline and Results 
 
The use of LEAN in this instance followed a long history of LEAN at Company B that 
began in the mid-1980's.  Figure 5.2 shows the significant milestones for LEAN and 
other improvement initiatives for the entire company.  The case examined here was an 
example of an improvement initiative that was conducted within a corporate environment 
that recognized that adopting change initiatives could result in the benefits of increased 
efficiency.  
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Member Team 
February 1999 April 2000 
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Targets Met with Completion of 10th Shipset 
Reductions: 
Labor Hours:  73%, Operator Travel:  94% 
Parts Travel:  51%, SF Usage:  34% 
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Before LEAN: 
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1 Shipset Required 25 
People for 6 Months 
After LEAN: 
1 Shipset Can Be Built by 
8 People in 
Approximately 3 Months 
Current Cell:  26 People 
6 Lines 
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Figure 5.2: Change Initiative Timeline for Company B 
 
5.1 Initiative History 
 
Cost reduction efforts during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase 
identified harness production as a candidate for outsourcing, since lower foreign labor 
costs would more than compensate for the added transportation of the parts.  Since a 
similar decision had already resulted in the loss of 900 local wire harness jobs on another 
aircraft, there was strong evidence that management was inclined to make a similar 
decision for this aircraft.  Five women employees in the harness shop were the initial 
catalysts who approached upper management with a request to allow the shop to work on 
improvement in order to match or improve on a foreign bid.  They also galvanized their 
fellow employees and created the atmosphere of enthusiasm and acceptance within the 
shop.  
 
The challenge was daunting, as their target for labor cost reduction was 74%.  The group 
of five knew that they had to do something different and initiated the endeavor.  They 
asked a union representative to speak to the shop employees.  That discussion encouraged 
them enough to make an appointment with a company vice president to ask for the 
opportunity to make improvements so that they could produce the harnesses of higher 
quality as inexpensively as the foreign plant.  The consequences were serious because all 
of the harness work for the other aircraft had been outsourced.  All that remained in the 
plant of the electrical work for that aircraft was the panel assembly and switches.  This 
vice president gave the approval to begin the initiative. 
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At the beginning, the director had a meeting with employees at which he showed the 
numbers and explained the predicament.  Some employees had already been involved 
with the effort.  The manager of the LEAN department was called in, as well as others 
who had just begun work in that department.  The manager of the LEAN group acted as a 
liaison with upper management.  They started the work in February 1999 and the first 
shipset of 122 harnesses (a set for one aircraft) was finished by the new cell that 
December.  They were still implementing improvements at that time.  All told, there were 
the five direct employees working on the initiative full-time for six months and another 
five full-time equivalents for one year.  By the time this case study was conducted, the 
cell had been LEAN for 2 ½ years after one year devoted to implementation. 
 
The team locked themselves into a conference room with brown paper all over the walls.  
There, the team conducted a value stream analysis by documenting every step and task 
that was being done at the time in the production of harnesses and describing the as is 
process.  The physical construction of the harness was essentially the same as it had been 
in 1991.  However, new ways to organize and accomplish the work could make 
significant improvements in the cost of production. 
 
The LEAN department staff acted as facilitators.  They asked questions of the harnessers 
to determine why something was done in a particular way or at all.  They dissected 
everything.  If something was determined to be a necessary task, the harnessers had the 
opportunity to say how it could best be done. 
 
Some of the team participants already had formulated some idea for what the layout 
should look like.  They also had the understanding that building sub-assemblies that fed 
into the line would help to level the workload and eliminate wasted time.  The first end 
termination sub-assembly is the first work station after wirecutting.  Some of the time 
was saved by utilizing new equipment. 
 
Once they had designed a new process, the accounting department helped to prepare a bid 
that connected the dollar cost to the number of hours involved.  The factory employees 
did not know the equivalent dollar amount.  This effort successfully kept the work in-
house. 
 
5.2 Champions for the Initiative 
 
All of the interviewees, except an employee who had been laid off from another program 
and rehired after the change was in place, could name a champion or group of champions 
who supported the initiative.  Since none of the interviewees for this case study were at a 
higher level than first level manager, the data are skewed toward those champions at 
lower levels who had the greatest visibility with the employees directly involved with the 
implementation.  There may have been more higher level champions who supported the 
project, but their role was not as apparent to those interviewed.  The hierarchy scales are 
relative within each group and a particular level of respondent may not fall into the same 
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group on the champion side.  Figure 5.3 shows the correlation between the level of the 
interviewee and the champion or champions they named. 
 
Figure 5.3:  Naming Champions for the Electrical Harness Cell:  Frequency and 
Management Level 
 
Not everyone who had been involved with the initiative is still involved with the cell.  Of 
the original group of 5 harnessers, one passed away, one moved to another program, one 
moved to a different assembly on the same program, and two retired.  The director of the 
LEAN department has since moved to another plant within the company and the two 
LEAN department staff members had recently moved to other organizations at the time 
this case study was conducted.  The manager of the electrical department had since 
moved to tooling. 
 
5.3 Training and Level of Effort 
 
Some of those who worked through the transformation remain either in the cell or in 
positions supporting it.  The supervisor of the Aircraft Electrical LEAN Cell was part of 
the initiative team.  The supervisor now has 26 direct reports and ensures that work 
moves smoothly and that schedule and costs are maintained.  This supervisor reports to 
the manager over electrical bench whose responsibilities cover three other aircraft and 
mock-up.  The specialist in support of this production line and others also played a key 
role in the transformation.  One of his roles is to research new equipment and have 
vendors demonstrate new equipment. 
 
When the implementation began, the LEAN department asked for volunteers to join a 
team to work on producing flow and creating a LEAN cell.  The team consisted of 15 
people for one year.  Some were dedicated full-time to the transformation, and some 
contributed as they were needed.  It included eight harnessers, including the original 
group of five and the shop supervisor, staff from the LEAN department, a specialist who 
supports the production line, a planner, an engineer, and a representative from 
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manufacturing control.  The manufacturing control person was not assigned to this 
project full-time, but that representation was essential for buy-in from that area and to 
support plant-wide efforts to produce flow.  Although it was a cross-functional team, 
those who came from other than manufacturing functions saw it as mainly a 
manufacturing change effort.  Those on the team who thought that no one group was 
dominant appreciated the way in which the LEAN department assisted them along the 
right path and ensured actions were accomplished. 
 
At the time, LEAN was a new concept even to some of those in the LEAN department.  
They had some classroom training to familiarize themselves with the principles and 
methods.  Before the decision was made to use LEAN in this shop, the company had 
already adopted other improvement techniques.  They had trained the workforce in and 
had used 6S to better organize the shops, remove clutter, and improve safety.  At the 
beginning of this shop’s transformation, they conducted training in LEAN that was 
attended by the full-time members of the project team.  Most of the training of the current 
workforce in the cell is now done on the floor in an on-the-job mode rather than in a 
formal classroom setting. 
 
The workforce was comprised of very experienced harnessers.  Many had over 20 years 
of experience, even if on different aircraft.  Some had been laid off when 900 jobs were 
lost and were later recalled for this program.  One interviewee was experienced enough to 
have spent significant time training other harnessers.  Although many did not have 
specific experience with LEAN manufacturing, they were all extremely experienced in 
their occupation and only needed training in LEAN principles that they could apply them 
to tasks they already knew very well. 
 
The planner whose primary concern is this cell was the one who rewrote the detailed 
work instructions for this cell.  He spent 100% of his time for several weeks working on 
the LEAN transformation.  The standard work instructions are stored centrally and are 
available through the computer network.  He had taken a daylong LEAN course at the 
beginning of the initiative in order to participate.  In addition to planning, they also made 
changes in how material is delivered to the cell. 
 
Engineering became involved only when actions affected them.  They helped facilitate 
flow in the cell, which also aids scheduling, by instituting red line procedures that allow 
them to mark up harness layout boards.  The cell had been building harnesses faster than 
changes could be incorporated.  In the old procedure, they would have had to pull the 
entire layout board, even for minor changes.  Now, they splice the change on paper onto 
the mylar overlay on the boards.  All documentation accompanies the package.  This 
procedure was approved in a memorandum that was approved by engineering 
management.  They use tools such as Temporary Deviation Authorization (TDA) to try to 
quickly fix problems.  This is an example of how significant changes in a manufacturing 
cell affected a connecting organization and its procedures in a positive way. 
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5.4 Generating Ideas 
 
Employees are encouraged to submit ideas and seem to be enthusiastic about sharing 
their ideas.  Although, during the first year, many team members spent 100% of their 
time on the effort, key personnel currently dedicate 25% to 50% of their time on change 
specific functions.  The emphasis must now be on supervising the crew, building the 
product, and maintaining continuous improvement efforts. 
 
At the beginning of the project, if a team member had an improvement idea, the team 
would implement it as soon as possible because they would be able to more immediately 
determine whether it would be advantageous.  The current employees who did not go 
through the conversion to LEAN have been able to absorb the LEAN principles and new 
procedures by observation and just being immersed in the environment.  They are already 
highly skilled harnessers who apply these skills in a particular context.  The workers are 
cross-trained and can cover any part of the line when necessary.   
 
There were other manufacturing shops in the plant also working on implementing LEAN 
practices, including those that produce larger components.  Many of the electrical shops 
for the older aircraft model had not entirely become LEAN, but were expected to do so 
after the cells were moved to a new location in the plant that would allow them to design 
the cells as if they were greenfields. 
 
5.5 Communicating the Initiative 
 
In order to document the new procedures, the team developed a book for the electrical 
department that serves as a central repository for their best practices.  There are 
notebooks with illustrations and descriptions of standard work for each process. 
 
The story of this shop’s transformation from a shop whose work was about to go out the 
door to a highly successful LEAN cell was published in an article on the company 
website.  They have also received recognition in company newsletters and the LEAN 
department published publicity pamphlets.  The article appeared in a magazine and that 
attracted interest from sister divisions and outside companies.  Representatives asked to 
come and see what was done.  The LEAN staff felt that conducting tours of the cell was 
the most effective way of sharing information.  The visible success convinced 
management to bring more work into this cell and they had not lost any electrical work. 
 
5.6 Success Measures in Electrical Cell 
 
Early in the planning, the team set aggressive improvement targets.  The planning began 
in March 1999 and the targets were to be met by the time the 10th shipset (122 harnesses 
for one aircraft) was completed in April 2000.  These targets included metrics in direct 
labor hours, operator travel distance, parts travel distance, and space usage.  The most 
significant improvement that directly affected cost savings was the reduction in hours 
required to produce the product.  Improvements in the cell design and process changes 
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that reduced the unnecessary movement of parts and people contributed to these savings.  
Table 5.1 contains the improvement metrics for these key areas. 
 
Table 5.1 Improvement Metrics for the LEAN Electrical Cell 
Improvement Metric Old Process LEAN Cell % Improvement 
Labor Hours per 
shipset (122 harnesses) 
9389 2555 73% 
Operator Travel 
Distance 
13089 feet 830 feet 94% 
Parts Travel Distance 15225 feet 7470 feet 51% 
Square Footage Usage 13600 sq. ft. 9000 sq. ft. 34% 
 
 
The project team conducted a value stream analysis in which they documented all of the 
tasks that were done to produce harnesses using the old method.  They labeled these tasks 
as value-added, non-value-added, or waste.  In designing the new procedures and the 
physical layout of the cell, they attempted to remove as much waste or non-value-added 
steps as possible.  The order and organization of some of the sub-processes were also 
changed.  Table 5.2 lists the sub-processes in order of occurrence and the number of steps 
by category for the old and new process. 
 
Table 5.2 Value Stream for the LEAN Electrical Cell 
 Old Process LEAN Cell 
Order of  
Sub-processes: 
Wire Cut 
Braid 
Layout after Braid 
Test 
Layout after Test 
Wire Cut 
Sub-Assembly 
Layout 
Braid 
Test 
Dress Out 
Tasks Value-
Added 
Non-
Value-
Added 
Waste Value-
Added 
Non-
Value-
Added 
Waste 
Number 35 104 24 52 61 2 
Total 163 115 
 
In the old system, the orders were simultaneous and 122 harnesses were due on one date.  
They could not level load their orders and could not affect the ordering process.  The new 
process allows the flow of a harness as a separate deliverable to the program, with 122 
harnesses still comprising an entire shipset.  They now use kitting, with three kits in one 
kanban, to supply the line with the materials needed for a harness.  They were soon to 
increase to five kits because of a production rate increase. 
 
The kanbans help the cell respond to a pull system and reduce the amount of work-in-
process inventory.  Movable carts containing tools and production hardware are used.  
The carts have bins, some of which are shadowed with foam.  This system eliminates 
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sorting, and makes the progress of kits and shortages more visible.  There is also a central 
supply supermarket. 
 
In wire cutting, they utilize a two-bin system.  They purchased new equipment to cut and 
label the wires with a laser printer.   The data are downloaded into the machine from a 
network database.  After wire cutting, the harness moves to the sub-assembly 
workstation.  The sub-assembly workstations are cells themselves and were the first 
major change made to balance the workload and reduce cycle time.  They are L-shaped 
and have specific locations for parts and tools, requiring only a slight rotation as the 
worker produces a sub-assembly. 
 
The harness goes from the sub-assembly workstation to the harness boards.  In the old 
process, most of the 122 boards would have to be set up at one time.  After 
implementation, there were only four lines, which later increased to six lines due to rate 
increases.  Engineering had to agree to changes as well so that the harnessers did not have 
to expend wasted effort by placing a harness on a board multiple times for markings, 
cutting, and finishing.  Special markings are placed on the board and the tape marking 
particular locations on the harness is placed while the harness is still on the board.  
Engineering also allowed the workers to cut the wires while still on the board.  The 
process was tested to ensure that enough was left for shrinkage and creep and that the 
harness was within an acceptable length range after braid.  The red line process that 
engineering approved and that had been in place for a year when this case study was 
conducted, improved the turn around time for a change on the harness from two weeks to 
one day. 
 
Another improvement to the layout process was the installation of tilting layout boards to 
replace the wooden tables that had been used previously.  One of the harnessers initiated 
this idea and handled the logistics to acquire the tables.  These adjustable tables not only 
improved efficiency by reducing the need to travel around a large object, they also 
reduced injuries and discomfort caused by leaning over the work. 
 
The bundled wires are covered by a knitted nylon sheath in a process called braiding.  
The braiding is done on three 50-year-old machines that are still working very well.  The 
machines are noisy and need to be in an enclosed area.  They were building a room in the 
new area where the cell was to move to accommodate these machines. 
 
Testing the harnesses for continuity and leakage after it has been braided can be very 
difficult to repair so the harnesses are tested before they move to braid.  They actually 
have a very low failure rate of approximately 1%, usually from crossed wires.  The 
finished or partially finished harnesses are now placed on rolling peg boards which 
support the assembly.  In the old procedure, the wire could be damaged when stuffed into 
bins and moved a great deal. 
 
The movement of harnesses through the cell is also represented on a prominent status 
board.  The status board shows each production line and has magnetic icons that mark the 
appropriate location.  The icons include finish flags, braid, test, and dress out. 
 75 
 
The employees generally consider this a more organized work environment.  It was 
difficult for them to show the comparison side by side because there were not many 
layout boards for the other aircraft left in house.  The cell is also more efficient.  All of 
the tools and parts are supplied with the job.  The crimpers and heatguns are stored on the 
carts and workers do not need to look in many different places for the supplies they need.  
Before LEAN, the harnessers had to get to the tool cabinet early and hope to find their 
tools.  Now, the breadcarts are stacked with kits and there is always a job waiting to be 
done.  When finished, the workers do not have to hunt for something to do.  In addition, 
the old method was organized with sub-assemblies in a separate area from the layout 
boards and not in continuous lines.  The current process is more interesting to workers 
because workers are cross-trained to work any part of the line and can move when and 
where needed.  The diversity keeps employees challenged and they enjoy working on a 
variety of sets, rather than doing the same tasks every day for a month to complete a 
batch, as would have been done in the old method. 
 
5.7 Savings 
 
The largest portion of hard savings came from reducing the number of labor hours needed 
to build a shipset.  A shipset is 122 different wire harnesses for one aircraft.  They 
realized a 72% reduction in direct labor.  Before LEAN, 25 people could build a shipset 
in 6 months.  After LEAN, 8 people could build the same shipset in 3 months. 
 
In 1999, there were 42 people in the shop and in 2002 there were 26.  Some cuts were 
made through layoffs, voluntary and non-voluntary, and some workers had moved to 
other areas.  They had also rehired harnessers each time the production rates increased, 
for example when the aircraft moved into low rate initial production (LRIP).  They began 
with 4 lines in the LEAN cell and now have 6 lines.  They have decreased the time to 
produce one shipset from 35 days to 21 days.  By December, 2002, they had planned to 
start to overlap the orders and have a 19 day build span. 
 
The final result actually saved the jobs, even if some individuals had already moved into 
areas with higher labor grades, such as mock-up, part of engineering development.  One 
concern voiced at the time the case study was conducted was that the workers laid off 7 
years before were imminently going to lose their rehire rights, and, if they could not be 
rehired soon, they would be considered new hires.   
 
In the first year of the LEAN implementation, some savings were used to purchase new 
equipment.  Another benefit to the company was that the Electrical Harness Cell was co-
located in the same plant as the aircraft, instead of in a foreign country.  There were not 
only no shipping costs, but when they have had to replace a harness, the cell has a one 
week turn around time. 
 
Although the harnessers were not aware of the actual dollar amount saved by using 
LEAN, the visible and dramatic changes made in the shop had convinced them that the 
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savings were real and significant.  The company has a reporting mechanism to summarize 
savings realized as a result of improvement initiatives. 
 
5.8 Resistance 
 
Most interviewees had not seen any significant amount of resistance to the initiative from 
employees other than those who were near retirement.  The resistance was usually 
characterized by disbelief that the process could be done a different way or declarations 
from the resistor that they would not do what a co-worker might have suggested.  The 
strategies used to address resistance could be classified into those dealing with culture, 
mitigating resistant behaviors, management emphasis, and actions taken towards 
regressive tendencies. 
 
5.8.1 Culture and Resistance 
 
Most of the employees had over 20 years of experience and were comfortable with a 
particular way operating the shop.  Some may have resisted the initiative at first, but the 
very real possibility of eliminating all of the jobs persuaded the employees to welcome 
new possibilities.  The fact that the workforce was more mature and experienced actually 
aided acceptance in this case because a knowledgeable and effective crew was able to 
adapt once they had overcome initial hesitancy and had practiced and validated the new 
procedures.  The education in LEAN practices and the effort to provide employee 
participation in the initiative also helped to establish ownership and trust. 
 
5.8.2 Mitigating Resistant Behaviors 
 
The project team implemented ideas from employees as soon as reasonably possible in 
order to counter statements of disbelief and to provide tangible evidence that a change 
could lead to improvement.  The attitude of considering ideas until they were proven 
beneficial or not was contagious.  Examples of employee ideas that improved the 
transition were workstation lights and kit layouts on the toolcarts.  This fostered an 
environment where “there is always room for something more we can do.” 
 
5.8.3 Management Emphasis 
 
People were mostly cooperative because the very existence of their jobs and those of their 
co-workers were at stake.  The five initiating employees were essential communicators of 
their plight.  One was a union representative.  This group’s intense communications with 
the crew helped the project team by ensuring that the crew was committed. 
 
One disappointment that could have been addressed by management action was the loss 
of many of the initial crew to other organizations.  This problem arose because harnessers 
for mock-up (engineering development) are in a higher labor grade classification.  The 
more experienced harnessers were able to take opportunities in other organizations in 
order to earn more money, but that took knowledge from this cell.  They have gone 
through three waves of people and no regular floor workers remain from the initial 
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conversion.  If the company had reclassified these jobs at a higher rate, some of this 
movement might have been prevented.  There is a cost associated with retraining people. 
 
The employees in the cell receive incentives for incorporating and embracing LEAN.  
They receive merit increases based upon the results of continuous improvement projects.  
There had been talk about including such incentives for management.  Those in 
management positions may have quantifiable goals to reach a particular reduction in 
certain metrics, but they need not use LEAN specifically to achieve them. 
 
Engineering was also fearful that they would lose configuration control by instituting the 
red line process.  There was tension between the perceived informality of a patch and the 
formal and lengthier procedure for releasing documentation. 
 
This LEAN project was the only one where so many people were devoted for so many 
hours to the initiative.  The LEAN department had not received as much management 
support nor had they experienced as much interaction with employees since then.  
Another difference was that the employees and the management from electrical solicited 
the LEAN department for their assistance.  In a completely separate shop where 
management had directed the LEAN department to take action, they did not receive 
similar engagement. 
 
5.8.4 Actions Taken Towards Regressive Tendencies 
 
Where resistance within the cell remained, it was usually manifested by resistance to a 
co-worker and the individual preferences employees had for certain tasks.  The LEAN 
department staff acted as mediators and set a standard, usually by having employees do 
the task in question.  The work was timed and videoed to enable validation and 
documentation. 
 
One team member acknowledged that there had been slight regression on small 
improvements that had been implemented.  However, the changes that resulted in 
significant savings were retained.  In addition, rehires were trained in the new procedures 
and the cell has been redesigned so drastically that it would be impracticable to easily 
return to the old way. 
 
5.9 Continuing Evolution 
 
This initiative was prompted because of the impending crisis of permanently losing jobs 
at the plant.  The added benefit of showing employees that operating more efficiently can 
actually make their jobs easier was only apparent after the fact, but the atmosphere of 
disruption was the critical reason for embarking on the transformation.  The problem of 
remaining competitive enough to retain jobs is still on the horizon, so they cannot 
slacken.  The current orders are in aircraft lots, so the jobs are safe for the near future. 
 
The validation of the change was expressed when returning employees were amazed at 
how much less troublesome their jobs were and how their ideas were welcomed.  They no 
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longer had to spend time running around gathering the tools necessary for their jobs.  
They were able to reduce hours and keep pace while the product was undergoing 
engineering changes.  When new people have been brought in, they have been meeting 
their goals within a month.  This has been one of the major selling features.  In 
comparison, most of the problems have been with outsourced harnesses, highlighting the 
greater quality product that results from this LEAN cell. 
 
Although the documentation of standard work and best practices has been formalized, 
much of the tacit knowledge collected in the minds of key team members has not been 
deployed or exploited.  Two interviewees indicated that they are the repository of much 
information that has not sufficiently been used as a resource for others going through 
similar initiatives in other organizations.  Their available time is already limited.  If 
knowledge has not been dispersed, the loss of certain key people could either cause 
difficulties in the current organization or waste resources used for reinvention in others.  
Some of this lack of dispersal has been due to organizational boundaries because an 
outside company has built the harnesses on a newer aircraft.  Some ideas adopted by 
other organizations in the company are the pegboard carts and tool carts. 
 
The cultural change seems to reside as much in the organization as in the people.  The 
harnesser workforce is completely different from that which was directly involved in the 
implementation.  All of the rehires have to repeat the learning curve.  Employees who 
have moved are not using LEAN and this unintentional seeding of other organizations 
has not resulted in a call for LEAN in those areas.  This cell is the only one in the wire 
area that operates under LEAN principles. 
 
The members of the cell consider LEAN to be ingrained in the organization and to be a 
description of how they operate.  The red line process was instituted so that changes 
could be incorporated quickly and nothing had to stop.  Even though the kanban signal 
lights were not working at the time the case study was conducted, the process still worked 
as intended and the plan was to hold off on repairing the lights until the move to another 
location in the plant. 
 
The more workers used the new practices, the more open they were to new ways.  They 
were immersed in a mindset that promoted change.  They have written special notes on 
the harness boards so that procedures would not just be in the official notebooks.  They 
have shared best practices among cell members and have helped each other learn 
exceptional tasks that only a few may have previously performed.  Some of them have 
developed notebooks on their own initiative. 
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6.0 Company C – One Case Study:  Quality Improvement in an Engine Parts 
Product Center 
 
This case study describes the transformation of a plant that manufactures precision 
machined parts for aircraft manufacturers.  The plant is located in a different state from 
its headquarters company and employs approximately 1400 non-union employees.  The 
headquarters company is a division of a larger corporation. 
 
The plant, called Company C in this study, was in danger of closing in 1993.  In fact, 
company headquarters had instructed the general manager, who was eligible for early 
retirement, to close the plant and retire.  Rather than find comfort in his own salvation 
and abandon the cause, the general manager reinvigorated his staff and workforce and 
used the crisis to turn the plant around.  The wholehearted adoption of continuous 
improvement and LEAN practices not only saved the plant from closure, but resulted in 
stunning ratings for the cells at Company C, where the first cell in the entire corporation 
reached the highest rating.  Figure 6.1 provides a timeline of these milestones. 
 
Figure 6.1:  Case Study C Initiative Timeline and Results  
 
The CI initiative followed a long history of LEAN or similar concepts at Company C.  
Figure 6.2 shows the significant milestones for the improvement initiatives for the entire 
company and not only this particular plant.  The case examined here was an example of 
an improvement initiative that was conducted within a corporate environment that has a 
formal organizational structure governing change initiatives and a standard format for 
measuring, assessing, and reporting improvements. 
Case Study 
Interviews 
Completed 
Plant in Danger of Closing 
Process Certification to 
Remove Variation in 
Parts Began 
1999 August 2002 
CI Facility Award Retired at This Plant After 
It was Won for Three Consecutive Quarters 
Results: 
1996 
CI Initiative Began 
19 Blue Ribbon Cells 
Corporate-wide 
3 Blue Ribbon Cells at 
This Plant 
September 1993 
All Cells at Plant were 
Red Ribbon 
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Figure 6.2: Change Initiative Timeline for Company C Corporate Level 
 
6.1 Initiative History 
 
Some of the reasons for wanting to close the plant were linked to a major aircraft 
manufacturer's dissatisfaction with the quality of the products from the plant.  The quality 
manager and a statistician in the CI office at the plant began work in September 1993 on 
process certification to remove variation in the parts. 
 
Following heavy losses in the aerospace industry in 1994, the corporation expanded its 
LEAN program and Japanese manufacturing methods, such as kaizen, cellular 
manufacturing, and standard work.  In 1996, CI was formally launched as an all-
encompassing initiative particular to the corporation.  It was the corporation's brand of 
LEAN and contained many quality improvement principles and tools under one umbrella.  
The adoption of the initiative by this plant is the focus of the case study.  The initiative 
will be referred to as the Continuous Improvement (CI) initiative in the text, although all 
continuous improvement activities at the company headquarters were not merged with 
the larger initiative until mid-2000. 
 
The plant became the proving ground and showcase for CI.  The plant was so successful 
that it won a facility award designed by the primary LEAN focal at headquarters for three 
consecutive quarters and retired the award at the plant.  That result was not foreseen. 
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Initiative Begun 
Intro to Kaizen 
Cellular 
Manufacturing 
CI initiative Merged 
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A number of factory workers were given training in CI tools and became CI leads, some 
of whom work full-time on the initiative.  These CI leads were first taught in weeklong 
modules at the company headquarters.  Many of the CI leads have been with Company C 
for over 20 years and have been CI leads from the early stages of the initiative.  A plant-
wide office for CI was established to spearhead these efforts and is currently structured 
with one manager handling supplier quality issues and one handling CI issues internal to 
the plant. 
 
They were already using many quality tools before the LEAN focal from headquarters 
arrived.  These tools were folded into CI and include kaizen events, 6S, Total Productive 
Maintenance (TPM), quality control data collection and charting, process certification or 
standard work, mistake proofing, root cause analysis, gap analysis, and set-up time 
reduction.  One particular root cause analysis tool was developed internally by 
mechanical engineering as a more prescriptive and scientific way of categorizing and 
solving problems.  Since they already have an established root cause analysis process, 
they saw no reason to repackage it as a value stream analysis.  One CI lead who was 
involved soon after the launch said that process certification was the initial focus and then 
they concentrated on TPM.  Another interviewee close to the initiative said that the 
initiative first emphasized quality and then delivery.   "A quality product improves other 
metrics automatically."  The emphasis was originally on efficient manufacturing, but was 
later extended to all aspects of the plant's operations. 
 
The plant is divided into business units that may have a common part family.  There are 
seven Original Equipment Manufacturing units and one After Market unit.  There are also 
18 different support cells and 15 business process cells.  Within a business unit, there 
may be four manufacturing cells.  The number of CI leads varies by business unit.  Some 
may be dedicated full-time and some also work the particular process in their cell.  Some 
CI leads report to a business unit manager and have a couple of other CI leads working in 
the cells. 
 
The manufacturing or process cells are measured against common metrics and receive 
either a qualifying status or one of three awards designating gradations of achievement in 
the CI initiative.  For the purpose of this report, I will call them yellow ribbon, red 
ribbon, and blue ribbon, from the lowest to the highest level.  Audits are done to 
determine the appropriate award level.  In an older system, the audit was done with a 
checklist and it only involved the CI lead and did not always involve the cell leader.  In 
the new system, the cell leader must also be knowledgeable about CI and its tools.  The 
auditor may ask questions of someone on the factory floor and one interviewee said that 
you could possibly fail an audit if the auditor randomly chose someone who did not 
understand CI and indicated that by his answer.  The Company C CI office does an 
assessment before auditors from headquarters arrive.  The blue ribbon audits can only be 
done by the CI focal from headquarters. 
 
When they started the CI program, it was strictly for improving manufacturing and the 
production business units.  Now, the support functions, such as quality assurance and 
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facilities and equipment maintenance are also included.  All of the departments at 
Company C participate in CI. 
 
6.2 Champions for the Initiative 
 
There has been high turnover in management at Company C, which might affect the 
emphasis placed on CI or the perceptions of support, as people observe different 
management styles.  Since the general manager who first turned the plant around left, 
there have been two other general managers, including the current one.  The second had 
been a business unit manager and then the Operations Manager.  There have also been 
three Operations Managers in the same time period.  Some of these managers move 
through different levels of management, some retire, and some leave the company.  
Those in the higher levels of management have supported and emphasized CI to varying 
degrees.  Interviewees said that one may be an active visible proponent, another may 
somewhat support it, and another may not walk through the plant as much as the stronger 
supporters.  Some were described as better listeners than others. 
 
This management turnover is also evident at the business unit level.  In one 
manufacturing business unit, there have been six managers since 1991.  Another 
manufacturing unit has had five managers since 1993.  One respondent in yet another unit 
reported that the tendency has been to change business unit managers every three years 
and his unit has had the same manager and cell leaders for the past three years.  In that 
business unit, the cell leaders change with the manager as the manager brings his people 
with him.  The Quality department has had four different managers in a span of six years.  
Many of the successful managers move up through the hierarchy. 
 
I interviewed six CI leads, many of whom had been in those positions for five to six 
years.  Some still did machinist jobs, but most worked full-time on CI.  Although they 
have seen many management changes, some of the same people moved through different 
positions within the plant.  I asked who they perceived as champions.  Some listed more 
than one.  Figure 6.3 contains a graphical representation of their responses. 
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Figure 6.3:  Naming Champions in Company C CI initiative:  Frequency and 
Management Level 
 
The levels within the hierarchy for respondents and champions are relative to the group 
along that axis.  The respondent at the highest level is in the middle category on the 
champion axis.  In this case, the highest level of respondent was a manager and the 
highest champion was a plant general manager.  These were also the most commonly 
named champions of the initiative.  The higher level champions had greater visibility to 
lower level employees and were recognized as often as the champions at lower levels of 
the organization. 
 
Interestingly, two respondents said that the champion should be the general manager, but 
did not name a particular person, only the position.  One respondent who, when asked to 
name an executive level champion, said that although there is one, he did not know his 
name nor had he ever met him.  There does not seem to be much visibility of leaders 
outside of the plant at the headquarters or corporate level. 
 
6.3 Training and Level of Effort to Support the Initiative 
 
The CI leads are chosen mainly from the machine operators because they are closer to the 
shop floor and can serve as a liaison to upper management.  One CI lead said the CI leads 
"stood the best chance of implementing change to our peers."  They were sent to the 
company headquarters for several weeklong module training sessions.  They learned 
skills such as team building, as well as how to use and deploy the CI tools.  They also had 
on-the-job training to learn computer skills.  One CI lead expressed a willingness to have 
more training on how to deal with negativity and with crises. 
 
The training for other factory employees is deployed through kaizen participation and 
information passed by the CI leads.  Many had already been trained to use and had been 
using some of the various CI tools before the initiative was formally launched.  The 
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employees are also cross-trained in operations to facilitate the needs of cellular 
manufacturing. An employee noted cross training as a significant change compared to 
previous ways. 
 
The interviewees spent different amounts of time in support of the initiative.  Figure 6.4 
gives a spectrum of the percentage of their time that a typical employee may use to 
support CI.  It ranges from 100% for full-time CI office personnel and some CI leads to 
2% to 5% averaged over the course of a year for factory workers.  Some workers may 
spend work numerous hours on a particular project or process change, but there may be a 
long time between changes that affect them or require their participation.  Some CI leads 
were dedicated full-time to the initiative.  Others worked their production jobs and 
punched out to fulfill their CI obligations that could include gathering data and preparing 
charts, which might amount to the equivalent of one day a month. 
 
Figure 6.4:  Percentage of Time Spent in Support of the CI Initiative 
 
Occasionally CI leads are asked to put aside their CI duties and work a machine when 
production schedules merit.  There are also what they call champions who spend time 
working a particular project for a short duration.  The entire cell stops operations for one 
hour a week to do preventative maintenance on the equipment, clean and tidy the cell 
area, and paint lines.  Five respondents mentioned preventive maintenance and the 
appearance of the work area as significant indicators for the time employees spend on CI.   
 
Four of the interviewees expressed some degree of frustration between the amount of 
time available and the time necessary to fulfill CI obligations.  One CI lead who had been 
dedicated to a different project for a few months recognized that not dedicating CI leads 
full-time could send a signal to employees that it was more of a transient initiative.  Some 
of the time crunch comes from combining the responsibilities of more than one job into 
one due to competitive pressures.  Even though the collection of data, such as that on 
machine performance, has been automated, there are still reporting requirements that 
place time stress on those tasked.  The CI work may be used to move or combine 
machines, reduce inventory, or improve flow, but the emphasis must be on production 
time.  Some specialists may only have time to work their projects and cannot help others 
with similar loads.  This might hinder cooperation that could be mutually beneficial. 
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6.4 Idea Sources 
 
They made numerous attempts to solicit ideas from the operators and build a feeling of 
ownership.  One interview stated, "The only good way to get a good process is to have 
buy-in by all operators."  The operator's primary motivation may be making their day 
easier rather than producing the product more inexpensively.  Almost everyone is 
involved in a kaizen at some point and the CI leads try to make people feel comfortable 
sharing their ideas.  The leads provide guidance or put the ideas into the proper format for 
approval or for the formal use of a CI tool. 
 
There is a formal form that operators can submit for manufacturing processes they would 
like to improve.  The part is measured with gauges and the form is reviewed and signed 
by two other people.  Normally, a process change can be made immediately if brought to 
the attention of a mechanical engineer.  This procedure allows those shifts without 
immediate access to mechanical engineers to affect a change.  Sometimes, an operator 
who thought of an idea that is not used is not informed of the reason their idea was not 
accepted.  Although those who solicit ideas realize that nothing can replace having your 
hands on the part, they also understand that the suggested improvement might not be 
optimal.  For instance, the improvement might speed the production, but not produce a 
flat enough part. 
 
One CI lead described the idea generation as a CI lead role with critiquing from the 
operators.  Some co-workers appreciate the creativity of the leads.  They are the focals to 
which workers can bring ideas.  One lead said that working on the floor instead of in a 
cubicle making charts makes operators more inclined to come to him because they know 
he cannot dictate as if he were management.  He described himself as the publisher who 
shares their ideas. 
 
There is also an emphasis on teaming.  Some interviewees described bringing together 
operators, designers, and manufacturing engineering to address problems.  Another 
interviewee said, "A team is a lot stronger than one person.  Somewhere in that team lies 
the answer."  Another, when describing how the group works together to work on process 
improvement, said, "They're the ones we have to please to make the work flow."  Teams 
may generate ideas that would not have been expressed otherwise. 
 
6.5 Communicating the Initiative 
 
The CI initiative and its component changes are actively communicated.  The bulletin 
boards dedicated to CI are very prominently displayed at the entrance to a cell.  They 
show the award level achieved by the cell and charts containing the metrics and the status 
for that cell.  Three of the interviewees mentioned the bulletin boards as a 
communications method.  One stated that someone would have to make a purposeful 
effort to be uninformed. 
 
Regularly held meetings were mentioned by eleven of those interviewed.  At monthly 
meetings, time is set aside for CI issues and there is time for discussion.  The financial 
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information and schedules are shared with employees.  The CI leads also have an open 
door policy with the CI office at the company headquarters.  They used to attend monthly 
or quarterly meetings at headquarters, but now they or Company C CI officer personnel 
can call headquarters when necessary.  Other formal communications methods include 
newsletters, handouts, e-mail, and an intranet.  The results of kaizens are presented to 
management and then the information is passed to those on the floor.  The CI leads spend 
much of their time on the shop floor and are readily available to pass information face-to-
face. 
 
Some of the reasoning behind decisions is not well communicated to employees.  The 
form and procedure used by the floor to suggest process changes to engineering is an 
example.  The suggestion might be the start of a good idea and engineering might 
respond in writing, but the form may be placed on file and the person who made the 
suggestion may not get personal feedback.  I was told that some of this is due to a lack of 
time.  The procedure has been improved from a hand-written, hand drawn version to an 
electronic version. 
 
In some cases, the only people involved in a process change are those who touch the part 
in question.  Information is passed to second and third shift operators by the CI lead, 
other operators or manufacturing engineers.  The first shift operator may act as the 
sounding board for who is getting the best results and why.  Some of the information is 
gleaned from the automatic signals from the machines which, in some cases, make the 
meetings between shifts unnecessary.  Workers utilize simple rules-in-use for 
standardization. 
 
6.6 Success Measures 
 
An interviewee stated, "The plant is a good low cost producer and CI had a lot to do with 
it."   Many metrics are used to measure the improvements made by the cells and to judge 
their standing for CI awards.  The manufacturing metrics include process delays 
(rework), equipment downtime, market feedback or customer satisfaction, scrap 
reduction, safety, inventory reduction, raw material waste reduction, travel time 
reduction, delivery hours, and space usage.  The metrics are standardized, so everyone 
reports against the same metrics. 
 
A database developed by someone in the CI office tracks process delays and serves as a 
prioritization mechanism for deciding when to use relentless root cause analysis and 
mistake-proofing.  Other computer databases make information readily available and 
reduce the search time that a machinist might previously have spent looking for a print.  
One CI lead who spends time throughout the plant said that the work is not only more 
efficiently done, but people are more cooperative about improving the quality of the 
parts. 
 
A major improvement was in equipment maintenance.  They instituted electronic gauging 
to monitor the machines, analyzed the data, and made repairs before costly breakdowns 
occurred.  One CI lead in a maintenance cell said their goal was for a 5% reduction in 
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downtime.  The cost savings were difficult to determine because it would depend upon 
what machine was down and for how long, as the parts have different values.  The 
perception of one operator was different than that of the employee in maintenance 
because he thought CI would do more to assist with operator maintenance.  He noted that 
the machines still break as often as before and that it is difficult to persuade operators to 
do the preventive maintenance and pre-checks. 
 
The electronic controls also help them program standard run procedures.  They can write 
a program to abort the operation if the machine exceeds the run time, for instance.  The 
gauges provide repeatability and reproducibility to a greater degree than mechanical 
systems.  One CI lead described what CI had done as making it harder to disprove a claim 
that you are making a good part.  The quality improvements in the product are associated 
with CI, so the expected quality of parts produced in a cell using CI processes is higher. 
 
Another improvement in maintenance was in the prioritization of repair for the 2154 
assets at Company C.  Since there are 125 people in the maintenance department, there 
were at least that many possible avenues available to inform the department that a 
machine was down.  The old system was haphazard and users had the perception that 
broken assets were the property of maintenance and they would be informed when it was 
fixed.  CI was used to analyze the flow for that process.  The interviewee used the term 
"in tune with what delights our customers," which illustrated the customer-focused 
approach.  Now priorities are set according to the production delivery schedule. 
 
There are also examples of significant improvements from kaizens.  One involved two 
almost identical parts that were 1 ½ inch high rings with 30-inch diameters.  The old 
process time was 18 to 20 hours, produced a great deal of waste, carried 250 pieces as 
work in progress, and utilized four lathing machines and a five-axis milling machine.  
The best operator was assigned to the project to prove out the best process.  They 
standardized the fixtures to accommodate either part so they could process either part 
without tooling changes and reduce set up time.  The difference between the two parts 
became the cutting program.  They co-located the lathes and replaced the 4 ½ hour 
milling machine process with an 18-minute process on a laser machine.  Total processing 
time was reduced to 12 hours, there were only 36 pieces of work in progress, and lead 
time was improved from eight weeks to one.  The projected savings that was formally 
documented was $3.5 million over three years. 
 
Another example of waste reduction includes a kaizen event that focused on a 22 pound 
part that began with a 450-pound forging.  The supplier was keenly interested because 
their market share had slipped from 60% to 25%.  The supplier put a whole new 
management team in place in order to have people who were enthusiastic about CI 
working the issue.  They were rewarded with a climb to a 70% share within a couple of 
years after the improvements were made.  Another kaizen improvement using mistake 
proofing in chemical mixing reduced hazardous waste, water usage, and electricity usage 
in nondestructive testing. 
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There is also a corporate-wide computerized database to document significant 
improvements.  Although one of the interviewees was not familiar with this system, all of 
the CI leads knew about it or had used it.  The entries are not so descriptive that you 
could duplicate it without calling the contact and learning more.  Improvements that 
require initial investments have to show a return within one or two years.  Not all of the 
improvements that result in savings are documented here because the CI leads would 
rather devote their limited time to improvements rather than documenting them. 
 
The most frequently mentioned improvements were the cleanliness and organization of 
the plant as compared to before the CI initiative.  Six people spoke of cleanliness and six, 
including three in the first group, mentioned the better-ordered work areas.  Another 
interviewee used the term "structured".  One interviewee spoke about the improved safety 
due to guards on the machines.  Before the initiative, the plant smelled dirty and oily, oil 
puddles were visible, drip pans were full, and the floor was littered with cigarettes.  Now 
the plant is clean, the machines are well maintained, lines are painted, and items are 
organized in shadow boxes.  Some of the emphasis on cleaning seems to have displaced 
people's perceptions about all of what CI was to do, although you need organization as a 
precursor.  One interviewee mentioned the disappointment of preparing and cleaning the 
cell for a VIP visit, only to have the VIP not visit the cell. 
 
The results of all of these improvements are the CI awards received by the cells.  Table 
6.1 shows the breakdown in manufacturing and support.  Company C is planning to move 
33 cells forward to the next level this year, including seven to blue ribbon.  The first cell 
in the entire company, and not just this plan, to achieve a blue ribbon award was a cell at 
Company C.  They were able to design the cell as a Greenfield because the cell had been 
moved off of the main floor.  Although the cell has since had problems with suppliers, 
they proactively worked with the suppliers and had no slips in delivery, so the problem 
was transparent to the customer. 
 
Table 6.1:  CI Award Levels for Cells at Company C 
Award Level Manufacturing Support 
Blue Ribbon 3 0 
Red Ribbon 34 17 
Yellow Ribbon 4 1 
Qualifying 2 0 
 
A corporate requirement is that blue ribbon cells are audited every year thereafter.  One 
hurdle between red and blue may be that red only requires that two thirds of a cell's 
metrics be green.  They may choose to focus on low-hanging fruit.  One CI lead 
described their three-year journey to the red ribbon level as dynamic because they were 
writing the script as they went. 
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6.7 Savings 
 
The intent was described as cutting waste, increasing machine capacity, and lowering the 
cost per standard hour so they can bring in more work.  Two people from one business 
unit reported that their group had brought in more work. 
 
There have been savings in labor.  One blue ribbon cell had had 22 people and now had 
seven.  They also eliminated a shift.  The other 15 people were still at the company 
working in other cells.  One cell that instituted standard work and identified the labor 
they needed saved $450,000.  The equipment maintenance area cut 47% of its workforce 
in the last two years, including a reduction from six to two supervisors, while increasing 
the number of assets for which they were responsible and increasing machine reliability.  
Another employee reported that Company C tries not to lay off workers, but uses natural 
attrition, 32-hour workweeks, cuts in benefits, and furloughs, when necessary.  A 
different employee stated his belief that the savings were due to outsourcing. 
 
One example of savings was a decrease in scrap rates in one cell from 10% to 4% to 1% 
to <1%, according to the CI lead.  Another example was a savings of $5000 per year in 
nondestructive testing by sending two employees to training on x-ray film processing 
machines to avoid the down time while waiting for a contractor. 
 
The savings are documented quarterly and the business units are measured monthly 
against their budgets.  Business units have reviews with the general manager.  Some 
savings are cost avoidance, but projected savings are committed in the budget.  One 
interviewee said that they did not appear to follow up to see if savings were actually 
realized.  Much of the savings are returned to the program.  Through "gain sharing" all 
employees are rewarded at year-end for plant-wide savings and they see which areas 
contributed to the savings. 
 
Savings are entered electronically when an engineer documents it for traceability and it is 
charged against a document number.  Substantial savings are reported to the CI office by 
the CI leads.  Some savings are submitted to the corporate-wide database.  The audits for 
CI awards are yearly and do not show savings over a series of years. 
 
Projects that are submitted for the computerized corporate-wide best practices 
documentation are reviewed by financial personnel in a pre-audit.  They are now 
requiring submission as a prerequisite or obtaining the next CI award level.  This may be 
a good requirement, as one pilot said that people are disappointed if their achievements 
are not celebrated.  Some reported that the system is not very user friendly and requires 
training to use and this, as well as a reported lack of time, has resulted in less enthusiasm 
about submitting projects. 
 
People also apply to be cost metric champions for a particular project that is too small for 
the corporate-wide system and are compensated according to the savings amount 
realized.  Another program provides $100 that can be used to choose gifts from a 
catalogue to individuals whose ideas save money. 
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Some savings are reinvested at the plant.  A CI lead can also authorize some common 
sense items without a formal business case.  These items might be a floor washer, 
computers, or shadow boxes. 
 
6.8 Regression 
 
Some interviewees reported that that enthusiasm and discipline had waned since the 
initiative had first been introduced.  Although the plant as a whole was moving forward, 
some groups may have found it harder to hold onto their gains.  On the other hand, it was 
also noted that supervisors and CI leads were actively monitoring their progress, could 
take action when they encountered slippage, and there was no thought of turning back or 
discontinuing the initiative. 
 
The leadership changes at the plant and at headquarters may have contributed to a 
perception that there was a lack of focus on CI because new management promoted their 
own priorities.  A CI champion at headquarters who had celebrated and publicized plant 
successes had passed away.  There was some concern that employees at lower levels 
were disappointed because their contributions might not be recognized and upper 
management would be compensated for the gains employees had made.  One interviewee 
who had had his third business unit manager in six years said that management turnover 
had had a tremendous impact on employee morale.  Another business unit whose 
manager became operations manager and later, plant manager, also experienced the 
feeling that the initiative had regressed from being very close to a cultural change under 
their former manager.  Employees expected management to promote and talk repeatedly 
about the initiative if it is in fact so important.  If not, perceived lapses in support might 
signal to employees that the initiative is losing favor with management. 
 
Other examples of regression may have been due to the movement of people within and 
across business units.  In January 2001, Company C had offered a voluntary separation 
package because they anticipated that the workload would decrease.  The following 
March, when the schedule accelerated, there were not enough people.  They still had 
obligations to the customer so CI leads went back on machines and new people were 
bought into the cells.  Allowing for the learning curve of the new workers meant that they 
were not up to speed until September 2001.  Pulling CI leads off of their CI work also did 
not reinforce long term goals because it gave the perception that the CI initiative was not 
that important. 
 
Another example of slippage attributed to absorbing new personnel was in a particular 
cell where they had moved machines to reduce set up time on a process from 1.9 to 1.2 
hours.  As of their last report, it had climbed back up to 1.5 hours, but no one had been 
tasked to investigate the reason.  Another interviewee noted that new people bring in a 
different attitude and the movement of people across cells had influenced his business 
unit's ability to maintain momentum. 
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Part of the regressive actions may be due to a misunderstanding between what Company 
C says CI does and what people perceive about the meaning of the initiative.  Many latch 
onto the cleanliness, neatness, and maintenance aspects of it, but, because they do not 
place much importance on those characteristics, it lessens the value of CI in their eyes.  
Some do not see the connection to improving workflow.  These people may only see the 
initiative in light of being asked to do more with fewer resources and at the same pay.  
This attitude is reinforced when kaizen results are not implemented and the reasons are 
not fully explained or understood by employees.  They think that their good ideas are not 
appreciated. 
 
The discipline required to maintain the machines and keep the work area clean spills over 
into the discipline needed to practice CI principles.  This discipline is exercised when 
using CI tools to design the work flow, putting tools and equipment in their proper 
places, tracking metrics and producing action plans, and holding people accountable.  
There was only a small amount of evidence of misplaced equipment and action plans 
missing from a bulletin board. 
 
6.9 Resistance 
 
The estimates given by the interviewees for the amount of resistance they observed in 
their organizations ranged from five to fifteen percent of the workforce.  Some reported 
that, at first, everyone was resistant because people tend to fear change, even if for the 
better, and because time constraints placed extra pressure on everyone.  Three 
interviewees thought that resistors tended to be older workers with seniority at the plant, 
although many workers with over twenty years of experience were CI leads or were 
otherwise supportive of the initiative.  It was observed by some interviewees that new 
employees accepted the initiative and its requirements as the normal way in which 
business is now conducted. 
 
One respondent felt that the majority of the workers did not think the initiative was 
effective.  Another respondent described the breakdown of employees as 10% leaders, 
80% followers, and the 10% who will never change.  Some CI leads let the last group go 
instead of expending energy trying to change the most recalcitrant people.  If the changes 
are implemented, the resistors will have to at least work to them. 
 
In order to address expected resistance to the changes, a number of strategies were 
followed.  These strategies could be classified into those addressing culture, mitigating 
resistant behaviors, management emphasis, and actions taken towards regressive 
tendencies.  They are interconnected and many approaches contain aspects of more than 
one category. 
 
6.9.1 Culture and Resistance 
 
There was resistance due to employee's perceptions about the applicability of CI and 
Japanese manufacturing and management practices to aerospace products.  Some saw it 
as "just painting lines", doing preventive maintenance, and producing charts on 
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productivity.  Even an employee that stated, "CI is the way of life now," misunderstood 
the benefits of CI and saw the emphasis on maintenance and not work flow. 
 
This kind of resistance may be most pronounced in a particular business unit that 
manufactures more difficult parts.  These parts are at the rear of the engine where it is hot 
and the materials are harder, the machineabilty is low, and the tolerances are tight.  They 
resist the very concept of cellular manufacturing.  They feel their work is more 
complicated than that of other cells.  The old way was described as the village concept, 
where lathe, milling, welding, and grinding were separate.  To them, requiring an 
operator to run two machines simultaneously leads to mistakes and produces parts of 
lower quality.  One employee thought the old system worked better and that cleanliness 
could have been implemented without having to co-locate the machines.  The advice by 
consultants to limit the travel time of parts was considered irrelevant, as there are people 
who are dedicated to move parts and the cost is not high. 
 
The foundation of the culture that is engrained in this community are the skills that many 
of the employees have learned from their fathers and grandfathers.  It is difficult to 
convince some that another way might be better.  People get comfortable with old ways 
and become creatures of habit.  They want to come in and do their job.  Some 
characterize themselves as the kind of people who look for better ways to do things. 
Those in maintenance, for instance, have either been trained or are inherently inclined to 
fix things.  The difficulty is explaining that if the process is done differently, the repair 
might last 20 years. 
 
Cross training is another aspect of cellular manufacturing that went against the grain of 
some who were resistant.  People prefer to specialize on certain machines and become 
extremely proficient at their specialties.  One interviewee who writes work instructions 
said he must now be much more specific because the average operator may be less 
proficient on a machine due to cross training.  This paradigm has removed the pride that 
employees felt for their specific proficiencies.  It has not been replaced with an 
understanding of what might be necessary for the common good. 
 
An understanding of the cultural biases of the employees and an effort to establish 
credibility was considered by choosing CI leads from among the most experienced and 
well-regarded workers.  In some cases, the effort backfired because the requirements that 
make having a dedicated CI lead necessary also remove that employee from production 
or maintenance work completely or for a significant amount of time.  Some of these CI 
leads and even some metric champions face animosity because others do not think they 
are pulling their weight.  In the case of a champion working a project to improve a 
particular metric, other employees may think that if the champion is to be compensated in 
proportion to the savings from an improvement, the champion should do the work 
without them. 
 
The most serious attacks on the culture have been the demands of the global economy.  
Pressures to make outsourcing decisions and maintain a competitive stature have made 
improvement initiatives necessary even to retain the jobs that still exist.  There has been 
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some effort to transfer mostly lower technology parts, but when international partnerships 
are producing a system, all of the partners negotiate a share in the manufacture.  One CI 
lead said, " People think they're owed job security and a paycheck.  People need more 
training in world politics and business and [they] will realize their jobs are in jeopardy." 
 
6.9.2 Mitigating Resistant Behaviors 
 
Many who display resistance either are reluctant to try the new way at all or have lost 
faith in the company's acceptance of new ideas.  There can be wasted credibility if a 
process was not justified and employees felt they made an effort to jump through hoops 
for nothing.  The increase in non-production jobs to coordinate CI activities must also be 
explained as an investment toward eventual improvements. 
 
One example of reconciling initial resistance was an exercise by a Process 
Implementation Team (PIT) to improve the 50% yield from a process by using mistake 
proofing to ensure the part went into the fixture the same way every time.  The operator 
was very reluctant, but a person from the CI Office convinced him to try it for one month.  
After two months, the operator was asking why it was taking them so long to put it on the 
other two identical machines.  The most reluctant operator became an active promoter.  
When employees have seen or experienced for themselves the good results of a change, 
they are very accepting. 
 
Other efforts to preclude resistance were to include more people in kaizens and to get key 
operators involved.  Key operators have the respect of their peers and, if they buy in, 
others will follow.  CI leads also tried to be empathetic and addressed the concerns of 
employees.  When preventive maintenance was introduced as an operator duty, 
maintenance workers perceived that move as taking away their responsibilities.  They 
were persuaded and motivated when they were told that they were needed for more 
complicated repairs and not for changing oil and greasing the machinery. 
 
Many resist because they do not understand why a change might be necessary or why a 
change they suggested was not implemented.  In the first case, it helped to show charts to 
explain graphically what mechanisms were behind the improvement.  This approach 
showed trust in their judgment.  It might also be necessary to explain to unfamiliar 
employees in more detail when a successful change is deployed from one cell to another.  
Employees also expected that the results of a kaizen be implemented and were 
disappointed if told that there was no money for the equipment or tool.  A couple of 
interviewees said that time constraints had limited the follow through needed to explain 
to employees the reasons why their ideas were not implemented.  Taking time in 
individual instances to explain would actually improve acceptance in the longer term. 
 
6.9.3 Management Emphasis 
 
The emphasis management places on the initiative sends signals to employees about 
whether it is worthwhile.  Tactics include monetary incentives that tie compensation to 
performance improvements realized through the use of CI.  Management's commitment 
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to the initiative is also displayed by their actions of support and the resources and time 
they provide towards the initiative's accomplishment.  Providing resources to document 
and publicize savings shows a commitment to share successes. 
 
The most common point made about contending with resistance was about monetary 
incentives.  Six interviewees mentioned that the unclear tie between CI and compensation 
was a barrier.  Seeing real money in their paychecks was a solid experience.  There are 
mechanisms to reward ideas, such as $100 towards catalogue purchases and raises for 
metric champions in proportion to the savings realized, up to a maximum of one dollar an 
hour.  These incentives work when they are timely and the reward follows closely behind 
the action. 
 
One employee said that he did not receive an award he thought he deserved until he 
complained.  When he tried to submit a co-worker for an award, his supervisor was 
reluctant to make others jealous by singling out one individual.  To the interviewee, that 
was a poor excuse for many reasons.  The savings were documented in the machine's 
logbook, the reward could be confidential if included on a pay stub, and human resources 
had advertised that they had available funds for the purpose.  This inconsistency was also 
true for cost champions.  One cost champion said he had received a raise and another said 
that he had still not seen increased compensation after a year. 
 
Company C has a gain sharing program whereby all employees share in some portion of 
the plant-wide savings at year-end.  One CI lead said that some people do not always see 
or believe the tie to CI, even though it is communicated as the reason.  These employees 
seem to think of CI as cleaning and painting more than as an improvement mechanism.  
They might see CI as another in a long line of initiatives and are weary of them.  Another 
interviewee said that the people he encountered do recognize that their end-of-year 
performance gains are due to CI. 
 
Another concern of employees was that upper management would receive an unfair share 
of the savings they created, while lower level workers seemed to be doing more work for 
the same pay.  One CI lead said that, although the performance appraisal for hourly 
employees lists CI metrics, the appraisal is not linked to compensation.  His opinion was 
that their motivation was not monetary, but in trying to find easier ways to do their work.  
Another interviewee thought that, in order to move toward a cultural change, there should 
be a more direct link between CI performance and the performance appraisals of business 
unit managers. 
 
In order for CI to be successful, management must show its support for the initiative and 
not appear resistant.  Some interviewees reported that their business unit managers and 
supervisors were behind them, even when the workers were resistant.  One CI lead said 
that, although CI supports grassroots efforts and soliciting ideas from workers, it cannot 
only go in that direction and that there also needs to be some weight given to 
management ideas.  In a very small number of cases, management support took the form 
of a threat of disciplinary action against employees to persuade them to participate in CI. 
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Sometimes management priorities are such that CI must be relegated to a lower 
importance.  When parts are overdue, production comes before everything, including CI.  
The first line supervisors have the direct responsibility for production or for maintaining 
machines.  One CI lead said that is why his business unit manager I able to support CI 
more than his supervisor.  Sometimes people feel like they are spinning because the 
emphasis goes from hot to cold.  Workers also receive conflicting views when they do 
not fully understand management's motivations.  For instance, they may be told to reduce 
floor space, but then are reprimanded when the work area looks crowded and cluttered.  
The floor space reductions must be matched with inventory and WIP reductions and not a 
selective use of LEAN principles.  Another inconsistency that was voiced was the 
perception that CI leads would be rotated every six months, but many have been in their 
positions for five years because the job carries it's own personality traits and skill sets 
developed over that period of time.  Others complained about a shortage of 
manufacturing engineers who could expedite process changes.  Dismissing the 
applicability of cellular manufacturing for a particular cell may be an unreasonable 
complaint against management. 
 
Another item that does not get as much emphasis as possible is the commitment and 
motivation to document savings and declare small victories.  The most common reason 
given was a lack of time.  If there were incentives to share best practices, it would be 
done more and the workers involved and CI would get greater recognition.  The 
corporate-wide system is sometimes cumbersome to use and is reserved for only the 
highest savings.  A simpler plant-wide system might provide an avenue for recognition. 
 
6.9.4 Actions Taken Toward Regressive Tendencies 
 
There are physical barriers to regression.  The CI bulletin boards that display the award 
status of the cell and the metrics against which they are judged are professional looking, 
prominently displayed and well maintained.  The co-location of large machines and the 
painting of lines are semi-permanent, in that they would take enormous effort to move or 
ignore. 
 
The principles have also taken hold.  One CI lead said that CI had taught him 
understanding and patience.  When management requires that the employees hold to 
standards that has resulted in tangible benefits.  One example was when this non-union 
plant lost work to the headquarters plant because headquarters had promised a certain 
amount of work to the union.  When the headquarters plant could not do the work, 
Company C eventually got it back and CI contributed to how effectively they could 
accomplish it and showed that if they held to a standard, they would be rewarded. 
 
6.10 Continuing Evolution 
 
The CI initiative has had a tremendous beneficial affect on Company C.  An interviewee 
used the words engraved, irreversible, and necessary to describe the initiative.  Most 
thought it had been good for Company C and that they are on an upswing.  One 
acknowledged that they had probably not done a good job taking pictures to record the 
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transformation.  Although there is not yet a uniform culture across all cells or business 
units, the plant is moving forward in its implementation and goals.  They plan to move 33 
cells into the next award category in the coming year, including seven to the blue ribbon 
level. 
 
What has helped sustain the benefits are the customer scorecard showing customer 
feedback, teaming and shared responsibility, enthusiastic CI leads, and the credibility that 
comes from CI leads placing themselves on the factory floor.  The plant is better 
organized, cleaner, and safer.  The continuous improvement mentality is allowing them to 
shrink tolerances and produce even better products, and close gaps in performance 
between shifts. 
 
They would like to get back to the impressive standing they held in 1999 when all of the 
cells at Company C were red ribbon.  The first cell in the entire company to receive a 
blue ribbon was at this plant, and in August 2002, when there were 19 blue ribbon cells 
corporate-wide, three were at this plant.  They have added a fourth since then.  The 
progression from red to blue is not linear and requires a significantly greater 
achievement.  In one comparison between a blue and red cell supported by the same CI 
lead, the blue cell had buy-in from everyone.  The other cell had a weaker manager, was 
more protective of their processes and watched the CI lead very carefully. 
 
Company C personnel are also trying to get authorization to do their own qualifying and 
yellow ribbon audits and to conduct CI lead training modules in house with their own 
extensive expertise.  In one business unit, it is now more difficult to take a CI lead off of 
CI duties to accommodate schedule increases and requires the approval of the business 
unit manager.  There is a general understanding that if processes are to be changed, 
management must invest the resources to design improvements in order to move forward. 
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7.0 Analysis 
 
In order to learn how, or if, the circumstances in the preceding case studies can be applied 
to other organizational change situations, a comparison of the salient characteristics is 
necessary and may enlighten those planning new implementations.  This analysis will 
examine the different approaches to leadership involvement, training methods, and 
communications and documentation as three categorical variables, and the connection of 
these approaches to the results and degree of success encountered in each case.  Since 
success requires overcoming the resistance encountered during implementation, the 
strategies taken to reconcile resistance are also of interest. 
 
7.1 Identifying Characteristics 
 
Although the four case studies are different in many ways, common themes exist in many 
of their defining features.  Table 7.1 summarizes the identifying characteristics of the 
case studies.  The greatest similarity is that all of the change initiatives were introduced in 
a crisis situation.  These organizations invested in the training and manpower resources 
needed to deploy the initiatives only when the costs of doing nothing became too high or 
the consequences of not improving would be the loss of business. 
 
Table 7.1:  Summary of Case Study Identifying Features 
Case Unit of 
Analysis 
Approximate 
# of People 
Directly 
Affected 
Change 
Initiative 
Start of 
Initiative 
Initiating 
Circumstances 
A1 Skin 
Fabrication 
Directorate 
800 LEAN 
Manufacturing 
April 1999 High Costs 
A2 Supplier 
Management 
Directorate 
50 Material Flow 
Optimization 
August 1998 High Costs 
B Electrical 
Harness Cell 
30 LEAN 
Manufacturing 
February 
1999 
Outsourcing 
Pressures 
C Engine Part 
Plant 
1400 CI 
(LEAN-like 
proprietary 
program) 
1996 Threat of 
Plant Closure 
 
The unit in Table 7.1 is the unit of application of the change initiative.  They can be 
classified according to functional area, technology level, or complexity of operations.  
The description of the functional area may be useful for determining if this comparison is 
applicable in other situations in different functional areas.  LEAN activities have 
typically been concentrated in manufacturing environments, but many companies are 
attempting to leverage their success with improvement programs by applying similar 
principles to business processes other than production.  Both cases A1 and B are in 
manufacturing units.  Case A2 applies to a business process in purchasing and inventory 
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control.  Case C is an entire plant and, although the initial emphasis was on 
manufacturing, the initiative was extended to the support and process cells. 
 
Information about the technology level of each case may also be useful when considering 
their applications to other situations.  It may also have some bearing on the environment 
of acceptance for change initiatives.  Some employees may view LEAN-like principles as 
more useful for less sophisticated products produced in large quantities than for those in 
the aerospace industry.  Both case A1 and case C involve the manufacture of high 
technology parts.  The company in case C produces precision machined parts for high 
performance products and some cells manufacture more difficult parts that have tighter 
tolerances or that must withstand high heat.  Case A1 includes the stretching, chemical 
milling, and etching of skin panels, which are expensive processes.  Case B is an 
assembly process and, although the final system is complex, the highest technology 
required in the cell is the testing for continuity.  Case A2 deals with expediters and the 
technological means are the telephone, e-mail, and the web, as well as parts databases. 
 
The level of complexity of operations refers to how the unit is interconnected to other 
organizations and how many requirements it must handle and from whom.  This may 
influence the speed of diffusion because there may be more parties or sub-organizations 
with differing interests that need to be convinced to adopt the initiative.  If there are more 
organizations involved, the success or failure of the initiative may have a wider impact.  
Cases A1, A2, and C produce parts for or support multiple product lines.  The directorate 
in case A1 is an internal supplier to all of the major product lines in the division.  The 
directorate in case A2 also provides division-wide support and must coordinate 
purchasing with external suppliers, internal contracting, and corporate supplier 
management.  I would consider cases A1 and A2 very close in level of complexity, but 
rank A2 higher because of the numerous external contacts.  In case C, the unit studied 
was the entire plant.  Their staff has to answer to the program offices at the headquarters 
company.  Case B assembles many different harnesses, but for only one program.  Table 
7.2 provides a rank order as a comparison for the organizations. 
 
Table 7.2:  Technology Level and Operations Complexity of Case Studies 
Rank 
(Highest to Lowest) 
Technology Level Complexity of 
Operations 
1 C C 
2 A1 A2 
3 B A1 
4 A2 B 
 
7.2 Success and Regression 
 
The units in the case studies all had some degree of dramatic success compared with their 
previous states.  These successes and their attendant savings allowed them to reverse the 
trends that placed them in their initial predicaments.  Table 7.3 lists the success measures 
and areas of savings for the cases.  The reductions highlighted in success measures 
contributed to the financial savings.  All of the case studies showed significant savings in 
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labor, material, or process time.  In all of the case studies, the savings reduced the unit 
cost and were committed in their budgets or business plans in order to establish 
accountability.  This allowed them to keep work they might have lost or to bring in more 
work with the same size workforce. 
 
Table 7.3:  Success Measures and Savings 
Case Success Measures Area of Savings 
A1 • Shortages reduced by 98% 
• Rework and Repair Costs reduced by 25% 
• Scrap Costs reduced by 42% 
• Cycle Time from 44 to 21 days 
• Employee Satisfaction improved by 14 points 
• Part number consolidation 
• Material Costs 
• Overtime reduction 
• Headcount reduction due 
to lower rates and natural 
attrition 
A2 • Part Numbers per buyer increased from 225 to 
450 
• Part number reduction from kitting 
• Supplier consolidation 
• Lower inventory 
• Fewer shortages 
• Half the planners and buyers 
• Smaller, more efficient 
workforce 
• Material Holding Costs 
B • Labor Hours reduced 73% 
• Operator travel distance reduced 94% 
• Parts travel distance reduced 51% 
• Square Footage usage reduced 34% 
• Turnaround on changes from 2 weeks to one 
day 
• Labor Hours 
C • Many high level CI Awards Won at this plant 
(3 out of 19 corporate-wide blue ribbons) 
• More organized and cleaner work environment 
• Rework reduction 
• Scrap reduction 
• 5% Reduction in equipment downtime 
• Travel time reduction 
• Inventory reduction 
• Set up time reduction; Standard run 
procedures;  Tooling (one example saved $3.5 
million over three years) 
• Square footage reduction 
• Improved Safety 
• Improved Customer Satisfaction 
• Labor Hours;  natural 
attrition and movement 
within company 
• Raw material costs 
 
 
The degree of regression to former practices or processes is also a measure of how 
successfully the initiatives have been diffused into the organizations.  Regression is 
defined as a full or partial return to the old method or process or a full or partial 
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discontinuance of changes adopted during the initiative implementation.  The 
characteristics of the regression also provide some observations about how it may have 
been prevented and different perspectives within the organizations about the extent of 
regression.  Table 7.4 summarizes the characteristics of regression in each case study.  In 
none of the cases studies did there seem to be any formal measurement mechanism in 
place to compare degree of regression against decreases in success measures.  Some 
regression was considered realistic and understandable, as long as they were achieving 
their objectives, even without full compliance to new procedures. 
 
The characteristics of regression have been placed in three categories.  Indications of 
regression are those that are evident from observation or that were mentioned as 
examples in interviews.  The prevailing perceptions given by interviewees related to 
regression are also described.  In case B, high employee turnover had resulted in some 
regression as rehires who had only been familiar with the old method were trained to use 
the new procedures and work within the changed environment.  Information about 
management turnover was also included because that could influence the emphasis 
placed on adopting the initiative and the amount of resources dedicated to implementing 
it.  Some of the sub-organizations in case C experienced regression due to frequent 
management changes because different managers placed a different priority on the 
initiative. 
 
The strongest defenses against regression were not supporting the old process or making 
permanent or semi-permanent physical changes to the work area.  In case A2, the process 
was so completely changed that purchasers could not use the old method.  The rest of the 
initiative was still being deployed and there was some variation in how well employees 
understood the other sub-initiatives.  In case B, the harness cell was reconfigured so 
differently from how it had been before that employees would have to learn and use the 
new method.  The improved work flow was such that employees preferred it to how it 
had been before once they learned the new rules and vocabulary of cellular 
manufacturing. 
 
In both A1 and C, there was some disagreement among interviewees as to the extent and 
significance of regression.  In case A1, lower production rates allowed a reversion to a 
hot list, which a manager viewed as a placebo.  Some employees thought that they were 
doing work in much the same way as before, but with fewer people.  In case C, some 
employees misunderstood the emphasis placed on a clean and organized work area as not 
contributing to improved work flow. 
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Table 7.4:  Characteristics of Regression in the Case Studies 
Case Indications Employee Perceptions Contribution of Personnel 
Turnover 
A1 • Discontinuance of 
Kanban cards 
• Reversion to Hot List 
(placebo or lower rates?) 
• Regression allowed if 
improvement not 
effective 
• Different responses 
within organization 
• Perception that 
product produced the 
same way with fewer 
people 
• Shifted focus after 
Kaizen 
• Satisfaction with 
improvements in metrics 
regardless of whether 
LEAN is the reason 
• Not mentioned as a 
factor (80% of workforce 
trained in LEAN) 
A2 • None reported (New 
process is the only one 
available) 
• Lack of visibility of 
some electronic 
capabilities 
• Min/max described as 
"how we operate" 
• Not mentioned as a 
factor 
B • Very few:  Some 
signal lights not used;  
awaiting repair for when 
cell is moved 
• Not using the old 
process because it does 
not exist on this program 
anymore 
• Learning curve for 
rehires; high employee 
turnover 
C • Progress monitored 
constantly;  disagreement 
over how well slippage 
was tracked and resolved 
• Number of cells at 
each CI award level are 
increasing 
• Some 
misunderstanding of 
principles of cellular 
manufacturing;  
perception that emphasis 
is on cleanliness, not 
work flow 
• Waning enthusiasm 
since launch and 
dramatic gains made at 
the beginning 
• High management 
turnover contributed to 
perceptions about 
changing importance of 
initiative 
• Voluntary separation 
offered in January 2001 
contributed to employee 
turnover and new hire 
learning curve 
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7.3 Resistance and Reconciliation 
 
The resistance against the initiatives encountered in the companies studied also offers 
observations of how effective certain strategies were at reconciling resistors, achieving 
acceptance, and redirecting people's energy toward productivity improvement.  Table 7.5 
compares the attributes of the resistance in terms of the resistors and how they exhibited 
their resistance. 
 
Table 7.5:  Characteristics of the Resistors and Resistance 
Characteristics of Resistors Case 
% of 
Workforce 
Age and Experience Specific Interests 
Characteristics of 
Resistance 
A1 • Estimates 
of 5%-30% 
• Some newer, 
some senior 
• Lower level mgrs 
with competing 
expectations 
• Shop employees 
worried about job 
loss 
• Unwilling to 
participate in 
LEAN classes 
• Apathy 
• Working 
around system 
A2 • Within 
Directorate:  
50%  
• Tended to be of 
higher seniority;  
wanted more control 
over suppliers 
• Outside 
suppliers:  Added 
work; Loss of status;  
Stricter measurement 
• Contracting:  
Emphasis on lower 
unit cost and not 
other qualities of 
supplier 
• Internal 
Customers and 
Suppliers:  
Make/Buy; 
contractual barriers 
to moving work 
• Complaints, 
worry 
• Aversion to 
changing practices 
• Uncooperative 
behavior 
B • Very 
Few 
• Usually from 
those near retirement 
• All were aware 
that every job was on 
the line 
• Disbelief 
• Unwilling to 
take direction 
C • Estimates 
of 5% to 
15% 
• Tended to have 
high seniority 
• Some who 
produced more 
difficult parts thought 
that cellular 
manufacturing was 
not adaptable 
• Uncooperative 
behavior 
• Complaints 
that cellular 
manufacturing 
was not applicable 
to their product 
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There was not always agreement about what kinds of people offered the most resistance.  
Although many interviewees said that the resistors tended to be those with over 20 years 
of experience and preferred to keep the status quo, many employees with high seniority 
were tapped to lead the initiative and were very effective.  Many years of experience may 
be a common trait among resistors, but is not a predictor of resistant behavior.  On the 
other hand, newer employees seemed to have come of age in a world of constant change 
and are generally accepting of initiatives in the workplace.  Most of the resistance was 
characterized by uncooperative behavior and complaints and did not jeopardize the 
implementation of the initiatives.  Only a few exceptional cases required the movement 
of individuals or threat of disciplinary action. 
 
I classified reconciliation strategies into four categories.  They included consideration of 
cultural issues, mitigating resistant behavior, management emphasis, and actions taken 
towards regressive tendencies.  The strategies are interconnected and many approaches 
contain aspects of more than one category, although they are listed under the heading for 
which they are most relevant.  Cultural issues are those that define the inherent 
characteristics of the company and its workforce.  The culture is influenced by company 
history, relationships with unions, and the particular personalities that shaped the 
structure of the organization.  Practices that attempt to mitigate resistant behavior are 
those that stress openness, inclusiveness, and participation.  The incentives, monetary and 
otherwise, and other resources and support that management provides for the initiative 
implementation are items listed under management emphasis.  Companies also take 
actions and proactively implement policies to counter regressive tendencies.  Figure 7.1 
contains an illustration in which I use a brick wall as a metaphor for resistance and depict 
the relationships with the strategies mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1:  Reconciliation Strategies to Counter Resistance 
 
Mitigating Resistant 
Behaviors 
Actions Taken Towards 
Regressive Tendencies 
Paths away from the wall 
The Brick Wall of Resistance 
Management Emphasis 
The grass is greener on this side 
Cultural Issues 
At the foundation 
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Table 7.6 summarizes the strategies used by the organizations to address the issue of 
resistance and reconcile resistors.  The approach that interviewees found most effective 
or which predominated the responses for each case is in bold face.  Items that caused 
problems or were not addressed or resolved are italicized.  The reconciliation strategies 
included addressing cultural issues, mitigating resistant behavior, choices or efforts 
management made about placing emphasis on the initiative, and actions taken toward the 
tendency to regress. 
 
Cultural issues included union rule considerations, easing fear of leaking proprietary 
information by sharing production schedules with external suppliers, and using the 
combined knowledge and skills embedded in the workforce.  These strategies addressed 
deeply embedded paradigms that might have prevented the adoption of the initiative.  In 
case A1, the union had to be brought into discussions early because cellular 
manufacturing and point-of-use delivery would require an acknowledgement that job 
descriptions might be changed or merged.  The long held belief that sharing schedule 
information might jeopardize competitive posture and should be closely guarded had to 
be overcome in case A2.  Consulting experienced and respected employees and including 
them in key positions related to the implementation was followed in all of the cases, but 
was considered even more crucial in cases B and C.  
 
Participation in kaizen events in the manufacturing cases and broadening the pool for the 
solicitation of ideas were ways to mitigate resistant behaviors.  In case B, the 
environment that was created provided openness to new ideas and the expression of this 
environment was described as contagious because all members of the organization felt 
that their ideas were welcomed.  Key operators and subject matter experts were enlisted 
as idea sources and to validate new methods in the case studies.  Presumably, these 
experts had a better understanding of the existing process and what needed to be 
accomplished so that they could both make sound choices about what attempts were 
feasible and added credibility by their support once a particular path was chosen. 
 
Monetary incentives tied to the performance of individuals or the organization was the 
most effective way in which management could motivate employees.  Most interviewees 
could better appreciate the financial advantages to the company caused by the initiative if 
their own financial outlook was improved.  Although an understanding that the fiscal 
strength and stability of the company would enable it to provide and maintain jobs was 
important, most people felt that they should be sharing in the gains to which they were 
contributing.  The objectives of the initiative were also clearer and more well-defined 
when employees could link the organizational and personal outcomes. 
 
Those organizations with the most dramatic redesign or in which the older process was 
no longer supported precluded the greatest avenues for regression.  In cases B and C the 
workspaces had been reorganized and heavy equipment had been moved so that the work 
flow could not easily revert to the old procedures.  The older inventory process was no 
longer supported by the supplier management directorate in case A2 and all inventory 
levels were set and purchases were made based on the new system.  The LEAN 
vocabulary was so ingrained in the minds of many of the employees in case A1 because 
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of the company's commitment to training and kaizens, that even the regressions that were 
noted were explained using LEAN concepts. 
 
Table 7.6:  Reconciliation Strategies 
Case Cultural Issues Mitigating Resistant Behaviors 
A1 • Cumulative work experience 
emphasized in training 
• Consideration of union issues 
• Tough talk:  "Get onboard or get out 
of the way." 
• Nurturing a core group of respected 
workers 
• Peer pressure 
• Kaizen participation 
• Using negative comments as an 
opportunity for explanation 
A2 • "Not invented here" countered with 
success stories 
• Natural attrition:  movement to 
other jobs or companies, lay offs 
• Assignment of resistors to 
successful suppliers 
• Allowing information to be 
shared with suppliers 
• Written testimonials from suppliers 
• Involved most enthusiastic 
employees 
• Included input of SME's 
• Electronic communications and B-
to-B 
• Team member interaction with shop 
personnel 
B • Mature and knowledgeable 
workforce was able to overcome 
initial hesitancy 
• Ownership and trust 
• Implemented ideas quickly 
• Openness to ideas was contagious 
C • CI leads chosen from among 
experienced and respected employees 
• Some employees do not think 
cellular manufacturing applies to their 
product 
• Skills passed through generations; 
attachment to tradition 
• Cross training requires more 
specific work instructions to counter 
decreased specialization 
• Persuading resistors to try the new 
method for trial periods 
• Kaizen participation 
• Key operator participation 
• Showing data to justify change 
• Many times there was no time to 
provide feedback to employees to 
explain decisions 
Legend: 
Boldface = Approaches that interviewees found most effective or which predominated 
the responses for each case. 
Italicized = Items that caused problems or were not addressed or resolved. 
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Table 7.6 (continued):  Reconciliation Strategies 
Case Management Emphasis Actions Taken Towards Regressive 
Tendencies 
A1 • Mgmt must teach LEAN classes 
• Visibility of initiative with upper 
mgmt 
• Specific goals on performance 
appraisals tied to initiative and merit 
increases 
• Visibility of new vocabulary 
• Digital imaging 
• Warn workers not to be impatient or 
have unreasonable expectation 
A2 • Open door communication with 
mgmt 
• Initiative goals tied to 
performance appraisals 
• Director involvement in issues with 
contracting 
• Passed off processes after 
development 
• Old process no longer supported 
B • Union support 
• Merit increases based upon 
improvements 
• Only project that received such 
support 
• Did not raise labor grade to counter 
employee movement 
• Documenting standards 
• Drastic redesign of process (Old 
process does not exist on this program 
anymore.) 
C • Unclear tie between CI 
performance, employee appraisals, and 
compensation 
• $100 awards to reward ideas that 
result in savings 
• Gain Sharing for all employees at 
year-end based on company 
performance 
• Metric champion raises 
• High management turnover 
sometimes caused confusion about 
priorities among workforce 
• Not enough time given to document 
all projects 
• Prominent CI bulletin boards 
• Redesign of cells and movement 
of heavy equipment 
• Rewarded with a return of 
previously lost work 
• Held to standards 
Legend: 
Boldface = Approaches that interviewees found most effective or which predominated 
the responses for each case. 
Italicized = Items that caused problems or were not addressed or resolved. 
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7.4 Testing the Hypotheses and Drawing Conclusions 
 
To extract lessons from the case studies, I return to the hypotheses in Section 1.3.  The 
hypotheses relate a number of concepts that emerge from the data.  These concepts are 
leadership, training, and communications and documentation.  In order to relate these 
concepts, I used classification procedures and axial coding as described by Strauss and 
Corbin.21  Since qualitative analysis is interpretive in nature, the researcher formulates the 
explanatory scheme from the concepts defined by the data and their relationships to each 
other.  The data were not numerical, but can be analyzed by looking at the properties and 
dimensions of sub-categories and understanding how they are linked.  The properties of 
the variables can be scaled from low to high.  Two by two matrices showing the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables will be used to visualize 
the relationships. 
 
7.4.1 Leadership 
 
Hypothesis 1.  If lower level leadership is more committed to the initiative, there will be 
less regression, even if measures were not taken to make the changes to the process 
irreversible. 
 
The first hypothesis relates the concept of leadership to the concept of regression.  It 
further specifies lower level leadership as a sub-category.  The measure of lower level 
leadership commitment in the case studies was the interview question that asked who the 
interviewee considered to be the champion for the initiative.  The champions were visible 
supporters of the initiative who provided resources for implementation and were actively 
engaged in the process.  It was observed that lower level leadership had more visibility 
with the operational employees whose cooperation is necessary to make the change 
initiative a reality.  Figure 7.2 contains a composite of all of the champion plots from the 
case studies and offers a side-by-side comparison of the strength of lower level 
leadership. 
                                                 
21 Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet, Basics of Qualitative Research, Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (Thousand Oaks, California, Sage 
Publications, 1998) 
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 Figure 7.2:  Composite of Champion Plots for All Case Studies 
 
In Figure 7.2, the horizontal axes refer to the relative position in the organization's 
hierarchy of those named as champions.  The relative position of the respondents is 
shown on the vertical axis.  The size of the circle indicates the number of times a 
champion at a particular level was named by interviewees at any of three levels.  For 
instance, in case A1, seven champions at a high level within the hierarchy were named by 
higher level interviewees.  A high respondent may not necessarily be a high champion 
because the axes are scaled to those within the same category of respondent or champion.   
 
In case A1, the champions named by lower level respondents were concentrated in the 
middle.  Middle and higher level respondents tended to name high level champions.  In 
case A2, the champions named by lower level respondents were also concentrated in the 
middle.  Respondents at the highest level only named high level champions.  In case B, 
lower level champions predominated, but there were no high level respondents.  
Champions at the middle and higher levels within the plant dominated the responses in 
case C for lower level respondents. 
 
The trend depicted by the arrows is that people tended to recognize the leadership of their 
more immediate supervisors or of higher managers more closely associated with their 
organizations.  If people had only named their immediate supervisors, you would expect 
all of the points to be along the diagonal.  The most populated areas tended to be below 
the diagonals and the upper diagonals were very sparse or empty.  The dispersion of the 
data within the lower diagonals shows that people were looking to higher levels for 
visible champions, but they were not ignoring the leaders at lower levels or those in the 
middle. 
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According to Rogers22, people are influenced by peers or from those in adopter categories 
not too far distant from their own.  This would indicate that leadership is required 
throughout the organization.  Opinion leaders play a significant role in influencing their 
peers and are found in every adopter category.  That means accessibility to opinion 
leaders who support the initiative must be encouraged.  The opinion leaders who affect 
opinions cannot be much higher in status than those they wish to influence.  People need 
reinforcement and validation from peers or near-peers.  High level champions may 
influence the opinions of their subordinates, but need an group of lower and middle level 
opinion leaders situated throughout the organization who can directly control the actual 
implementation, assess its effectiveness, and adjust their actions and those of their own 
subordinates. 
 
Since the initiatives must be diffused and accepted by the lower level employees in order 
to function as intended, I will concentrate on the observations about these interviewees.  
Very rarely will lower level leaders be named as champions by their superiors.  For lower 
level respondents in all of the cases, lower to middle level champions predominated.  
Case C showed high visibility of the high level champions at the lower levels because the 
initial implementation was so closely tied to the general manager of the plant who first 
motivated the entire plant and reversed a downward trend. 
 
The amount of lower level leadership visibly committed to the initiative was measured 
using the champion data collected from respondents.  The percentages of lower level and 
middle level champions named by lower level respondents, and the percentage of lower 
level respondents named by all respondents were calculated.  Since the level within the 
hierarchy was relative, the middle level champions named by lower level respondents 
may not have been extremely high within the organization.  Since the focus was on lower 
level leadership, the middle level champions were also included, but the score was 
weighted at 20% as compared with the 40% weighting for the other two measures.  The 
cases were ranked in each category and assigned a score based upon rank.  Rank 1 earned 
four points, rank 2, three points, rank 3, two points, and rank 4, one point.  The scores 
were summed to obtain a cumulative score as shown in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7: Leadership Scores 
 Named by Lower Level Respondents Named by All 
Respondents 
Case 
% of 
Champions in 
Lower 
Score 
40% 
wgt 
% of 
Champions 
in Middle 
Score 
20% 
wgt 
% of 
Champions 
in Lower 
Score 
40% 
wgt 
Cumu-
lative 
Score 
A1 20 1 60 3 14 2 1.8 
A2 25 3 67 4 14 2 2.8 
B 67 4 33 1 50 4 3.4 
C 21 2 36 2 22 3 2.4 
 
                                                 
22 Supra 7 
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It is also necessary to scale the degree of regression in each case.  The degree of 
regression was assessed as a combination of the amount of regression evident from 
observation and interviews, the severity of the consequences and whether actions were 
taken to reverse or prevent them, and the level of agreement among the interviewees as to 
whether any regression had occurred.  The cases were rated from very low to very high in 
these categories, a score was assigned to the rating, and the scores were summed, as 
shown in Table 7.8.  Information gathered in the case studies and highlighted in Table 7.4 
was used to determine these scores.  A very low amount or evidence of regression 
received the highest score.  In the consequences category, a firm attitude and effective 
actions taken to reverse or prevent regression received a higher score.  Disagreement 
amongst interviewees about whether there was regression or the extent of the regression 
indicated that the changes had not been fully embedded without some slippage and the 
case was scored lower than a case in which employees spoke consistently about how a 
new process was actually practiced.  Figure 7.3 depicts the plot relating the scores for 
lower level leadership and degree of regression.  The upper end of the scale for degree of 
regression is labeled low because lower regression is better and the most desirable 
conditions on both scales should intersect at the top right. 
 
Table 7.8:  Degree of Regression Scores 
Case Amount of 
Regression 
Score Consequences Score Agreement Score Cumulative 
Score 
A1 Medium 3 Medium 3 Low 2 8 
A2 Low 4 Medium 3 High 4 11 
B Very Low 5 High 4 High 4 13 
C Medium 3 Very High 5 Low 2 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3:  Lower Level Leadership vs. Degree of Regression 
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The data support the first part of hypothesis 1 and the commitment of lower level 
leadership is positively correlated with less regression in these cases because the trend 
moves toward the upper right.  The qualifying phrase, "even if measures were not taken 
to make the changes to the process irreversible", is not fully supported.  Cases A2 and B 
exhibited the least regression, but they also took the strongest actions against regression 
by not supporting or removing the old processes.  Loss of support for the old method or 
drastically changing the physical layout may be a better indicator than lower level 
leadership commitment for reducing regression. 
 
7.4.2 Training, Communication, and Documentation 
 
The other concepts that may be related to the diffusion of change initiatives are 
workforce training and communication and documentation practices.  Data were 
collected on formal training methods, the functional mix of project teams, time devoted 
to initiative implementation and maintenance, idea sources, avenues of communication, 
best practice documentation, and the adoption of the initiative throughout the wider 
organization.  Training, informational communication, and the documentation of savings 
and best practices are related.  The results of formal training sessions and kaizens are 
often documented and distributed in some way to interested parties.  The documentation 
itself can be used as a means of communicating highlights of the initiative.  All three 
categories together contribute to organizational learning.  They provide the subject 
matter, a supportive environment for learning, and the context in which it is used.  The 
evidence of this learning can be seen by how effectively these practices were adopted  
across the organization and how widespread the adoption was. 
 
Rogers also noted that personal contact was more important than mass communications 
for diffusion.  A larger number of trained employees who are well-versed in the 
advantages of the initiative are needed to promote it.  Their personal influence can also 
help to counteract selective exposure, perception, and retention, whereby people filter the 
mass produced information they receive and tend to only seek and retain that which 
already supports their own opinions.  An interaction effect can occur when there is a large 
enough number of adopters to network with others who may still be resistant.  This effect 
speeds adoption by individuals.  A learning organization, where more individuals can use 
the principles from training, can benefit from the interaction effect. 
 
The particular items or approaches used in training, documentation, and communication 
for each case study can be found in Tables 7.9 through 7.12.  The number of items listed 
under each category is not a determinant of how well each was achieved because it is 
dependent on who was interviewed and the methods they thought worthy of mention.  
Some training methods, such as information sheets, are also documentation and can be 
used for communication.  Other examples that fit into multiple categories are cascade 
training, websites, and articles.  The arrow indicates that training, documentation, and 
communication contribute to the adoption of the initiative. 
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Table 7.9:  Training, Communications, Documentation, and Adoption in Case A1 
Training LEAN Classes 
Kaizen Events 
Documentation Kaizen Reports 
Baldridge Criteria Award 
Communications Crew Meetings  
Mgmt Talks 
All-Hands Meetings 
Celebrations 
Company Publications 
Memos Across Shops and Shifts 
  
Adoption of 
Practices Across 
the Company 
High:  LEAN Projects in All Manufacturing Units, but not Many 
Process Units 
 
In case A1, the primary training means were formalized classes and kaizen events.  
Company A had a formal LEAN umbrella organization to coordinate and support 
training, facilitation, and implementation.  The manufacturing initiatives, in general, 
made large investments in training.  Face-to-face communications, especially crew 
meetings, were described as the primary means to share information with employees.  
LEAN practices were widely used throughout the company in its manufacturing units and 
to some extent within process organizations. 
 
The TIP sheets used in case A2 served as training devices, formal documentation of 
procedures, and as communication means.  The training was less formal than that done in 
manufacturing units and was sometimes geared specifically to the individuals who were 
to implement the new procedures.  The adoption was evaluated as medium to high 
because Phase II of the initiative was still undergoing implementation, although the 
min/max phase was almost universally adopted. 
 
Formal training was more intense at the beginning of the implementation in case B.  
Newer employees, hired since the implementation, were trained on the job.  The members 
of the crew took great initiative in documenting their practices and creating their own 
records.  The tours given to visitors have made the greatest impressions toward 
communicating the success of the initiative.  Although other aircraft program electrical 
cells have not adopted LEAN practices as completely as this cell, some ideas, such as 
pegboards and toolcarts, have been widely adopted by other organizations. 
 
In case C, the headquarters CI office provided formal training to CI leads.  The CI leads, 
in turn, facilitated kaizens and led the CI implementation and adoption with the help of 
the local CI umbrella organization.  Although the corporate-wide documentation database 
was described as not very user-friendly, the success metrics and cell standings were 
prominently displayed on standardized CI bulletin boards at each cell or department.  All 
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sub-organizations, including support and process cells used, practiced, and were 
evaluated on CI, displaying a highly widespread adoption of the initiative. 
 
Table 7.10:  Training, Communications, Documentation, and Adoption in Case A2 
Training TIP Sheets 
OJT 
One-on-One 
Cascade Training 
Mentoring, Coaching 
Spontaneous Training 
Documentation TIP Sheets 
Data Documentation 
Internal Website 
Official Notices 
Communications TIP Sheets 
All-Hands Meetings 
Meetings between Initiative Integration Off & Mgmt 
IIO at Staff Meetings 
Weekly Meetings with Operations 
Quality Councils 
Internet 
  
Adoption of 
Practices Across 
the Company 
Medium to High:  All Internal Customers Must Set Min/Max Levels 
 
 
 
Table 7.11:  Training, Communications, Documentation, and Adoption in Case B 
Training Classes for Initial Project Team 
OJT 
One-on-One 
Documentation Book for Electrical Dept. 
Crew Members' Notebooks 
Memorandum for Red Line Process 
Communications Article in Magazine and Company Website 
Tours of Cell 
Meetings with Upper Mgmt 
  
Adoption of 
Practices Across 
the Company 
Medium:  Held Up as Example, but Only Some Practices Widely 
Accepted 
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Table 7.12:  Training, Communications, Documentation, and Adoption in Case C 
Training Modules Training for CI Leads 
Kaizens 
Cross-Training on Equipment 
Documentation CI Award Levels 
Corporate-wide Savings Database 
CI Office Process Delay Database 
Change Form from Operators to ME's 
Communications CI Bulletin Boards 
Regular Meetings, Meetings with HQ 
CI Lead contact with CI Off and HQ 
Electronic Gauging 
Articles 
Hand-offs between Shifts 
  
Adoption of 
Practices Across 
the Company 
High:  All Cells Use CI, Including Support and Process Cells 
 
 
The cases were evaluated with regard to the training given to the workforce to prepare 
them for the initiative and to teach them to use the tools necessary for implementation.  
The factors considered were the percentage of the workforce trained and the 
completeness of the subject matter.  The cases were also evaluated on the formal 
documentation made available to the workforce that they could then use to share best 
practices and provide information on proven ideas and changes.  The scores are shown in 
Table 7.13.  Rank alone was insufficient for scoring, as some of the cases were very close 
in some aspects.  Grades of very low, low, medium, high, and very high were used. 
 
Table 7.13:  Training and Documentation Scores 
 Formal Training Availability of Documentation 
Case Rank Grade Score Rank Grade Score 
A1 1 High to 
Very High 
4.5 4 Medium 3 
A2 4 Low 2 2 Medium to 
High 
3.5 
B 3 Medium 3 1 High 4 
C 2 High 4 3 Medium to 
High 
3.5 
 
The diffusion of the initiative is also a function of the functional mix of the project teams, 
the various sources from which ideas were solicited, and the level of effort devoted to 
implementing and maintaining the initiative.  Table 7.14 provides a synopsis of  these 
areas for each case.  Training and broad solicitation of ideas are also linked by their affect 
 115 
on the preparedness of the workforce.  Better preparation may enable the buy-in required 
to engage the workforce in the initiative. 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 relate training and documentation practices to diffusion and 
integration of the initiative. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  Training a larger part of the workforce leads to the employees having a 
greater ability to integrate, diffuse, and initiate change. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  Having a formal best practices or lessons learned documentation available 
to all results in better diffusion and less regression. 
 
The degree of diffusion was determined using a cumulative score for four areas.  The 
cases were placed in rank order for the adoption of practices across the company, the 
functional mix of project teams, idea sources, and the time devoted to the initiative.  Rank 
1 earned four points, rank 2, three points, rank 3, two points, and rank 4, one point.  The 
adoption of practices across the company was weighted twice as much because it was a 
more direct observation of diffusion.  Diversity of idea sources can compensate for less 
diversity on project teams.  The project team mix for cases B and C were too close to 
differentiate by a separate ranking.  Table 7.15 contains the ranking for each area and the 
cumulative score. 
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Table 7.14:  Functional Mix of Project Teams, Idea Sources, and Level of Effort 
Case Functional Mix of 
Product Teams 
Idea Sources Time Devoted to 
Implementation 
Time Devoted to 
Change Initiative 
A1 • Crew 
Members 
• Manufacturing 
Management 
• Coalitions of 2 
to 3 leads 
• Management 
in Directorate 
• Product Line 
Managers 
• Supervisors 
• Lead 
Mechanics 
• Crew 
Members 
• Mission 
Statement:  
66% of FTE 
• 5 Full-time for 
4 months in 
one area 
• Mgmt:  25% to 
30% 
• Floor:  <10% 
A2 • Buyers 
Assigned to 
Shops 
• Subject Matter 
Experts 
• Initiative 
Integration 
Office 
Members 
• Users (Buyers) 
in Directorate 
• Suppliers 
• Manufacturing 
Shops 
• 9 People Full-
time from IIO 
for 1 ½ Years 
• IIO:  100% 
• Mgmt:  30% to 
50% 
• Employees 
Not On Project 
Teams:  Very 
Little 
B • Crew 
Members 
• Supervisor 
• Planning 
• Engineering 
• LEAN 
facilitators 
• Crew 
Members 
• Specialists and 
Planners 
Assigned to 
Cell 
• Engineering 
• LEAN Staff 
• 15 People on 
Team for One 
Year 
• 5 FTE's for 
One Year 
• 5 FTE's for 6 
Months 
• Mgmt:  25% to 
50% 
• Crew:  
Continuous 
Improvement 
Part of Job 
C • Crew 
Members 
• Key Operators 
• Designers 
• Manufacturing 
Engineers 
• CI Leads 
• Crew 
Members 
• CI Leads 
• Engineering 
• Approval by 
Mgmt or ME's 
• >20 CI leads 
Had 4 Weeks 
of Training 
• CI Office and 
Some Leads:  
100% 
• Eng. Tech:  
50% 
• Cell Ldr:  35% 
• Floor:  2% to 
5% 
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Table 7.15:  Diffusion Scores 
Case Adoption 
Across the 
Company 
Functional 
Mix 
Idea Sources Level of 
Effort 
Cumulative 
Score 
A1 2 1 2 4 14 
A2 3 3 1 3 12 
B 4 2 4 2 9 
C 1 2 3 1 17 
 
 
The amount and extent of formal training and the availability of best practices 
documentation were ranked in a similar fashion and graded very low, low, medium, high, 
or very high in order to compare these variables with the degree of diffusion.  
Communication means that fit the training or documentation categories were folded into 
those areas so they would not be overlooked.  The plots relating formal training to 
diffusion, availability of documentation to diffusion, and documentation to regression can 
be found in Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4:  Extent of Formal Training vs. Degree of Diffusion 
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Figure 7.5:  Availability of Best Practices Documentation vs. Degree of Diffusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6:  Availability of Best Practices Documentation vs. Degree of Regression 
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The second hypothesis seems to be supported by the trend of the four data points in 
Figure 7.4.  Case A2 was able to achieve a moderate amount of diffusion without formal 
training for a large part of the workforce.  Case B had intensive formal training for the 
initial team, but utilizes on-the-job training for incoming new hires.  They publicize their 
gains to the plant, but training a larger part of the company workforce is not under their 
purview.  Although the trend seems to go towards the upper right, the data points show a 
wider dispersion.  Cases A1 and C seem to exhibit some similarities not shared by the 
experiences of cases A2 and B.  Cases A1 and C invested a great deal in training, and the 
training and its planning and coordination were more formalized than in the other two 
cases.  Cases A2 and B used a just-in-time model for their training.  In case A2, an 
implementation team  developed the new procedures and then brought in the employees 
who would be using the specific procedures.  In case B, the implementation was a crash 
course in LEAN for everyone involved.   
 
Hypothesis 3 must be examined in two parts.  The first part relates the availability of 
formal best practices documentation to greater diffusion.  The trend of the four points 
appears to go toward the lower right in Figure 7.5.  This would indicate that the 
availability of formal best practice documentation does not necessarily correspond to 
greater diffusion of the initiative.  The availability of formal documentation does 
correspond to less regression because the trend in Figure 7.6 goes to the upper right, 
supporting the hypothesis. 
 
The steep trend in Figure 7.5 bears further examination because all of the cases had a 
medium to high degree of availability of documentation, but did not experience the same 
degree of diffusion.  The experiences in cases A1 and C seem to support the hypothesis, 
but those in cases A2 and B do not support it.  For instance, case B made formal 
documentation available for their entire workforce and some crew members create their 
own notebooks.  This information is not used throughout other electrical cells and is 
particular to their operation.  The differences between cases A1 and C, on the one hand, 
and A2 and B, on the other, may be explained by the more formal environment of the 
initiative in cases A1 and C.  They have company-wide umbrella organizations that can 
act as visible reminders, clearinghouses, and advertisers of the initiatives and the 
documentation associated with it.  The initiatives in cases A2 and B did not have high 
enough visibility and people may not have searched or have known to search for the 
documentation.   
 
7.5 Summary of Key Findings 
 
The information about lower level leadership, workforce training, and the availability of 
documentation related to improvement initiatives was collected and evaluated in the four 
case studies above.    The relationship between these factors and regression from the 
initial gains of the initiative and the extent of the diffusion of the initiative was 
considered.  The following relationships were  illustrated by the trend of the four data 
points in each comparison: 
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• Stronger and more committed leadership for the initiative at lower levels corresponds 
to lower amounts of regression, supporting H1. 
 
• The greater the percentage of the workforce that has received formal training, the 
greater the initiative was diffused throughout the organization, supporting H2. 
 
• The availability of formal best practice documentation or documentation about the 
successes experienced by the organizations using the initiative does not necessarily 
lead to better diffusion or adoption of the practices, counter to H3. 
 
• The availability of formal best practice documentation or documentation about the 
successes experienced by the organizations using the initiative does seem to 
correspond with less regression in the organizations that have implemented the 
initiative, supporting H3. 
 
The implications for the decisions that corporations must make regarding fostering and 
nurturing leadership, training the workforce, and providing resources for documentation 
will be examined in the next chapter.  All of these areas of emphasis require decisions by 
management that influence staffing and funding priorities.  Those who make the decision 
to embark on a large-scale project such as a major change initiative must take these 
factors into account when trying to obtain the best outcome from the initiative. 
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8.0 Recommendations for Corporate Policy 
 
During a time of intense global competition between fewer players, and the pressures that 
ensue from this struggle to maintain and increase market share, companies have chosen 
initiatives that are designed to increase their efficiency and productivity and place them 
in a more advantageous competitive position.  Finding strategies to diffuse these 
initiatives more rapidly will enable companies to reap the benefits of the initiatives 
sooner and for longer periods. 
 
At the beginning of this thesis, I posed four key research questions and corollary 
questions that pertain to the general question.  I will review these questions and attempt 
to answer them with the data collected and observations made during the four case 
studies.  These key research questions further prompted the hypotheses and I will review 
the findings and make recommendations for corporate policy that may contribute to the 
adoption and diffusion of change initiatives.  The study has many implications for how 
companies should promote leadership support for the innovations they chose to 
implement, how to train and communicate to the workforce, and ways to document and 
make information about best practices available.  The recommended approaches may 
result in better diffusion of the initiative throughout the organization and a lower 
likelihood of regression to former practices. 
 
8.1 Introduction and Implementation of Change Initiatives 
 
In the first question, I asked how change initiatives are introduced and implemented.  I 
also asked about the mechanisms by which organizations decide change is necessary and 
choose a philosophy to follow or emulate.  I wanted to determine what functional part of 
the organization acts as a promoter and how the organization as a whole is structured 
with regard to its eventual achievement of its stated goals. 
 
In all of these case studies, the change initiative was implemented to counter a crisis 
situation.  In cases B and C, it would have meant the loss of the business and the jobs 
involved.  In cases A1 and A2, the high costs resulting from the baseline processes would 
have made the division less competitive.  The organization in case A1 was an internal 
supplier and its problems affected all of the programs to which the division contributed.  
Case A2 dealt with the entire division's inventory, and so also affected every program.  
From this small sample, it seems that companies tend to feel the need to quickly adopt a 
change initiative in a specific situation when the survival of the organization is at stake, 
or when costs balloon so high that the competitive outlook appears bleak. 
 
This would indicate that it might prove difficult to initiate a change program in the 
absence of a crisis.  If a situation short of a crisis also warrants changes because the costs 
of doing nothing may be only moderately high, the crisis condition in which employees 
and management may be more likely to accept the possibility of change might not be 
present.  In the absence of a crisis, it may even be more difficult for management to 
recognize that early changes might be necessary in order to prevent more serious 
problems later.  Management at all levels should actually seek opportunities for change in 
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less troubled business units and upper management should support reasonable change 
efforts after weighing the priorities of these suggestions. 
 
In all of the cases, the companies either had an improvement program in place or adopted 
a company-wide program that an outside supplier or consultant had found successful.  
The particular initiative that the company would follow was chosen at the very top levels.  
The companies found adequate information for existing programs and chose from among 
them based on the positive experiences of their contacts.  They did not feel the need to 
invent entirely new programs.  If there are individuals or groups who would like to 
introduce an extremely innovative or unfamiliar initiative, they would need influence 
with those at very high levels in order to have their program enacted. 
 
The organizations under study adapted the vocabulary and toolsets of these already 
established programs to their own particular challenges.  They were not the organizations 
that originally chose a method for the entire company to follow or that introduced a 
completely new method, but used the improvement mechanisms already recognized by 
the company executives.  In case A1, a major external supplier's positive experience with 
LEAN catalyzed the organization's choice of LEAN and the company was able to use 
established instructional materials and adapt them for their use.  Company C used 
Japanese consultants to establish a corporate-wide improvement program.  Case study B 
also utilized LEAN principles and improvement tools that had been widely recognized 
throughout the company and had been incorporated into training programs.  The 
directorate in case A2 also started with widely understood industry practices, such as 
min/max, and then improved upon the corporate standard and created their own initiative, 
Material Flow Optimization, that encapsulated all of the smaller initiatives into one 
program. 
 
All of the companies in these case studies had umbrella organizations in place to provide 
facilitators, initial training, coordination, and expertise on improvement programs.  These 
umbrella organizations acted as clearinghouses for ideas and reporting and advertising 
successes.  Company A has the Company A Production System Promotion Office.  Case 
A2 used its own Initiative Integration Office, but MFO was still an enabler for LEAN in 
other departments.  The electrical cell in case study B also called upon the LEAN 
department for help with its implementation.  Company C has a CI Office that supports 
CI and the CI leads plant-wide, as well as a counterpart CI office at the headquarters 
level. 
 
These organizations used existing improvement programs already in existence in their 
companies.  Those at the executive levels had already chosen the guiding principles that 
the company would follow.  The organizations that implemented these initiatives were 
able to be creative within their own organizations during and after the implementation, 
even if they were not designing their own unique initiatives.  The one exception in this 
study that did create its own initiative was case A2, in which many smaller improvement 
projects were rolled into their MFO initiative.  This initiative was not fully deployed at 
the time that the case study was conducted and, although their min/max initiative showed 
success, I cannot conclude how well MFO as a whole would have performed. 
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This case study was also a business process improvement in supplier management.  Since 
most other mature improvement initiatives have been in manufacturing, those planning 
the MFO initiative had less historical precedents from which to borrow.  This indicates 
that organizations that are not using the centralized change initiative defined by the 
company can still create their own organic initiative.  They can form their own internal 
change organization and capitalize on the change environment that already exists in the 
company due to the more mature manufacturing change initiatives.  These smaller change 
organizations can be effective because they are closer to the people and tasks involved in 
the implementation of the initiative. 
 
The umbrella organizations in the companies were also key contributors to the initiatives.  
The respect and authority they command within the company may determine how much 
direct involvement personnel from these organizations have in the implementations or 
how much guidance is sought by the implementing organizations.  The umbrella 
organizations were not the focus of this study, but could constitute an interesting follow 
up for future study.  There has been a proliferation of these improvement organizations in 
many companies and their contributions to the success of change initiative 
implementations may be important.  Some companies have a more monolithic and 
centralized approach, while others disperse the responsibility for directing and 
coordinating change activities, even when they have a central office available for 
guidance. 
 
Central organizations were effective in the mature change settings in manufacturing.  
They provide clarity of purpose and a standard set of principles and tools from which to 
start.  In business process changes, the absence of a company-wide organization for 
change was not a hindrance because small organic organizations specific to the business 
unit can begin to create new initiatives on their own even if they have not seen as many 
successful precedents.  Smaller, decentralized change organizations that act outside or 
beyond the purview of the central organization can also be helpful for creating programs 
that meet the specific needs of their organization, rather than trying to artificially apply a 
standard to their problems just because it is a standard.  The value of central organization 
that provides a change clearinghouse remains, but does not limit the actions of the 
smaller organizations.  In case B, in which the request to enact change was a grass roots 
effort, a stronger central organization might have been helpful if it had identified this 
opportunity for upper management in the first place. 
 
8.2 Attaining Senior Management Endorsement and Employee Cooperation 
 
The second set of research questions asks how organizations actually attain senior 
management endorsement as well as employee cooperation and empowerment.  Are the 
particular people entrusted to implement or promote change placed in influential 
positions?  To what extent are the job security concerns of employees allayed?  Does 
management recognize differences in performance when change initiatives are attempted 
but not fully incorporated into the organization’s culture and when they are truly 
successful? 
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This set of questions touches upon a variety of topics that were explored by this study, 
namely leadership issues, resistance to change among the workforce, and linking success 
measures to the adoption of the change initiative.  The main question deals with the fact 
that senior management and the rest of the workforce may have different priorities when 
deciding if a change initiative is in their interests.  These interests may never be perfectly 
compatible.  Senior management is responsible for increasing profits and keeping the 
company on a competitive footing and the productivity improvements introduced by a 
change initiative can cut costs dramatically and allow savings that can be used to grow 
the business.  Some of the resistance from the workforce may be due to the recognition 
that much of these cost savings will be due to labor reductions which may affect them 
directly.  The health of the company in general and its ability to provide any jobs at all 
may depend on cutting costs, including jobs, to keep up with competitors.  One 
interviewee at Company C thought that people should be better educated about world 
political and economic issues so that they would understand the factors that company 
management must consider. 
 
One reason for this lack of trust among the workforce may be the nature of LEAN-type 
initiatives in the first place.  In these initiatives there is a great deal of emphasis placed on 
eliminating waste.  Operators may feel threatened because it is usually tasks that they 
perform that might be labeled as waste in order to improve productivity.  If they are the 
employees that actually produce the product, they may find these efforts disingenuous if 
similar examinations are not made of the work done by managers.  Confounding this 
issue is that many operational employees may not know or understand what managers do 
and that as managers move farther up the hierarchy, they may not understand what 
operators do. 
 
Anxiety about job security may help explain why many resistors tended to be senior 
employees, although, it should be noted, not all senior employees were resistors.  Newer 
employees were raised, educated, and trained in an environment of constant change and 
come to their jobs expecting to have to participate in change initiatives that allow the 
company to adapt to a changing competitive environment.  In all of the case studies, 
management engaged the senior and experienced workers.  In case A1, the director 
communicated with the union early in the implementation about job descriptions and 
praised and valued work experience during LEAN classes and kaizens.  In case C, 
experienced employees were chosen as CI leads, metric champions, or key operators who 
validated new procedures.  The cell in case B used its experienced and knowledgeable 
workforce to its advantage because these workers knew how to build the product and, 
once they could overcome their initial hesitancy, they produced an explosion of new 
ideas.  The directorate in case A2 used subject matter experts to formulate the new 
procedures. 
 
It is evident from these case studies, that senior, experienced employees are key to the 
acceptance and implementation of the initiative.  I recommend that management 
proactively seek these experienced employees and utilize them on planning teams and 
pilot teams that are testing and implementing the initiative.  Ideally, there should be a mix 
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of employees, but an assumption about perceived resistance due to initial hesitancy 
should not automatically preclude the inclusion of an individual.  Those who were non-
believers initially may prove to be excellent examples and will help to convince their 
coworkers by providing more legitimacy. 
 
The strides made in these organizations were significant when measured by cost savings.  
In some situations where slower production schedules allowed some regression to older, 
less efficient practices, the interviewees tended to claim that these regressions did not 
jeopardize the initiative, nor did they significantly reduce the savings that were realized.  
I did not observe any mechanisms through which higher management could distinguish 
between lapses in the initiative implementation that might reduce savings or other factors.  
Management was satisfied if the organization attained or exceeded its performance 
objectives, regardless of whether the changes were fully enforced.  It was certainly 
recognized that these savings might not have been possible without the change initiative, 
but the initiative was only a means and its full adoption and institutionalization was not 
an end in itself. 
 
Those entrusted with implementing the initiatives were sometimes chosen because they 
were well respected for their competence by both higher authorities and the employees 
below them.  These were not authoritarian figures, but people who were both technically 
proficient and firm in their beliefs about the improvement capabilities of their 
organizations and who could create an inclusive and trusting environment in which 
subordinates could feel comfortable contributing ideas.  When upper management 
chooses leaders to implement critical improvement programs, they not only look for 
those with proven technical competency, but those who engender trust by consistently 
applying standards and acting in support of the program so that the beliefs they profess 
match their actions.  The director in case A1 was specifically assigned to this directorate 
because people at the executive level had confidence in him and thought he had the 
appropriate combination of skills and manner to tackle the problems in Skin Fabrication.  
The general manager at Company C could have taken retirement, but he cared about what 
happened at the plant and stayed and contributed personally to the efforts that reversed 
the situation, rather than leave the problem for others. 
 
The success of the initiative does not only depend upon the vision and objectives of the 
highest levels within the hierarchy.  The executives must be able to harness the energy 
and creativity of the managers and supervisors who have more direct influence on the 
employees who must adopt the change initiative in the manufacturing or business process 
units.  Some of the focus of the preceding case studies was on the perceived champions 
for the initiatives who provided resources and encouragement to the employees 
implementing the initiative.  In particular, the connection between leadership 
commitment at the lower levels and less regression was the subject of the first hypothesis 
I proposed.  The trend of the data supported the hypothesis that stated, in part, that if 
lower level leadership is more committed to the initiative, there will be less regression.  
The data, plotted in Figure 7.3, compares scores for degree of regression and the 
concentration of lower level leadership named as champions in the four cases.  A high 
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level champion cannot be effective at implementing an initiative in the absence of 
supporters among junior management. 
 
8.3 Incentives to Promote Leadership throughout the Organization 
 
When a company chooses to introduce and implement a major change initiative, the 
initiative usually has the enthusiastic support of at least the head of the company and 
perhaps a few of the president's, CEO's, or general manager's inner circle of management.  
In order to implement this initiative down to the operational levels and fully incorporate 
the principles of the initiative within the processes used by the company, senior 
management must attain the active support of all levels of management and a large 
portion of the workforce.  Attempts can certainly be made to force the initiative by 
dictate, but this would only result in a shallow acceptance of the initiative and the 
appearance on the surface that changes have been implemented.  The general workforce, 
their immediate supervisors, and middle management also must feel that they contribute 
and that by accepting the initiative they are improving matters for the company and their 
positions in it. 
 
The case studies indicated that better commitment by lower level leadership was 
positively correlated with fewer and less severe instances of regression.  Enacting 
measures to create a more irreversible change may be an even stronger defense against 
regression, but the importance of leadership support should not be underestimated.  It 
would be shortsighted to only take these irreversibility measures because, although it will 
prevent the regression in a specific situation, it will do nothing to cultivate the leaders 
who may continue to seek improvements or later diffuse these ideas as they move to 
different positions.   
 
Many times, talented individuals tend to be promoted and moved throughout the 
organization, which tends to have a detrimental impact on management continuity.  Thus, 
having depth of leadership where support comes from many directions can help ensure 
that the initiative survives management turnover and the vagaries of individual 
personalities.  This leadership may be displayed by those in positions such as middle 
management and supervisors, but also by lead mechanics or other individuals with 
influence among their co-workers.  One recommendation is to determine minimum time-
in-grade provisions for positions of lower and middle management to enable these leaders 
to have real impact before they are moved and the focus is lost.  These provisions must be 
required across the board so that there are no differences in advancement that could 
hinder careers or make certain positions less desirable. 
 
Rogers23 makes two points that are particularly relevant to this discussion.  One is that 
non-material ideas are more difficult to diffuse than changes that produce material gains.  
The other is that, since innovators tend to be viewed as deviants by others in their social 
system, it is better to seek the acceptance of opinion leaders to assist in the diffusion of an 
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idea.  Innovators may not be the best change agents, but opinion leaders are found in 
every adopter category. 
 
The connection of these ideas to this study is that many of these change initiatives are 
trying to diffuse principles and ideas to apply to processes, rather than the adoption of a 
particular finite system or tangible item.  In this way, the change initiatives resemble non-
material ideas, even if their implementation is intended to produce material gains for the 
company through greater productivity and increased profits.  The challenge is promoting 
a change in methods and outlook that translate into material gains.  Employees must be 
given information so that they can recognize how the gains are connected to the initiative.  
Another recommendation is that in those companies with year-end gain sharing, clear 
reports accompany the pay showing the percentage that each improvement program has 
made to this very real benefit. 
 
The analysis in the preceding chapter showed that lower level leadership commitment 
was positively correlated with less regression to former practices.  One part of fighting 
regression would be to provide consistent leadership at the lower levels.  The choice and 
retention of effective leaders should be a point of management emphasis.  In the case 
studies, a common strategy to reconcile resistors that fell under the area of management 
emphasis was to tie monetary incentives to the performance objectives.  Meeting the 
performance objectives, in turn, relied on the proper use of the initiative.  In situations 
when monetary incentives were not clearly connected to the accomplishment of the 
objectives employees may not have understood that the company's and their personal 
financial gain may have been due in large part to the adoption of the initiative.  Upper 
management needs pay mechanisms to motivate the lower level leadership to fully adopt 
the initiative and lower level managers need these mechanisms to motivate their 
subordinates to deploy and maintain changes. 
 
This recommendation involves the common theme sounded about monetary incentives as 
instrumental in advancing practices the company wishes to be adopted.  Companies 
already have a performance appraisal system for individual performance, compensation 
and bonus plans, and many ways to measure the financial results of the initiatives.  The 
gains made by organizational units and individual employees who utilize the principles 
and methods of the initiative should be tied to their performance objectives for all levels 
of employees.  Higher scores on appraisals should in turn result in monetary 
compensation as merit increases or bonuses, if management is serious about promoting 
the initiative and ensuring its acceptance and proper use.  Employees must see a tangible 
connection between the implementation of the initiative, the financial health of the 
company and their job security and material gains.  Showing the benefits of the initiative 
in the concrete manner of pay and awards will deflect the cynicism created by the 
perception that those in upper management are the main beneficiaries of the 
improvements and cost reductions and that they are not subject to the negative 
consequences in the way that general employees may be. 
 
A second recommendation addresses the choice of individuals as champions for the 
initiative at different levels of leadership.  Opinion leaders at many levels should be 
 128 
nurtured and subject to the performance incentives used to promote the initiative.  
Support for these leaders would take the form of placing them in influential positions and 
publicizing the active support they receive from upper management.  There must be depth 
of leadership to counter high management turnover.  If the initiative depends upon the 
personalities and influence of only a few individuals, it will not survive their departure, 
even if they leave due to promotions resulting from their superior implementation of the 
initiative.  Although generous monetary incentives may make it more attractive for 
organizational leaders to stay in their positions longer, leaders below the organization's 
direct managers should also be nurtured.  The time-in-grade provisions discussed above 
would act to slow management turnover. 
 
Employees at the operational level are more likely to respond to leaders closer in the 
hierarchy to their own positions.  Since their acceptance is crucial to the 
institutionalization of the initiative, the lower level leaders with whom they make the 
most contact must not be ignored.  Although innovative people are required to generate 
ideas and cultivate unconventional methods, the initiative cannot diffuse without the help 
of opinion leaders who have the respect and trust of their fellow workers. 
 
It is sometimes difficult to reduce the savings realized from these initiatives by using 
some savings to provide financial incentives, but it may be in the long-term interest of 
retaining the institutional learning and momentum.  In case B, for instance, many of the 
initial implementers left for a different department because the other jobs were rated at a 
higher labor grade.  Perhaps more would have stayed if their jobs in the current electrical 
cell had been upgraded.  It is difficult to decide to deploy savings towards human 
resource development rather than adding these savings in their entirety to the bottom line.  
Another recommendation is for management to predetermine a percentage of the actual 
savings that they will agree to invest in human resources in the organization. 
 
8.4 Training the Workforce to Enable Diffusion 
 
This study also enabled the comparison of different approaches to training the workforce 
about the initiative.  The spectrum ran from trying to include almost every employee in 
formal training to using a small core to define the new processes and providing specific 
training to the rest of the workforce only when they would need to start using the new 
procedures.  The issue of training and deploying the new practices is also important 
because the training usually requires large investments of time and resources and 
removing people from production for a period of time. 
 
Although the trend of the case studies showed a positive correlation between the extent of 
formal training in the initiative and a higher degree of diffusion, the individual cases 
showed mixed results.  The two cases that invested a great deal in training a large part of 
the workforce about general principles and specific applications of the initiatives, cases 
A1 and C, also showed the greatest degree of diffusion.  Cases A2 and B used a just-in-
time model for their training.  In case A2, an implementation team developed the new 
procedures and then brought in the employees who would be using the specific 
procedures.  In case B, the implementation was a crash course in LEAN for everyone 
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involved.  The emphasis was to extinguish the local fire first and to worry about diffusion 
throughout the company later.  In case A2, they were implementing a brand new initiative 
without the example of previous experiences in that business practice as models.  The 
desired diffusion would be in the gains realized from new practices, not a diffusion of the 
changed procedures themselves. 
 
When companies attempt to train the vast majority of the workforce, the curricula tend to 
be more formalized in order for most workers to gain both general information necessary 
to understand the initiative and knowledge about the specific tools needed to practice the 
initiative.  In some cases, where the deployment is more centralized, it is not necessary 
for every employee to receive classes in every tool if they have no foreseeable application 
for this tool.  If employees receive training related to initiatives in measured doses, they 
will exhibit less weariness and cynicism created by the perception that they must learn 
about a program that may appear very similar to previous initiatives. 
 
The recommendation for training combines the best features of the approaches used in 
the case studies.  All employees should be trained in the fundamental principles and 
methods of the initiative, but training in specific tools and procedures should be reserved 
until needed by the individuals who are to be taught.  A well-trained workforce is 
necessary for employees to become rational decision-makers by understanding the basic 
tenets of the initiative.  Unnecessary instruction in the minutiae of the initiative may bore 
those who may never use the tools and may contribute to the sense of weariness that can 
be caused by introducing initiatives in various guises that appear to be the same thing 
under different names.  It may only be perceived as more bureaucracy and less as a 
helpful instrument for improvement. 
 
The employees should also be provided with some overview of how this initiative fits 
into the evolution of improvement programs they have already experienced at the 
company and why this one might be different or better suited to achieve company goals.  
Employees who are grounded in the basics of the initiative's principles can participate in 
kaizens and similar activities and use their skills, experience, and common sense to 
improve the processes they know well.  This is also supported by Rogers24 in his 
recommendation that change agents concentrate their efforts on promoting the 
competence of those in the social system, rather than promoting a specific or tangible 
innovation.  This will enable potential adopters to better evaluate any innovation they 
encounter and eventually change the norms of the social system.  It will go beyond the 
short-term victory of gaining acceptance for a particular innovation and create the general 
conditions needed for acceptance of good new ideas. 
 
8.5 Barriers to Complete and Lasting Change in Large, Complex Organizations 
 
This set of research questions asks about the nature of misunderstandings between the 
professed long-term goals of upper management and the perception by operational 
members of the organization.  Is communication enough to seal the breach?  How do 
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organizations deploy resource savings from change efforts?  If change is considered 
beneficial in the current environment, why is it sometimes so difficult for large 
organizations, which have been successful at their endeavors in the past, to change even 
in their best interests?   
 
The stated goals of upper management when they decide to adopt a change initiative is 
usually to cut costs and increase profits, make the company more competitive, and 
develop capabilities that allow the company to be more nimble in a changing market 
environment.  Employees may understand the business imperatives of the change, but 
what they may experience personally are job cuts, merging more tasks into one job 
description, or lowering the skills required to do particular jobs through automation or 
repetition.  It is no wonder that it is difficult to engender the trust needed to align these 
interests.  Most interviewees in the case studies had little insight into where savings are 
redeployed other than thinking that they were added back into the bottom line of the 
programs.  If some is reinvested back into enlarging the capabilities of organizations, it is 
not widely known.  Furthermore, the reinvestments referred to in the interviews tended to 
be capital investments, not in human resources.  In case study B, the cell was able to add 
two lines to their original four, and there were numerous examples of equipment 
purchases in cases A1 and C.  In case C, the gain-sharing program that provided year-end 
bonuses due to savings was directly due to improvements made using the change 
initiative, but employees were not always consciously aware of the connection. 
 
The perceptions about the effectiveness of communications are also widely different.  In 
some cases, those in management or in lead implementation positions thought that the 
initiative was well communicated and understood.  This perception was not always 
shared by those at the operational level.  This may be due to the greater and deeper 
understanding that people have for programs in which they are heavily involved on a 
daily basis.  They may forget that these issues are not high on the agenda of others.  In 
case A2, although MFO had not been fully deployed, some interviewees were confused 
about what sub-initiatives were considered part of the overall initiative.  In case C, for 
instance, operators did not always receive feedback from engineering about the status of 
their ideas.  The most common explanation given for this disconnect between the amount 
of feedback provided and what employees thought was necessary was lack of time. 
 
There are many diverse interests to satisfy in large, complex companies.  These interests 
are not only different but have varying amounts of influence on the course of events.  
One way to view the overall direction of the company with regard to its complete 
adoption of the initiative is for executives to ask whether the reward system, 
compensation practices, and communications means are aligned with the stated 
objectives for performance improvements.  The view of the entire company was beyond 
the scope of this study.  Most organizations have shining examples of their successes 
with change initiatives, but may still struggle to adopt these practices uniformly across 
the entire enterprise.  Perhaps if these victories occurred in parallel, the successes of the 
higher achieving sub-organizations can be diffused simultaneously and reinforce each 
other.  This requires not only simultaneous initiative implementations, but also equivalent 
and consistent emphasis placed on all of these implementations.  Juggling numerous 
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initiatives may be a challenge, but employees should be informed from the start that not 
all improvements can be exceptional.  They may be more accepting because the 
expectations will be high, but not unreasonable and they are less apt to suffer 
disappointment and become demoralized. 
 
8.6 Communicating and Documenting Best Practices and Successes 
 
The workforce can also be engaged through the formal documentation and intelligent 
communication of the successes of the initiative and proven methods to achieve them.  
The interviewees involved in this study were proud of the many accomplishments they 
achieved, even when they were not publicized.  Occasionally, the importance of 
documentation was overlooked or the documentation that existed was underutilized.  In 
some situations, employees did not receive feedback when their ideas were not 
implemented.  A lack of time was the usual reason for these oversights.  Of the many 
duties that are required of those in leadership, feedback and documentation may have 
been given less emphasis.  The justifications for not using an idea may have been very 
reasonable, but uninformed employees may have thought that their contributions did not 
warrant recognition. 
 
The data in the preceding chapter showed that better availability of best practices 
documentation was positively correlated with less regression.  The availability of 
documentation did not seem to increase diffusion of the initiative in the organizations 
studied.  Taking measures to prevent regression in the first place will allow managers to 
concentrate on diffusion issues without having to do constant battle with regressive 
tendencies. 
 
I would also suggest that training, communications, and documentation are intersecting 
mechanisms for diffusion.  Many companies make large investments in training, but 
perhaps these areas should be better balanced.  If an uneven share of resources was spent 
on communications at the expense of training and documentation, there would be less 
content to communicate.  Similarly, if training was not documented and the results were 
not communicated, the benefits of the training might end as soon as the class was 
completed. 
 
The last recommendation would be to provide incentives or imperatives within job 
descriptions for more successes to be documented and broadcast.  Companies have had 
some success with small awards programs that enable employees to share the gains from 
their ideas.  Supervisors and managers should be encouraged by the incentives linked to 
their own appraisals to highlight the contributions of others in this way so that the norm 
would be idea creation, not jealousy of a rare individual who was compensated.  This will 
go a long way toward repairing goodwill and gaining the trust of participants.  
Management should recognize the need for the time to document and promote the 
achievements that have been made.  This recognition should be made tangible by 
supporting the documentation efforts in performance objectives and the incentives tied to 
the performance.  Other sub-organizations can benefit from these lessons and, through 
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their participation, the originating organization may eventually benefit themselves from 
the experiences of others. 
 
8.7 In Organizations with a History of Change Initiatives, What Mechanisms to 
Maintain Momentum are Evident? 
 
Are the change initiatives self-reinforcing?  Are limiting factors that counteract initial 
advances recognized?  Are fundamental or only symptomatic causes in the system 
identified and addressed?  How is the evolution through multiple change initiatives or 
programs characterized? 
 
All of the interviewees were asked how the initiative stood at the current time and if they 
saw it evolving.  Some with a higher-level understanding of the strategy could answer 
this question more specifically.  One way to learn whether these initiatives have become 
self-reinforcing would be a future study of multiple years of objectives and how they 
have changed over time during the life of the change initiative. 
 
Through experience with these change initiatives, these companies have learned to 
identify both the fundamental and symptomatic causes for resistance to diffusion.  
Removing these barriers, however, has been better accomplished in smaller sub-
organizations.  The most recalcitrant resistors are generally removed or silenced.  Waste 
in individual processes is identified and improvement actions are taken.  Employees are 
generally free to ask the question, "Is this the smart way of doing this?" or "How can we 
improve this method?"  Most of the problems described as low-hanging fruit have been 
examined and resolved.  Since the lifetime of these initiatives is years, management has 
an opportunity to capitalize on these successes and create the environment in which it 
will be completely engrained before moving to a succeeding stage when new initiatives 
may be introduced.  If the initiative has proven successful in one part of a company the 
seeds should be planted early for it to generate improvements throughout.  Introducing 
new initiatives before the current one has taken root risks alienating the workforce as they 
are forced to shift gears and start supporting what they may view as a new flavor-of-the 
month.  One idea for further study would address the last question about the extent to 
which the evolution through multiple change initiatives or programs may be influenced 
more by the experiences and agendas of those in management or by particularities in the 
company history. 
 
8.8 Summary of Recommendations and Ideas for Further Research 
 
The recommendations for corporate policy makers were based upon the data gathered in 
four case studies.  The major areas of interest were leadership, training, and 
communications and their connection to less regression and greater diffusion.  The 
recommendations are as follows: 
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Leadership and Incentives 
These recommendations address the retention and positioning of leaders throughout the 
organization and the incentives necessary for stimulating the adoption of the initiative. 
 
• Use minimum time-in-grade provisions for positions of lower and middle 
management to enable these leaders to have real impact before they are moved and 
the focus is lost.  Apply the provisions across the board so that there are no 
differences in advancement that could hinder careers or make certain positions less 
desirable. 
 
• The gains made by organizational units and individual employees who utilize the 
principles and methods of the initiative should be tied to their performance objectives.  
Higher scores on appraisals should in turn result in monetary compensation as merit 
increases and bonuses.  Employees must see a tangible connection between the 
implementation of the initiative, the financial health of the company and their job 
security and material gains. 
 
• Opinion leaders at many levels should be nurtured and subject to the performance 
incentives used to promote the initiative.  Support for these leaders would take the 
form of placing them in influential positions and publicizing the active support they 
receive from upper management.  There must be depth of leadership to counter high 
management turnover.  Employees at the operational level are more likely to respond 
to leaders closer in the hierarchy to their own positions. 
 
Training the Workforce 
The data supported hypothesis 2 which maintained that training a larger part of the 
workforce led to employees having a greater ability to integrate, diffuse, and initiate 
change.  The following recommendation balances the need for training and the costs 
involved in achieving it. 
 
• All employees should be trained in the fundamental principles and methods of the 
initiative, but training in specific tools and procedures should be reserved until 
needed by the individuals who are to be taught.  Unnecessary instruction in the 
minutiae of the initiative may bore those who may never use the tools and may 
contribute to the sense of weariness that can be caused by introducing initiatives in 
various guises that appear to be the same thing under different names. 
 
Communications and Documentation 
Wide availability of documentation about the initiative and its practices helped to prevent 
regression.  In addition, effective communications played an important role in enabling 
employees to see the correlation between initiative successes and personal and 
professional benefits.  
 
• In those companies with year-end gain sharing, accompany the pay with clear reports 
showing the percentage that each improvement program has made to the benefit. 
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• Provide incentives or imperatives within job descriptions for more successes to be 
documented and broadcast.  Supervisors and managers should be encouraged by the 
incentives linked to their own appraisals to highlight the contributions of others in 
this way so that the norm would be idea creation, not jealousy of a rare individual 
who was compensated. 
 
Management Policies and Organizational Structure 
These recommendations deal with choices of management emphasis and organizational 
models that could help foster trust and assist in smoother implementations. 
 
• Management at all levels should proactively seek opportunities for change even in 
less troubled business units, and upper management should support reasonable 
change efforts after weighing the priorities of these suggestions. 
 
• Smaller, organic change offices in sub-organizations can be used where there are less 
mature change histories from which to build models.  These organizations are 
effective because they are closer to the people and tasks involved in the 
implementation of the initiative.  They can complement the central change 
organization and can capitalize on the change environment that already exists in the 
company due to the more mature manufacturing change initiatives. 
 
• Management should proactively seek experienced employees to assign to planning 
teams and pilot teams that are testing and implementing the initiative.  An assumption 
about perceived resistance due to initial hesitancy should not automatically preclude 
the inclusion of an individual because non-believers can help to convince their 
coworkers and provide legitimacy. 
 
• Management should predetermine a percentage of the actual savings and apply it to 
investments in human resources in the organization. 
 
This study also highlighted many ideas for further study that were outside the scope of 
this research. 
 
• Examine how companies capitalize on localized successes to deploy the initiatives 
across the entire organization.  Are the reward and compensation systems and the 
communications means really aligned with the stated objectives for performance 
improvements? 
 
• How is the evolution through multiple change initiatives or programs characterized in 
companies with long histories of change initiatives?  How does prior experience with 
initiatives affect the choice of new initiatives?  To what extent is the evolution 
through multiple change initiatives or programs influenced by the experiences and 
agendas of those in management or by particularities in the company history. 
 
These recommendations are based on data showing the interaction between performance 
incentives and lessening resistance and the roles played by leadership, training, 
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documentation, and communications in diffusing the adoption of change initiatives and 
their associated ideas.  In addition to the challenges of producing highly technical and 
complex products in a competitive global marketplace, aerospace companies must also 
contend with the same cultural and social barriers encountered by any large organization.  
More complete and simultaneous deployment of the compounded learning that 
organizations have already experienced would allow companies to make better use of the 
lifespan of a change initiative and the enthusiasm displayed towards the initiative. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Change Management Questionnaire 
(for research use during interviews) 
 
1. In what part of the organization do you work? 
 
2.  What is your supervisory level?  To whom do you report?  Who reports to you? 
 
3.  In what change initiatives have you been involved directly within the last five years? 
 
4.  What functional group within the company was the umbrella organization for the 
above change initiative(s)? 
 
5.  Who was the high-level champion for the change initiative who might have provided 
funding or other support for the initiative? 
 
6.  Where did the specific idea(s) for the change originate? (Which person, functional 
area, and/or department?) 
 
7.  Were the persons who originated the idea(s) sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
process they were attempting to change? 
 
8.  Did you experience any direct affects to your job from these change initiatives?  Did 
this include new training, a new job description, or process or procedure changes? 
 
9.  Was the process change your primary function during that time period?  What 
percentage of your time was devoted to the change initiative? 
 
10.  How many man-hours or different functions were involved in the change process? 
 
11.  Over how long a period of time did the change process occur? 
 
12.  How were major change initiatives communicated to employees? (frequency, scope) 
 
13.  Were there any cost savings attributed to the changes?  How were they documented? 
 
14.  What level of the corporation determined where cost savings would be redirected? 
 
15.  How were those cost savings used?  (lay-offs, outsourcing, reinvestment in new 
capital equipment or training) 
 
16.  Was there any resistance to the change initiative or process change?  By whom?  
How severe? 
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17.  Did this resistance jeopardize the whole initiative?  If the initiative went through, 
what steps were taken to reconcile or convince the resistors? 
 
18.  Is the changed process still in place?  Has it continued to change in any way?  Please 
describe. 
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